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ABSTRACT 
CONTAINING TITO: 
U.S. AND SOVIET POLICIES 
TOWARDS 
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BALKANS, 1945-1955 
 
 
İşyar, Levent  
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Edward P. Kohn 
September 2005 
 This thesis examines the early Cold War in the Balkans by bringing historical 
and regional factors into play. In particular, it focuses on the plans for a Balkan 
federation and the Balkan Pact.  
 The major actor in these cooperation attempts was Yugoslavia, and it was a 
privileged state in its relations with the superpowers. By putting Yugoslavia into the 
centre of analysis, this thesis reconsiders this period and the influence of these two 
regional alliances upon the regional and Cold War relations. 
 Balkan federation plans were the extension of historical tendencies of the 
contributing parties. Balkan Pact was completely a Cold War tool but its demise was 
triggered by non-Cold War reasons rooted in the regional relations. Early Cold War 
in the Balkans should be studied by treating the role of historical and regional factors 
as equal with the superpower policies. 
Key Words: Tito, Yugoslavia, Balkan Federation, Balkan Pact, Turkey, Greece, 
Bulgaria, Soviet Union, U.S.A., Cold War. 
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ÖZET 
TİTO’YU ÇEVRELEMEK: 
AMERİKA VE SOVYETLERİN  
YUGOSLAVYA VE BALKAN POLİTİKALARI, 1945-1955 
 
 
İşyar, Levent  
 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Edward P. Kohn 
Eylül 2005 
 Bu tez Balkanlarda Soğuk Savaş’ın erken dönemlerini tarihsel ve bölgesel 
etkenleri de hesaba katarak incelemektedir. Özellikle, Balkan federasyonu planları ve 
Balkan Paktı’na odaklanmaktadır. 
 Yugoslavya bu işbirliği çabalarında temel aktördü ve süpergüçlerle 
ilişkilerinde imtiyazlı bir ülkeydi. Tez Yugoslavya’yı analizin merkezine koyarak bu 
dönemi ve iki bölgesel ittifakın bölge ve Soğuk Savaş üzerindeki etkilerini yeniden 
ele almaktadır. 
 Balkan federasyonu planları katılan tarafların tarihsel eğilimlerinin Soğuk 
Savaş’taki uzantısıdır. Balkan Paktı ise tamamen bir Soğuk savaş aracıdır ama 
çöküşünü kökü bölgesel ilişkilerde yatan Soğuk Savaş dışı sebepler tetiklemiştir. 
Balkanlardaki erken dönem Soğuk Savaş, tarihi ve bölgesel etkenlerin rolünü 
süpergüç politikalarıyla eşit muamele ederek çalışılmalıdır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tito, Yugoslavya, Balkan Federasyonu, Balkan Paktı, 
Türkiye Yunanistan, Bulgaristan, Sovyetler Birliği, ABD, Soğuk Savaş  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the early years of the Cold War, every event was seen as a part of 
global super-power struggle and local and regional factors were removed. 
Accordingly, this helped historians to reach simplified conclusions based on one 
side’s view and speculations. After witnessing the death of the Soviet Union, one has 
the capability to find information on the same events from different perspectives and 
see the parallel results.  In this regard, declassification of the documents on both 
sides, especially the archives of the Soviet Union and its satellite states provides 
information on the situation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, two major Cold War 
battlefields, and helps historians to revise their old and distorted knowledge of the 
Cold War.  
This thesis covers the development of U.S. and Soviet policies towards 
Yugoslavia and the Balkans, in particular the cooperation plans in the Balkans 
between 1945 and 1955. U.S. policies regarding this region were initiated during the 
early phases of the Cold War as a result of Balkans’ adjacency with the Soviet 
Union, namely for strategic reasons. In contrast, for the Soviet Union the controlling 
Balkans was a strategic and ideological mission as well. Nevertheless, the Cold War 
froze in the Balkans during the 1950s and little was achieved by the Cold-Warriors in 
the next decades. In this respect, the shaping of U.S. and Soviet policies will be 
analyzed in two phases based on their attitude towards Balkan cooperation as a wing 
of their Cold War policies, under the knowledge of previous attempts and alliances in 
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the region. The first attempt of alliance was the Balkan federation initiated by 
Marshall Tito of Former Yugoslavia (hereafter Yugoslavia), which would include 
Bulgaria, Albania and some parts of Greece. For the Soviet Union, it would possibly 
serve for the reconciliation of Communism in the Balkans. Eventually, the idea of a 
Balkan federation constituted a major element in Tito-Stalin split of 1948 since Tito 
and Stalin had different plans for a Balkan federation. The second attempt was the 
Balkan Pact of 1954, which was established by Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece, and 
most significantly this was the first treaty of cooperation between NATO members 
and a Communist state. Basically, it was directly a consequence of the containment 
policies of the United States, and the price Yugoslavia had to pay to the U.S. for the 
aid poured into Yugoslavia.   
The evolution from plans towards a Balkan federation to the Balkan Pact is an 
extraordinary transition in the Cold War, specifically the transfer of Tito’s 
Yugoslavia from the team Russian Bears to American Eagles. Yugoslavia is the 
focus of analysis in this thesis. In these alliances, Yugoslavia was the common actor 
and was in the center of attention of the Cold War parties, and accordingly their Cold 
War policies regarding this region were shaped based on Yugoslavia and its moves. 
In the first instance, Soviet policy towards the Balkans was materialized by 
Yugoslavia, and Stalin’s failure in excluding Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 
June 1948 - the end of monolith - led to the end of Balkan federation plans and 
Yugoslav rapprochement with the Western bloc. Most importantly, the Tito-Stalin 
split changed the course of Cold War. In the second instance, U.S. policies towards 
Yugoslavia evolved from the preservation of Yugoslavia as an outcast towards the 
association of Yugoslavia with western defense. Yugoslavia maintained a fluctuating 
behavior towards tying itself to the West.  
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On a regional level, this thesis points out the regional factors in play during the 
crystallization and the failure of these pacts. The Cold War did not start by a single 
event and then spread to the world; instead it started at different places of the world 
at different times. For the Balkans, the situation was far more complicated than any 
other part of the world because the Cold War brought new dimensions to the already 
existing conflicts in the region. Thus, the Yugoslav version of the Balkan federation 
had its roots in the region’s history, and was supported by its neighbors who had 
similar intentions for the sake of some parts of Greece. The progress towards the 
federation ended as a consequence of Stalin’s desire to reinforce his control in the 
satellite states against the West.  
At the same time, the Balkan Pact was a Cold War tool meaningful in East-
West tensions and played a symbolic role in the Cold War. While Yugoslavia, 
Turkey and Greece signed the Pact linking Yugoslavia indirectly with NATO, each 
state had different expectations other than security; in particular Turkey and Greece 
supposedly maintained a line parallel to U.S. interests. Yugoslavia’s approach, on the 
other hand, was shaped by its bilateral relations with the U.S. and its problematic 
relations with Italy caused by the Trieste problem. Nevertheless, an unexpected and a 
non-Cold War factor, the rise of the Cyprus problem in Turkish-Greek relations, 
played a major role at the end of this alliance, equally important with the 
normalization of relations with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. However, the 
developments towards the Balkan Pact, forward association of Yugoslavia with the 
West, itself caused and determined the timing of this normalization to an extent. This 
Pact alone represented a shift in Cold War policies and deserves to be studied – the 
Western Bloc making an alliance with a non-Soviet satellite Communist regime 
without a command economy at the height of the Cold War. 
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Until the end of the Cold War, historical studies about the period of these 
alliances mainly focused on the significance of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan 
and Tito-Stalin split from the American perspective under the light of whatever was 
available from the existing archival data. Together with these, most of the current 
studies on the U.S. experience in the Cold War are limited in scope, and accordingly 
their treatment of this period focuses on the Tito-Stalin split and U.S. efforts towards 
benefiting from this event.1 Another group of scholars, which studied Yugoslavia and 
the Balkans, focused on Yugoslavia’s relations with the West after the split and 
maintained a more independent vision than Cold War historians. John C. Campbell’s 
early work, Tito’s Separate Road,2 is in this category and as while lacking detailed 
information, it supplies the general framework, just like other scholars who studied 
Yugoslavia, Nora Beloff’s Tito’s Flawed Legacy3 and Stephan K. Pavlowitch’s Tito: 
Yugoslavia’s Great Dictator.4 The last and perhaps the most up-to-date group of 
scholars, who studied the whole process of Yugoslav-American relations, provide 
outstanding archival data on the U.S. and British foreign policy. Beatrice Heuser’s 
book, Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-53,5 
is a valuable study, but as it is understandable from the name of the book, excludes 
the regional historical background. For a good understanding of American policy 
                                                 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987); Melvy Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the 
Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); Melvyn Leffler, “Strategy, 
Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952,” The Journal of 
American History 71, No. 4. (Mar., 1985): 807-825.; Robert R Bowie & Richard Immerman, Waging 
Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998); Wayne S Vucinich, At the Brink of War and Peace: the Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic 
Perspective (New York: Social Science Monographs, Brooklyn College Press, 1982) 
2 John C. Campbell, Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1967) 
3 Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West, 1939-84 (London: Victor Gollancz, 
1985), 142 
4 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito: Yugoslavia's Great Dictator: A Reassessment (Columbus: Ohio State 
Univ. Pr., 1992) 
5 Beatrice Heuser, Western Containment Polices in the Cold War: the Yugoslav Case, 1948-53 
(London: Routledge, 1989) 
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towards Yugoslavia, Lorraine M. Lees’ book Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, 
Yugoslavia and the Cold War,6 is the best in its category.   
However, all of these studies mentioned reflect the story of one side only. 
Concerning cooperation attempts in the Balkans, the tendency is towards the 
evaluation of these developments within the framework of the Cold War 
subordinating the influence on the regional states. Currently existing Soviet and 
Yugoslav archival documents help make a comprehensive analysis of the same 
events. On the other hand, studying two cooperation attempts in the Balkans during 
the Cold War provides an alternative understanding of the course of events. In this 
regard, this thesis will look at the early Cold War and the cooperation attempts in the 
Balkans under the light of existing studies and available archival data. While taking 
Yugoslavia as the center of analysis, it will indicate the differences of perceptions 
among the actors by bringing regional factors into play as an alternative to existing 
studies. Moreover, this thesis will argue that for the study of the 1945-1955 period in 
the Balkans, regional and historical relations between the states should be treated 
equally with the super-power Cold War policies in order to comprehend the course of 
the Cold War and the failure of two alliance attempts in the Balkans. The Cold War 
brought new factors into play for the Balkan states, but could not make local 
problems and conflicts disappear. Nationalism was transmuted in the Balkans by 
local circumstances; the same thing happened to Socialism, Communism and 
Western ideals as well. 
The structure of this thesis will be as follows: Chapter II will first analyze the 
efforts on multilateral cooperation during the interwar period to provide the historical 
relations of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia to point out the extent of their 
                                                 
6 Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University 
Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 
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cooperation and inherent characteristics in their relations. This perception will be 
helpful to understand the reasons of the plans for a Balkan federation and the role of 
Turkish-Greek relations behind the end of the Balkan Pact. Accordingly, it will 
separately summarize the situation in three countries in the aftermath of the World 
War II. Chapter III will deal with the Balkan federation period. It will argue that 
Tito’s federation plan was the extension of historical romanticism into the early years 
of the Cold War. The harmony and clash of Yugoslavia’s regional expansionist plans 
and the Soviet Union’s security interests in the region will be analyzed in detail. 
Then, the role of Yugoslavia’s independent behavior on the Tito-Stalin split, in line 
with the federation plans, will be covered. Chapter IV will examine the transition 
period in Yugoslav-American relations beginning from the Tito-Stalin split through 
the signing of the Treaty of Ankara between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in 1953. 
It will first underscore the impact of Yugoslavia’s vulnerable situation on U.S. 
foreign policy and in the shaping of regional and Cold War relations. It will 
emphasize the evolution of U.S. foreign policy from aiding Yugoslavia towards 
associating it with the western defense structure. In parallel with this, the steps 
towards a trilateral Balkan treaty and U.S. diplomacy will be analyzed. Chapter V 
will be the case study of the period from the Treaty of Ankara to the Treaty of Bled 
in 1954, an outsider in the Cold War, namely the Balkan Pact which established a 
collective defense between the signatories. The death of Stalin and its impact on the 
Cold war and the Balkan states marked the beginning of this phase. Then, the 
trilateral relations and its impact on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy will be the 
center of analysis. The U.S. policy and the obstacles that occurred in the Balkan 
relations and Yugoslavia’s relations with Italy will be addressed. This chapter will 
argue that the Balkan alliance was a paper-pact as soon as it was born. Subsequently, 
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the Cyprus issue, its impact on Greek-Turkish relations and on the alliance, and Tito-
Khrushchev correspondence will be covered, emphasizing the timing of these 
developments. In conclusion, the development of U.S. and Soviet Cold War policies 
towards Yugoslavia and the Balkans between 1945 and 1955, accordingly the 
regional cooperation attempts, and the role of regional historical factors will be 
assessed. It will be emphasized that in order to understand the achievements of the 
Cold War policies in the Balkans, regional factors should be treated equally with the 
larger Cold War policies.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE BALKANS UNTIL THE COLD WAR 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will delineate the causes of cooperation in the Balkans during the 
interwar period in order to identify the main problems and hereditary characteristics 
of Balkan cooperation attempts. The first part will introduce the period from the 
early 1920s to the Balkan Entente, and further cover the Balkan Entente process in 
detail. Given the background, reasons for tendency towards cooperation and alliances 
in the Balkans historically vary. First of all, disintegration of the Ottoman Empire 
had already begun in this region before World War I, and the Balkan states 
flourished. As a result of this, the Balkan picture changed frequently; fed by late 
transformation into nation-building and state-building phases in this region led to 
continued political clashes, border disputes and growing irredentist feelings. In 
addition to intra-Balkan disputes, the centuries old Ottoman Empire was losing its 
might in protecting its existence, and became a possible target for the Great Powers. 
Since the Balkans was a boiling-pot in the beginning of the twentieth century, it 
served as a big potential for the Great Powers to materialize their intentions 
regarding the Ottoman Empire.  
 It should be noted that, expansionism was not a unique phenomenon for the 
bigger states; expansionism, namely becoming “greater,” was a long-lasting trend in 
Europe, even small states in the Balkans had expansionist tendencies i.e. Serbian 
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Greater Serbia - "Nacertanije,"7 or Greek “Megale Idea”8, and thus they played a role 
in the European power politics. However, while trying to make territorial gains they 
had to protect themselves from their neighbors and the Great Powers 
simultaneously.9  
Making judgments on the Balkans without having sufficient knowledge of the 
region has played a leading role in the development of misconclusions and clichés. 
As with the case of ethnicities and religious diversity in the Balkans, the situation is 
like an alphabet soup and the number of ethnicities and nationalities is much more 
than the number of states. Once the waves of nationalism hit this region, they 
brought to life frozen conflicts as a consequence of this multi-ethnic structure.10 
Besides that, the Balkan Wars, and then the Great War caused demarcation of 
borders without really taking into consideration the ethnicities. The alliances made 
during this period were a small-scale practice of balance of power politics 
dominating European affairs. However, what these wars really brought to the 
                                                 
7 Essentially, Nacertanije can be reduced to two main goals: 1) an independent policy must imply 
balancing between the Great Powers and relying on those who have no direct interests in the Balkans; 
it is possible to rely on Russia only as regards its support of Serbian aspirations, and this should by no 
means lead to Serbia's subjugation to the Slavic empire's Balkan goals; 2) the development of 
Yugoslav co-operation in order to carry out Serbia's unification, first with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and then also with Montenegro, Old Serbia and Macedonia - the predominantly Serbian-inhabited 
lands within the Ottoman Empire - having in mind the access to the sea through a narrow belt in the 
north of Albania (today's Montenegrin coastal region of Ulcinj). For Ilija Garasanin, unification with 
the Southern Slavic peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy was a noble task for future generations - he 
thought that, considering the circumstances, only active co-operation was possible, primarily in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina… Dusan T. Batakovic, Ilija Garasanin's "Nacertanije": a Reassessment, 
Institute for Balkan Studies, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Belgrade. 
            http://www.rastko.org.yu/istorija/batakovic/batakovic-nacertanije_eng.html (July 4, 2005). 
8 In January 1844, the Greek Prime Minister, Ioannis Kolettis, addressed the Constitutional Assembly 
in Athens: The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is only a part, the smallest and poorest, of greece. 
The Greek is not only who inhabits the kingdom, but also who lives in Janina, or Thessaloniki, or 
Seres, or Adrianople, or Constantinople, or Trebizone, or Crete, or Samos, or any other country of the 
Greek history of race…There are two great centers of Hellenism, Athens and Constantinople. Athens 
is only the capitol of the Kingdom; Constantinople is the great capital, the city, I Polis, the attraction 
and the hope of all the Hellenes. Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
Centuries (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 262. 
9 It should also be noted that, despite the existence of expansionist tendencies, even some illusory 
intentions in this period, it is odd to stereotype Balkan countries as aggressive and war-loving nations, 
and equally seek the beginning of the Great War in this region.  
10 See, Jelavich, Barbara & Charles, The Establishment of Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 1986) 
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Balkans was the disintegration of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empire meant the end 
of expansionism towards east and west for the Balkan states. But new borders and 
new states, such as Turkey, brought new problems such as relocation and exchange 
of populations between Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria. From a general point of view, 
as Christopher Cviic states, “the old Empires were by no means perfect, but the 
national states that followed them were almost invariably worse.”11      
The end of the Great War brought little new and positive to this region. While 
popular arguments in the international arena in this period revolved around Woodrow 
Wilson’s self-determination and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’s version of Marxism, both of 
them were unable to overcome existing problems, most importantly issues like the 
Macedonian question.12 Post-war settlement did not satisfy most ex-belligerents, nor 
the Balkan ones, which became clear in the cases of Germany and Italy. Balkan 
states which were torn by domestic power struggles and economic backwardness -
coupled by the Great depression later- resulted in totalitarian regimes. Prior to the 
1930s, designs of the European states such as Italy on the Balkans constituted the 
core element of the Balkan picture. In sum, status quo interest and old problems 
marked the borderline dividing the Balkan countries during the inter-war period, and 
it was exactly this cleavage, which had to be surmounted in order to come close to 
real Balkan cooperation.13 
 
 
                                                 
11 Chritopher Cviic, Remaking The Balkans (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991): 7. 
12 Matthew Smith Anderson, The Eastern Question (London: Macmillan, 1966): 273-299; Fikret 
Adanır. “The Macedonian Question: The Socio-Economic Reality and Problems of its Historiographic 
Interpretations” in International Journal of Turkish Studies, (1985-6): 43-64. 
13 Oral Sander, Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye, 1945-1965 [Balkan Developments and Turkey, 1945-
1965] (Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1969), 5; Wolfgang Höpken, “Balkan Cooperation Between the 
Two World Wars: National Self-Interest and Multilateral Cooperation,” İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında 
Avrupa ve Balkanlar: İdeolojiler ve Uluslararası Politika [Europe and the Balkans in the Interwar 
Period: Ideologies and International Politics] (İstanbul: Aybay Yayınları, 1994), 101. 
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2.2 Attempts and Extent of Cooperation after the Great War 
In the early 1920s, Bulgarian leader Alexandar Stamboliiski made efforts to 
create some sort of a multiethnic Balkan peasant federation, but his efforts proved 
futile. His aim was to expand the “Little Entente,”14 which was formed by 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania in 1921, by the participation of Bulgaria, 
but it did not materialize.15 The main objectives of the Little Entente were the 
preservation of the status quo established by the postwar treaties, accordingly 
prevention of Hungarian revisionism and the restoration of Habsburgs. However, 
growing dissatisfactions from the post-war settlement became clear in the late 1920s 
and Bulgaria supported the revision of the minority rights in Macedonia and the 
passage to the Aegean Sea.  
In this regard the only positive development in the Balkans can be taken as 
the normalization of relations and the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey in 
the early 1930s after both countries sorted out the reasons of friction between each 
other.16 In general, Turkey, wanting to preserve the status-quo, proceeded with 
friendly relations with neighboring states, and helped the development of peace in 
the region. Given the background in the early 1920s, one of the significant problems 
in the region was the post-war settlement between Greece and Turkey. Accordingly 
the question of the Greek population in Turkey and the Turks in Greece represented 
an example of the extent of the population problem in the region. During the 
Lausanne negotiations, in January 1923, a protocol was signed between the two sides 
regarding the exchange of these populations. Nevertheless, the problem was not 
finalized, and in 1926 a treaty was concluded on the status of the “etabli” (settled 
                                                 
14 Eliza Campus, The Little Entente and The Balkan Alliance (Bucharest: Bibliotheca Historica 
Romaniae, 1978) 
15 Özer Sükan, 21. Yüzyıl Başlarında Balkanlar ve Türkiye [The Balkans and Turkey in the Beginning 
of the Twenty-first Century] (İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayınları, 2001), 181-82.  
16 Sander, 7-9. 
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Turkish or Greek populations in Greek or Turkish mainland respectively). 
Unfortunately, this treaty could not solve the problem, it even exists today. The 
relations began to improve with Venizelos’ rise to power in 1928. On June 10, 1930 
the two states agreed on the status and properties of the “etabli” Turks in Greece and 
“etabli” Greeks in Turkey. This treaty was the product of Greek Prime Minister 
Venizelos and Turkish President Atatürk, who consequently put signature to three 
more agreements on 30 October 1930.17  
 
2.3 Balkan Entente 
When totalitarianism was rising in Europe, and especially as Italy was 
threatening Mediterranean security; the idea of the formation of a Balkan Pact was 
suggested by the former Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Papanastasiou18 at the 
October 1929 meeting of the Association of World Peace Convention. All of the 
Balkan delegations accepted his proposal, and next year in October the first Balkan 
Conference was launched in Athens “under the obvious  sign of the unanimous desire 
to seek ways of rapprochement”19 with the participation of Bulgarian, Greek, 
Rumanian, Turkish and Albanian delegations and was followed by the Istanbul 
Conference. The third Balkan Conference was held in Bucharest where the idea of a 
Balkan Pact was spelled because of the approaching threats to Balkan security 
                                                 
17 These agreements were Friendship, Neutrality, Consensus and Arbitration Treaty; Protocol on the 
Limitation of the Naval Forces, and Settlement; Commerce and Sea Traffic Convention. Fahir, 
Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1980 [Twentieth Century Political History 1914-1980] 
(Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1987), 325-327; Melek Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler” 
[Relations with Greece], 325-357 in Baskin Oran, ed., Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından 
Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919-1980: Cilt I [Turkish Foreign Policy: Facts, Documents, 
Interpretations from the War of Independence to Present: Volume I] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), 336-
348. 
18 Alexandros Papanastasiou served as the Prime Minister of Greece during March 12, 1924 - July 24, 
1924 and May 26, 1932 - June 5, 1932. 
19 Campus, 38.  
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caused by aggressive foreign policies of Italy and Germany.20 In fact, the meaning of 
the Entente to the signatory parties varied; first, it was to blockade possible 
Bulgarian revisionism, secondly to avoid Bulgarian-Yugoslav alliance, and thirdly 
against aggression in the Mediterranean.  
The Balkan Pact of 1933 was established after a series of bilateral treaties. 
Turkey signed Treaties of Friendship, Non-Aggression, Arbitration and Consensus 
with Rumania in October 17, 1933 and with Yugoslavia in November 27, 1933. 
Although Eleftherios Venizelos left his office in 1932, the Prime Ministers of Greece 
and Turkey, Panagis Tsaldaris and İsmet İnönü respectively signed the Pact of 
Cordial Agreement (Pacte d’Entente Cordiale) between their countries on September 
14, 1933. With this pact two countries agreed on guaranteeing their borders mutually. 
This pact created reaction and tension in Bulgaria who perceived Greco-Turkish 
rapprochement as a serious threat towards its revisionist claims on Macedonia. 
Turkish Prime Minister İnönü and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü paid a 
visit to Sofia to calm the Bulgarian leaders by offering them to join the pact and to 
prove that their fears were groundless and to obtain Bulgaria’s adherence to the 
Pact.21 
The Greco-Turkish Pact symbolized the zenith of the relations between Greece 
and Turkey. Just a decade before, these countries were fighting each other, but now 
they were cooperating against possible aggression. This Pact showed Rumania and 
Yugoslavia the feasibility of an alliance between Balkan countries. Furthermore, 
perceived the fear of Bulgaria’s revisionist aims led them to agree with Turkey and 
increased their willingness to expand their understanding to a single Entente. When 
they came together in the Fourth Balkan Conference in November 1933 in 
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Thessalonica, four countries agreed on continuing their peace efforts without 
Bulgaria. The conference was ended with the declaration of the hope that all Balkan 
countries should join a Balkan pact, thus leaving an open door for Bulgaria.22 
Bulgaria could not take the final step to join the Balkan understanding. 
Albania, also, under heavy Italian influence did not join these efforts. As a result, the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Rumania came 
together in Belgrade in February 1934 and prepared the Draft Agreement of the 
Balkan Entente. The Agreement was signed by four countries on February 9, 1934 in 
Athens and put into effect. According to the agreement, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia 
and Rumania bound themselves to mutually guarantee the security of the existing 
Balkan frontiers and to consult with one another in case they were threatened. The 
sides agreed not to embark upon any political action in relation to any other Balkan 
state without the consent of the other signatories. And the contracting parties 
declared the Entente open to any other Balkan countries whose adherence would be 
the object of favorable examination.23 
The materialization of the Balkan Entente meant the end of the Balkan 
Conferences. The conferences were held with the hope that the Balkan understanding 
would expand gradually. L. S. Stavrianos states that “the Balkan Entente was more 
restricted, having been organized for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and 
therefore automatically directed against revisionist Balkan states.”24 This 
characteristic of the Pact was simply the resurrection of pre-World War I alliance 
building mentality. This limited aim of preventing the aggression of any Balkan 
state, in particularly Bulgaria, and the inability of the pact to extract military 
commitment from any member were the basic reasons for the Entente’s short life. 
                                                 
22 Campus, 67-68. 
23 Sükan, Özer, 187; Fırat,, 351-52; Armaoğlu,, 339.  
24 L. S. Stavrianos,, The Balkans since 1453, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 739. 
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Coupled with this, the Entente began to show signs of cracking almost as soon as it 
was organized. “The principal reason was the pressure of resurgent Germany. 
German economic hegemony, which became increasingly pronounced during the late 
1930s, inevitably had diplomatic repercussions. The Balkan countries could not 
afford to antagonize their principal customer because there was none other able or 
willing to purchase their goods.”25 Germany acquired a dominant position in the 
Balkan trade as a result of the Balkan states’ decreasing trade with Italy after the 
latter clearly showed its aggressive aims in Ethiopia. The totalitarian regimes of the 
Balkans welcomed the German influence in this diplomatic situation.26 
Looking from the Balkan view, the Balkan Entente divided the Balkans into 
two camps: the signatory states on one side and Albania and Bulgaria on the other 
side. Exclusion of Albania and Bulgaria was a great mistake. On the other hand, as 
Misha Glenny says “the Pact was clearly aimed at Bulgarian revisionism. Bulgaria 
had never officially repudiated its claims against all four neighbours – the southern 
Dobrudja (Romania), eastern Thrace (Turkey), western Thrace (Greece) and northern 
Macedonia (Yugosalvia).”27 Besides, the Pact’s vision did not go beyond that of 
military alliance since none of the member states had compatible foreign policy aims. 
For instance, Greece and Turkey’s main concern was the Bulgarian revisionism. 
Greece only wanted the guarantee its borders with Bulgaria, but did not want to 
support Yugoslavia in case of an Italian attack as it had borders with the Italian 
dominated Albania. Apart from the situation in the Balkans, Turkey’s most 
significant concern was its request of remilitarization the demilitarized Straits Zone. 
This potential revision heavily concerned Rumania who feared that it would increase 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 740. 
26 Sander, 13. 
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Bulgarian claims to revise the Treaty of Neuilly, and in consequence change the 
Rumanian-Bulgarian border.28 
Between the years 1934 and 1936 it could be easily understood that the status 
quo in the Balkans could not be preserved only by means of this sort of regional 
cooperation since Italy became more aggressive. Mussolini’s declarations about 
Italian aims in Asia, Italy’s militarization of the Dodecanese Islands, and its 
conclusion of Rome Protocols with Austria and Hungary heavily disturbed the 
Balkan countries. After Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia, it was perceived, in particular 
by Turkey, that Mussolini’s next target would be the Balkans. The increasing 
German influence led Turkey to take serious steps on the way to revise the Straits 
regime. Thus, on July 20, 1936, the signatory states of the Lausanne Treaty met 
again under Turkey’s initiative and agreed on Turkish control of the Straits with the 
Convention of Montreux.29 
International threats were reflected in the proceedings of the Balkan Entente 
Conference held in Belgrade on May 4-6 1936. This time, the main concerns of the 
Entente members were now to make certain that their obligations would not involve 
them in a war with a Great Power. To this end, Turkish and Greek representatives 
sought to limit the obligations of the member states as much as possible. It was 
agreed that the liability for mutual defense should be limited to purely Balkan 
exigencies and that in all other cases the obligations of the Entente members should 
be restricted to the action required by the League Covenant.30 
After signing the Montreux Convention, Turkey began try to diversify its 
foreign policy alternatives. While Turkey was trying to continue its cooperation with 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 13-14. 
29 Dilek Barlas, “Türkiye’nin 1930’lardaki Balkan Politikası” [Turkish Policy Regarding the Balkans 
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the Balkan Entente members, it also improved its bilateral relations with the Balkan 
states in order to protect the Balkans. Although Turkey did not trust France and 
England much, it tried to improve relations with them in order to prevent possible 
German and Italian designs on the Balkans. Turkey’s rapprochement with England 
did not prevent its cooperation with Greece; however, other Balkan countries began 
to pursue different policies. Yugoslavia signed agreements with Bulgaria and Italy in 
March 1937. Germany’s occupation of Czechoslovakia made Turkey and Greece 
immediately sign a new agreement. In February 1939, the Balkan Entente members 
decided to extend the pact for seven more years, however, Italy’s occupation of 
Albania two months later made it very difficult for the Pact to make healthy 
decisions.31 
In this environment, on October 19, 1939 Turkey signed a fifteen-year mutual 
aid pact with France and England. A few months later, on February 2-4, 1940 the 
Balkan Entente held a meeting in Belgrade. Here Turkey made a futile effort to bring 
Balkan nations together, however, the other states rejected such a proposal stating 
their fear of Turkey’s ties with France and England. They thought that it would bring 
Anglo-French dominance to the Balkans. “It was tacitly agreed that it was up to the 
various members to deal individually with the Great Powers in order to preserve their 
neutrality. The Balkan Entente had become a paper organization lacking unity, 
independence, and effectiveness.”32 As seen before, The Balkan Entente and Little 
Entente were targeted towards regional aggression and outside powers. The common 
tie between the two was Romania.  In 1940, Rumania came under the dominance of 
Germany and joined the war against the Soviet Union on Hitler’s side in 1941. This 
put an end to the Balkan Entente for all practical purposes. Glenny asserts that, 
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“hence, both the Little Entente and the Balkan pact suffered from the same defect: 
they were strong alliances against the weak and weak alliances against the strong.”33 
 
2.4 World War II and Its Impact on the Balkans 
The war brought bloodshed, civil wars, fear and calamities to the Balkans. The 
secret or open agreements during or after the war marked the map of the post-war 
Balkans. The “Percentage Agreement” on October 9, 1944, between Churchill and 
Stalin increased and solidified the effects of Soviet occupation of the Balkans. 
During the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences no real agreements were made 
concerning the Balkans, these conferences further increased the division of the 
Balkans.34 Just a few years after the end of the World War II, Yugoslavia, Greece 
and Turkey would meet together again in a strictly different environment, in a new 
type of atmosphere more complicated and problematical than the Balkan politics, but 
until June 28, 1948, they had little in common except for the growing intentions of 
Yugoslavia on Greece. This part will summarize the situation in these three countries 
to the differences of circumstances and intentions at the end of World War II.  
 
2.4.1 Turkey and the Soviet Threat 
Turkey was one of the first countries that felt the Soviet threat on its security 
arising from the changing world order. The beginning of the Cold War is 
multifaceted, but one thing is clear that the problem of spheres of influence started 
during World War II. Until the last months of the War, Turkey maintained a 
relatively neutral stand.35 Till the war, having combined with Turkey’s anti-
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imperialistic stand, Soviet foreign policy regarding Turkey was toward preserving 
Turkey’s sovereignty and control over the Straits. Nevertheless, Soviet policy of 
friendship and collaboration with Turkey, even relations between Moscow and 
Ankara since the period of the Turkish War of Independence, inspired guesswork, 
and brought less than expected in terms of cooperation.36 Turkey’s adherence to 
Western ideals and institutions played a leading role in the failure of Soviet-Turkish 
collaboration. At the end of the war, Soviet foreign policy indicated a slight shift 
with the denunciation of the Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 
1925 with Turkey on March 19, 1945. On June 7, 1945, just a month after the 
German surrender, the Soviet Union notified Turkey that the restoration of friendly 
relations depended on Turkey’s acceptance of certain prerequisites, namely the 
revision of the Montreux Straits Convention and establishment of a permanent Soviet 
base in the region of the Turkish Straits.37 Detailed proposals for re-modification of 
the Montreux regime was presented to Turkey on August 7, 1946. The return of the 
districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum to the Soviet Union was also verbalized. 
In particular, Nikita Khrushchev’s comments on the post-war Soviet policy 
regarding Turkey reflects the extent of Soviet decisiveness on Turkey and its 
unintended repercussions; except the fact that Khrushchev wrote these after 
witnessing the outcomes of Stalin’s foreign policy. According to his memoirs 
published decades later: 
Stalin gave in and sent an official memorandum to the Turkish 
government pressing our territorial claims. Well, the whole thing 
backfired. Beria didn’t foresee that Turkey would respond to our demand 
by accepting American support. So, Beria and Stalin succeeded only in 
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frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans. Because 
of Stalin’s note to the Turkish government, the Americans were able to 
penetrate Turkey and set up bases right next to our borders. Stalin ruined 
our relations with the Turks. Turkey has allowed the US to have military 
bases on its territory ever since. 
Khrushchev accused Stalin’s “inflexibility and the psychic disturbance which 
came over him at the end of his life.”38 For the Turkish side, those claims were 
unacceptable, and were taken as serious threats, and criticized seriously. Hasan Saka, 
the Turkish Foreign Minister, responded that the Soviet demands offered no basis for 
discussion as they were incompatible with Turkey’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.39 Ahmet Emin Yalman, the editor of daily Vatan, stated that “any shot on 
the Turkish Russian frontiers may become the first shot of the Third World War 
because all the nations are bound to waken to the fact that the Russian appetite can 
accept Trafalgar or Times Square as its final limits.”40 
 As a matter of fact, Soviet demands from Turkey were not unexpected from 
the Turkish side at the time of notification. As early as 1939, when Turkish Foreign 
Minister visited Moscow and in 1940, during Molotov-Ribbentrop conversations, the 
Soviets raised their demands on the control over the Straits. At the end of the war, 
Stalin’s intentions became overt among his allies. For him, the Straits had great 
importance for Soviet security and Turkey was not strong enough to protect them. It 
was a matter of Soviet security.41 Western military existence in the region heightened 
Stalin’s apprehension that “should Turkey, after refusing to accept Soviet proposals, 
begin to take military measures in the Straits jointly with some non-Black Sea 
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powers, this would run directly counter to the interests of the security of the Black 
Sea Powers.”42  
 
2.4.2 Greece and The Greek Civil War 
In the case of Greece, the story is more problematic. An the end of the World 
War I, Greece tried to invade Turkey with the dream of creating an illusory Greater 
Greece. Greek’s Anatolia campaign ended with a complete disaster and weakened 
both countries’ economies and human resources. As seen before, interwar Greek 
relations were quite smooth as a result of increasing insecurity caused by several 
reasons such as strengthening European dictatorships. During World War II, Greece 
was invaded by Italy in 1940, and then by Nazi Germany and partly by Bulgaria. The 
end of the War brought another war to Greece, which would be more disastrous than 
the former. The Greek Civil War is one of the three major 20th Century European 
Civil Wars along with Spanish and Russian ones. The country was divided and fell 
into turmoil, since Greek resistance movements, communists and royalists, who once 
cooperated against the invaders became enemies at the end of the war and started 
fighting each other. As a result of growing of East-West tensions, the Greek Civil 
War has been perceived as a struggle between communist and non-communist forces 
in the country by the historians, and the focus was on the probability of Greece’s 
possible end, sharing the fate of Eastern European countries.  
From a different point of view, Greek Civil War was a matter of domestic clash 
between the forces once fought against fascism while now fought for domestic 
control. 43 Statis N. Kalydas states that identities of warring parties were very fluid; 
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“For instance, a Slavophone peasant of Macedonia could be a self-professed 
Bulgarian komitadji collaborating with the German occupation authorities, a member 
of the Slavophone guerrillas of ELAS, a member of Tito’s Macedonian partisans, or 
a right-wing Greek nationalist.”44 Consequently, Greek Civil War started during the 
Second World War, so it is a gross-oversimplification to perceive it as a war against 
communism. 
From a general point of view, the fate of Greece and the Balkans was 
determined by the famous Percentages Agreement between Winston Churchill and 
Joseph Stalin in 1944. This was not made as a result of urgency of the situation in the 
Balkans, but to avoid any clash between British and Soviet troops which might 
provoke bigger ones since the Soviet Army was marching through Western Europe 
without facing an equal opponent. In the end, wartime spheres of responsibility 
became post war settlement itself. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid can be 
taken as the final settlement of the Balkan problem because until that time nobody 
addressed such a clear-cut settlement.45  
Just like the post-World War I settlement, Stalin and Churchill’s approach 
ignored local differences and responsibilities of the Balkan people. Nonetheless, an 
agreement between two leaders shaped the map in this region but could not settle the 
local problems, as seen from the Greek case. Since the United Kingdom was not in a 
position to maintain order in Greece, and was even dependent on American support 
to stabilize its own zone in the interior, leaving Greece to its own demise was 
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unacceptable after witnessing the outcomes of Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe 
and continuing Soviet activities in the Middle East. As stated by Clement Attlee, the 
British were “backing a lame horse” in Greece and Britain simply could not afford to 
maintain a military force there in order to prop up an unpopular and inept 
government.46 
More specifically Greece had a long and strategically thin northern frontier 
which it was in no position to defend in case of a Soviet attack.47 Coupled with this, 
Greece had border disputes with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. As a result of Marshall 
Tito’s semi-independence from Moscow, Yugoslavia maintained an expansionist 
foreign policy in the post-war environment. In the case of Greece, Tito’s intentions 
were much clearer, and Yugoslavia was the leading supporter of the Greek 
Communists guerrillas, materially. In essence, the popular obsession of the past 
towards becoming greater was maintained in the post-World War II environment 
when Tito “claimed Greek Macedonia (by calling for the ‘unification’ of Macedonia 
under Belgrade’s aegis), and had supported Bulgarian claims over Western 
Thrace,”48 in order to create a Balkan federation centered around Yugoslavia which 
will be dealt in the next Chapter. Shortly, it is more appropriate to call it Greek 
Defense Policy, instead of Greek Foreign policy until the end of the Civil War in 
1949.  
The transfer of authority from the British to the Americans resulted in the more 
active support of Greece, together with Turkey, not because of these countries’ 
respective and enlightened democracies, but as a result of perceived Soviet threat in 
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this region.49 According to Robert A. Larson, “given the military position of the 
Allied armies in 1945 and the uncertain intentions of the Soviets, the United States 
found itself involved in areas of the world which less than a decade earlier had 
ranked fairly low on the agenda of diplomatic priorities.”50 This is much clear in U.S. 
foreign policy regarding the Balkans than any other case. Lastly, U.S. intervention, 
the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Aid, also meant the blockading of the plans 
for a Balkan federation. 
 
2.4.3 Tito Strikes Back 
 Neither Turkey nor Greece benefited more than Yugoslavia from the 
increasing Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 
first decade of the Cold War. Tito had his own partisan resistance movement, 
established control over his country, and Yugoslavia was the only country in Europe 
which liberated itself at the end of the war without considerable outside help. As 
compared to other communist states of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia had an 
independent stand from Moscow. Later, when the Balkan Pact of 1954 was signed, 
Yugoslavia represented complex background that made it less comprehensible than 
any other Balkan country again.  
In detail, Yugoslav history after German invasion in 1941 and the name Jozip 
Broz Tito are inseparable. During the war, Jozip Broz Tito, leader and chief 
commander of the People's Liberation Front, faced many problems before the Allies 
recognized him as the anti-fascist factor in the country and not Draža Mihailović and 
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his Chetniks.51 As compared with Greece, polarization between resistance 
movements indicates great similarity, but Yugoslavs resolved their civil-war during 
the war. On March 7, 1945, a single provisional Yugoslav government took office 
with Tito as the Prime Minister. Unlike Charles De Gaulle of France, Tito had a 
strong-real-resistance-movement and stood against the invasion in real terms.52 He 
maintained fighting successfully in two fronts simultaneously: against the German 
invasion and against the Chetniks in The Civil War. More than that, he was the only 
leader in the region who had the bases for a new strong communist state with his 
own liberation army, and he was recognized by the Allies as the part of the winning 
side at the end of the war. One of the factors strengthening Tito’s position against the 
Soviet Union was the issue of self liberation. The other factors can be summarized 
as, “Tito and his partisans fought against Hitler largely by themselves; they won their 
own civil war; with more help from the West than from the Red Army, though with 
an assist from the Red Army in Serbia; they developed a tremendous pride and 
confidence in themselves.”53 In addition, Tito took Yugoslavia on its own course and 
placed his intentions and his countries’ needs as a priority. The Yugoslav 
Communists did not want to subordinate themselves to the Soviets, they believed 
they coped with the Nazis by themselves so they had no debt to Stalin. Even when 
Soviet troops entered Yugoslav territory for a brief period of time Yugoslavs had 
unfortunate experiences, and the existence of the Red Army led to social tensions 
because of numerous thefts and rapes. 
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Tito, as the sole ruler of his country, had a different Balkan view which would 
clash with Stalin’s in the future. While maintaining similar measures in domestic and 
foreign policies like his Communist neighbors, he was a privileged person in his 
relations with Moscow. In the domestic affairs of Yugoslavia, he was strictly 
Stalinist in order to silence his critics especially in the suppression of party members, 
and in economic policies like aggressive collectivization of farms, heavy industry 
and a command economy. Taking into consideration the local factors, new 
Yugoslavia was very similar to the Soviets as compared to Eastern European states. 
As a result of its multi-ethnic structure and federative state model, Soviet methods of 
running the state were copied; even an artificial nation, Macedonia, was created to 
avoid ethnic problems. These developments were welcomed in Moscow for a while. 
Tito was as orthodox as Stalin in terms of ideology, personality and brutality, 
excluding the fact that he did not want to be dictated. His notion of Yugoslavia was 
different; one that the new state should have a leading regional role in the post-war 
Balkans.  
In foreign policy issues, Tito openly followed the Soviet line and never 
hesitated to hide his opposition against the Western states on two occasions. One was 
in May and June 1945 at Trieste when Yugoslavian troops occupied the territory and 
stopped by Allied forces, and in 1946 when two U.S. planes were shot down in 
Yugoslavia. Belgrade came to the verge of open conflict with the United States.54 
The Western countries perceived, and to a certain extent they were right, Yugoslavia 
as an enthusiastic and loyal satellite of Moscow fulfilling Soviet intentions by 
provocative policies towards the West. In contrast, Tito’s regional plan of creating a 
Balkan federation was not completely appreciated by Moscow. As Tito considered 
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himself as the patron leader of the region and as the major adviser of the communist 
parties of Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania, one can understand he had pretensions in 
the region as Stalin had in the wider area of Eastern Europe. During the interwar 
years, Comintern had a plan for the break-up of Yugoslavia and its replacement by a 
Balkan federation which was favored by Bulgarian Communist Party but was never 
initiated. As Civiic notes, the reasons were obvious in the Bulgarian support of this 
idea: “the possibility of reopenening the Macedonian issue via the idea of a Balkan 
federation was attractive.”55 At the end of the war, Yugoslavia’s position in the 
Balkans was totally different, but the idea of a Balkan federation never disappeared. 
Whereas Stalin’s vision of the Balkan federation was not Tito’s own federation 
system with Albania and Bulgaria and with Greece when the communists would win 
the civil war.56   As stated by John C. Campbell, “the solidarity of the communist 
world was a fine thing to show as a façade to the West, but the reality of the 
Yugoslavs’ relations with the Soviet leadership was a story of disillusionment and 
frustration well before the break in 1948.”57  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 During the interwar period, major obstacles that limited achieving efficient 
cooperation in the Balkans can be summarized as the existence of mistrust, border 
and ethnic disputes, and failing to achieve a form of cooperation without alienating 
key states. These factors could not be overcame since the Great War and led to a 
loose cooperation in the Balkans and ended with Axis invasion. At the end of World 
War II, the Balkan picture did not change dramatically, but the war did not put an 
end to expansionist tendencies of some states who wanted to benefit from the post-
                                                 
55 Cviic, 14 
56 This issue will be covered in Chapter III.  
57 Ibid. 97. 
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war environment. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria cooperated against Greece’s sovereignty 
and tried to fulfill their earlier intentions, encouraged by the Soviet Union. Yugoslav 
and Bulgarian actions can be explained by historical reasons, not with the 
expansionist characteristic of Communism or Soviet aggressiveness.  
 The ethnicity issue and the resentment of the past affected Balkan politics 
during the interwar period, and played a role in the post-World War II policies of 
these states. While Tito ignored the multi-ethnic problems of his own state, ethnicity 
played a role in his approach to the establishment of a future Balkan federation, a 
federation of southern Slavic people under Yugoslav domination; in a sense, the 
expansion of the Macedonian question into the post-World War II environment. It is 
clear that Yugoslav-Bulgarian attitude in the region, when Greece was suffering from 
domestic chaos and Turkey was isolated and faced with unacceptable demands, 
strongly influenced Turkey and Greece’s siding and cooperation with the West 
during the following years. In Chapter III, the Balkan federation issue and its impact 
on the region and Cold War relations will be examined in detail.    
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CHAPTER III 
PLANS FOR A BALKAN FEDERATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will reconsider the efforts towards the creation of a Balkan 
federation after World War II. In the first place, it will cover the obstacles against an 
alliance in the Balkans through the end and just after the war. Then, it will examine 
the development of the idea of a Balkan federation until the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. 
June 28, 1948 was a milestone for Cold War politics, not only for the Westerners but 
also for the Communist camp. However, this date also put an end to Communist 
Balkan federation plans. In this regard, considering the lack of harmony between 
Yugoslav and Soviet efforts towards an alliance in this region as a leading factor in 
the Tito-Stalin split, this chapter will analyze the events until June 28, taking into 
account the impact of Balkan federation in Soviet-Yugoslav relations on the one 
hand and East-West relations on the other.  Three important documents: The 
Yugoslav and Soviet reports of Tito-Stalin Conversation of May 27-28, 1946, and 
Report of Milovan Djilas about a secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting of Feb. 
10, 1948 will be covered considering that these meetings include immense 
information about Soviet and Yugoslav plans in the Balkans, and also about the 
causes of Tito-Stalin split.  
While giving historical details, the impact of important Cold War events on 
regional relations, i.e. the Czech coup, the Marshall Aid and establishment of the 
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Cominform, will be covered. In addition, Albanian-Bulgarian-Yugoslav role in the 
Greek Civil War and its meaning for possible Balkan federation and on the Cold War 
will be emphasized. Therefore the analysis will be made at two levels; regional and 
global.  
Yugoslav-Western relations, in particular Yugoslav-American relations and 
the process of Yugoslav-Soviet conflict after the secret Soviet-Bulgar-Yugoslav 
meeting will be dealt with to comprehend the basis of Yugoslavia’s future 
rapprochement with the West. Until Tito’s defiance of Stalin, the Western camp 
perceived Yugoslavia as a Communist country maintaining the Soviet path and 
sometimes acting more strictly than Moscow. Yugoslavia was a key and problematic 
state, namely privileged, for Soviet security, and would have the same significance 
for the Western defense system.  
 
3.2 Initial Plans for a Balkan Alliance 
Given the background, a brand new alliance in the Balkans was a matter in 
discussions during the Yalta conference between the Allies;58 in turn, “the possibility 
of some kind of Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation had been discussed during the war 
between Tito and Dimitrov.”59 Just before the end of the war the discussions were 
still going on between Yugoslavs and Bulgarians on this subject. For Stalin, a 
federation would serve his long-term interests in that it would strengthen Soviet 
political existence in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; but a federation should be established 
                                                 
58 U.S. Department of State, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta (Washington, D.C., Government 
Printing House, 1955), 876-877, 890. 
59 Duncan Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1979), 36; also Edward 
Kardelj confirms that Dimitrov had wanted rapprochement between two countries during the war. 
Dedijer, 101.  
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without any interference from his Western allies.60 “During the meeting of Foreign 
Ministers on February 10, 1945, however, V. Molotov [Soviet Foreign Minister] had 
said that this was not an urgent matter at the present time.”61 On the other hand, 
Duncan Wilson argues that at the beginning of 1945 the Western powers were 
against any form of Balkan federation, and Stalin was not ready to encourage it 
openly.62 Both of these explanations represent a part of the main issue; as a result of 
spheres of influence obsession, neither side wanted any sort of federation or alliance 
out of its control. Vojtech Mastny adds one more step for these obsessive behaviors; 
his explanation of the Soviet behavior indicates a different dimension of Stalin’s 
intentions. He links it with the general Soviet foreign policy towards the West, its 
representation in the international organizations and its relation with the Communist 
regimes:  
Stalin triumphed when his country entered the United Nations as one of 
the permanent members of the Security Council, even cajoling the world 
organization into granting the Ukrainian as well as Byelorussian Soviet 
republics separate membership as if they were sovereign states. Even 
more important was the launching in 1945 of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers as a great-power directorate viewed by Moscow as the main 
safeguard to ensure that in all important international decisions its 
interests would be heeded. Moreover, before the war ended, the Soviet 
Union had succeeded in aborting projects by smaller Eastern European 
states that could enable them to combine their forces to better resist its 
                                                 
60 Already since late 1944, the leadership of the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 
having come to power, began talks on uniting both countries into a federation. The talks were 
sanctioned, if not even initiated, by Stalin himself, who at the time was in favor of expediting the 
creation of such a body. Apparently, he had intended this as a means to significantly strengthen the 
“people’s democracy” in Bulgaria: first, with the help of the more stable communist regime in 
Yugoslavia, and second, reckoning that by uniting with Yugoslavia—a member of the anti-Hitler 
coalition—Bulgaria would successfully shed its status as a vanquished nation and consequently escape 
U.S. and British prerogatives stemming from their participation in the establishment of allied control. 
In early 1945, however, the Western allies, exercising these prerogatives, vetoed the establishment of 
the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. And when Stalin in turn decided to have Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
for now sign only a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the veto was extended to this as well. 
The matter had to be put off to follow the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. See, Soviet and 
Yugoslav Records of the Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946, in Leonid Gibianskii, “The 
Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with 
Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” Cold War International History Project 
Bulletin (CWIHB) 10, (March 1998): 125, n.14. 
61 Türkkaya Ataöv, NATO and Turkey (Ankara: Sevinç Printing House, 1971), 116. 
62 Wilson, 36,  n. 5. 
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growing power. Instead, having already in 1943 concluded with 
Czechoslovakia the kind of vague treaty of “friendship and mutual 
assistance” Stalin preferred, Moscow proceeded eventually to tie other 
countries of the region to its fold with similar treaties.63 
 
Nevertheless, establishing an alliance of any sort was a difficult objective to 
achieve in the first years after the War. It was limited with small steps and 
maintained in the form of strengthening ties between Communist governments and 
with Moscow.  In addition, as opposed to false comments such as, “during the first 
post-war years, the USA and Great Britain demonstrated no great interest concerning 
the position of Tito's Yugoslavia, which contrasted with their ongoing interest in the 
course of events in Poland and Czechoslovakia,”64 the Balkans and Yugoslavia were 
strategically important regions for the European defense since Trieste65 was a 
continuing dispute, Greek Civil War did not lose momentum and the Soviet Union 
maintained propaganda in non-Communist states. Therefore, it was a critical decision 
to establish military alliances openly in an environment causing insecurity on the 
other side.  
There is a variety of explanations regarding the shifts in Soviet foreign policy 
in this period. Vladimir Dedijer points to another side of Soviet policy regarding 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans. According to him, Stalin’s support towards a 
Balkan federation was a consequence of Stalin’s intention towards preserving his 
control over Balkan affairs. Dedijer says that: 
                                                 
63 Vojtech Mastny, “NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56,” 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working 
Papers Series, Working Paper No. 35. 
 http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFB01.pdf (Jan. 15, 2005) 
Also in April 1945, Tito had been invited to Moscow to sign a treaty of friendship and Stalin, who 
rarely agreed to share the limelight with anyone, did him the signal honor of sending him on a 
triumphal tour of the USSR and allowing him to be welcomed as a war hero. Beloff, 142. 
64 Jordan Baev, “U.S. Security Estimates on Yugoslavia (1948-1991),” National Security and Future 
1, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 95-106.  
65 Yugoslav and Slovene armies captured Trieste on May 1, 1945. However left the territory as a 
result of international pressure. As dealt before, on February 10, 1947, Free Territory of Trieste was 
established by a treaty which divided territory into two zones.   
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Stalin had been toying with the idea of bringing all the East European 
countries, including Yugoslavia, within Soviet borders. This was to be 
done in two stages: first, Poland and Czechoslovakia were to form one 
federation, Rumania and Hungary another, and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia 
still a third; secondly these new states would merge with the Soviet 
Union.66 
 
In response, according to Leonid Gibianskii, “only the latter of these was the 
immediate goal of his comment on federations, while the reference to the previous 
two seems more plausible as a strictly tactical move, used to camouflage his true 
intentions.”67 Later developments support Dedijer’s reasoning, except the fact that 
Soviet and Yugoslav versions of a Balkan federation were different and Dedijer 
presents the Yugoslav version of the story. Stalin’s possible federation plans were 
not a matter of discussion until the secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting 10 
February 1948 which will be dealt within the following parts. Additionally, 
Yugoslavia followed the Stalinist line in foreign policy, and “in most diplomatic and 
intelligence reports related to the period before 1948, the cabinet of Josip Broz Tito 
is regarded as the closest ally of the Soviet Union and as a ‘standard’ Stalinist 
communist type regime in East Europe.”68 In contrast he had his own plans regarding 
the future of Yugoslavia and Yugoslavia’s neighbors, while Stalin’s behavior was 
changing constantly based on the developments in international affairs and driven by 
preserving his authority. 
                                                 
66 Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost, 101. Vladimir Dedijer was the editor of Yugoslav 
Communist party newspaper “Borba,” then he worked as a member of the party until 1954.  He wrote 
several books about Yugoslavia including Tito: a Biography, Yugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican and 
The Road to Sarajevo. 
67 Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on 
Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” CWIHB 10, 
(March 1998): 116. 
68 During the first post-war years, the USA and Great Britain demonstrated no great interest 
concerning the position of Tito's Yugoslavia, which contrasted with their ongoing interest in the 
course of events in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In most diplomatic and intelligence reports related to 
the period before 1948, the cabinet of Josip Broz Tito is regarded as the closest ally of the Soviet 
Union and as a "standard" Stalinist communist type regime in East Europe. The attention of the 
leading circles in the United States to Yugoslavia increases considerably only when the conflict 
between Stalin and Tito is openly acknowledged at the end of June, 1948. Jordan Baev, “U.S. Security 
Estimates on Yugoslavia (1948-1991),” National Security and Future 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000): 95. 
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3.3 Moscow-Belgrade Relations: 
Tito-Stalin Conversation of May 27-28, 1946 
 
Tito’s design of Yugoslavia was to be the dominant state in the Balkans.69 
Furthermore, for Tito a federation with Bulgaria meant the integration of Bulgaria 
into Yugoslavia. “The Yugoslavs wanted to see the Bulgarian part of Macedonia 
(Pirin) joined to the existing Macedonian Republic, which was one of the new 
constituent parts of Yugoslavia. A Bulgarian Republic would then join the new 
federation as a seventh unit, on the same footing as the other six.”70 This sort of a 
federation was out of Stalin’s plans, but Bulgarians and Yugoslavs had to act in line 
with Stalin. Since Stalin did not have a coherent idea about a possible federation 
from the very beginning making tactical moves based on the events, Yugoslav-
Bulgarian moves which lacked coordination led to problems in their relations with 
Moscow. A letter from Moša Pijade to Edward Kardelj can be taken as an indicator 
of Stalin’s unstable mood.71 Not surprisingly, until 1948 the plan for a Balkan 
federation had an unstable history, discussed then but could not be materialized 
several times, just because of lack of harmony of interests between Sofia, Belgrade 
and Moscow. For instance, during Tito-Stalin conversations of 1946, Tito treated a 
possible federation with Bulgaria and Albania negatively, or tried to look 
uninterested, most probably to hide his real intentions, as seen from the excerpts of 
conversation from Soviet documents: 
                                                 
69The link with Albania and Bulgaria had been envisaged by Tito as early as 1943, and talks had 
started behind closed doors with the leaders of the Communist parties of these two countries in the 
latter half of 1944, Pavlowitch, 53. 
70 Wilson, 36; also Beloff confirms that, “whereas the Bulgarian Communists favored unity with 
Yugoslavia on equal terms Tito wanted to break up Bulgaria, annex its Macedonian area to the 
Macedonian republic of Yugoslavia, and turn the rest of Bulgaria into a seventh Yugoslav Federated 
Republic. For the Bulgarians too the rupture came just in time.”  Beloff, 143. 
71 “…in January 1945, when I was in Moscow as the head of the Yugoslav delegation preparing, 
together with the Bulgarian federation…Stalin, during a visit both delegations paid him at the 
Kremlin, had supported the Bulgarian thesis of a dualistic federation –a federation in which Bulgaria 
would not be just one of seven south Slav republics, but one in which all six other republics would 
make up one unit and Bulgaria the other….two days later, he brought up the matter again, but now 
took the view that Bulgaria should be one of seven federal units..” Dedijer, 187. 
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Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with 
including Albania in the Federation of Yugoslavia. Tito replied in the 
affirmative. Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be difficult 
for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of Albania 
into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste. Tito agreed with this. As a 
result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the 
question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and 
Yugoslavia. Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for the 
defense of the territorial integrity and national independence of 
Albania.72  
 
When Stalin asked questions about the possibility of Albanian-Yugoslav-
Bulgarian rapprochement, Tito still reacted negatively, giving the impression 
that he was not in favor of a federation with any country in the region for 
simple reasons: 
Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula for this treaty and 
to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer together. Com. Stalin touched on 
the question of including Bulgaria in the Federation. Tito said that 
nothing would come of the Federation. Com. Stalin retorted: “This must 
be done.” Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, 
because the matter involved two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria 
is strongly influenced by other parties, while in Yugoslavia the entire 
government, [though] with the presence of other parties, is essentially in 
the hands of the Communist Party.73 
 
Nevertheless, in November 1947 Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation and Assistance was signed without any reference to any sort of 
federation. In turn, as it shall be seen from the later developments, this treaty may be 
taken as the first step towards a federation and one of the major causes of conflict 
between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.  
 
 
 
                                                 
72 The Soviet Record of the Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May, 1946, in Leonid Gibianskii, “The 
Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with 
Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” CWIHB 10, (March 1998): 119-120, 
120. See Appendix I. 
73 Ibid. 
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3.3.1 Tito: Mission Greece! 
Tito’s view of Yugoslavia was not limited only to unification with Bulgaria 
and Albania; “Towards the south, the very concept of federation left Communist 
Yugoslavia open to new members.”74 Yugoslav foreign policy regarding Greece was 
the strongest factor in the evolution of the Cold War in Southeastern Europe. Even 
Yugoslav support of the Greek guerrillas had played major role in the 
implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1947. During this period, Stalin preferred not 
to get involved in the Greek Civil War directly avoiding any opposition with the 
West.  
Neighbor states’ aid to Greek communists was a well-known issue, and a 
matter of discussions between the West and the Soviet Union in the United Nations.  
As it can be understood from Tito’s comments and Stalin’s responses, there was a 
consensus between the two men on the Greek situation in 1946: 
S[talin]: “Right. If you have good relations with your nor[thern] 
neighbor, then Greece will also look at you differently... And does 
Greece raise any demands with regard to Yugoslavia?”  
T[ito]: “There were provocations against us, but not in recent times.” 
S[talin]: “The Eng[lish] maintain an army there in order to prop up the 
reactionary forces, and yes, possibly for other reasons as well.” 
T[ito]: (laughs): “We have demands against them: Aegean Maced[onia] 
and Salonikki.” 
M[olotov]: “Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You need access to the 
Aegean sea.”75 
 
This dialogue verifies that Tito was not only supporting Communist guerrillas with 
Stalin’s consent, but his territorial demands from Greece were also not limited to 
Greek Macedonia,76 he was thinking of expanding Yugoslav borders to the Aegean 
                                                 
74 Pavlowitch, 53. 
75Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin and the Yugoslav Government Delegation Headed by 
J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May, 1946, in Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the 
Cold War: Archival Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” CWIHP 10, (March 1998): 120-123, 122. See Appendix II. 
76 British Foreign Service sources indicate that: A congress of the group of the National Front of 
Macedonia was held on the 2nd August to the 4th August at Skopje. It was notable chiefly for a 
manifesto which, although it spoke of securing agreement with despotic Bulgarian Government, 
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Sea. Stalin’s support was strongly felt in the United Nations. During the discussions, 
Soviet delegates had tried to show British existence as a sort foreign intervention in 
the Greek Civil War:  
The first Greek case was brought to the Security Council’s attention on 
January 21, 1946 by a letter from the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation 
to the General Assembly, in which it was charged that the presence of 
British troops in Greece constituted interference with that country’s 
internal affairs and contributed to tension fraught with grave 
consequences to the maintenance of international peace.77 
 
In parallel with Soviet arguments, Yugoslavs maintained defending their neutrality 
against the Civil War in Greece. In fact, on Oct. 14, 1946, Tito gave an interview to 
the representatives of the New York Times, Life and Tim,e and said that while 
Yugoslavia has “no part in what is now taking place in Greece,” it “would certainly 
take some action in accordance with the principles of the United Nations” to stop the 
present persecutions of the Macedonian people.”78   
Since Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were Soviet allies, it is not wrong to argue that 
until the Marshall Plan, Stalin supported Greek Communists militarily too by using 
them, especially Yugoslavs as a cat’s-paw. Report to the UN Security Council by the 
Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, dated May 27, 
1947, indicates the relation between Greek Communists and neighboring states. The 
U.N. Balkan Commission concluded that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were 
responsible for supporting the rebellion. According to this report: 
The Greek government charged that support was being given by the 
Yugoslav and Bulgarian Government, through propaganda and 
                                                                                                                                          
amounted to demand for the inclusion of the Pirot district in Yugoslav Macedonia and contained 
strong hint that a similar claim would be laid to “Aegean” Macedonia. Clutton to Bevin, Aug. 10, 
1946 Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965, Vol. 3: 1938-1948 
(Archive Editions: Slough, 1997), 705. 
77 Consideration of Greek Problem by the Security Council during the Year 1946, in Staff of the 
Committee and the Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949 
(New York: Arno Press, 1971), 753. 
78 Peake to Bevin, Oct. 19, 1946 Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-
1965, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 722; also, Tito Denies Plot on Greece, Pledges Resort Only to U.N.; The 
Quest for the Herring is a Rough One,  New York Times, Oct. 15, 1946.  
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otherwise, looking towards the detachment of the providence of 
Macedonia from Greece and its incorporation together with Bulgarian 
and Yugoslavian Macedonia into the Federative People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 79 
 
While Stalin’s role in the Greek Civil War was different from Tito’s, and not as 
direct as Tito’s, Tito maintained his path  for a greater Yugoslavia by containing 
Greece. “As early as October 1943, in relation to activities in Greece, he [Tito] had 
felt able to write to one of his top commanders: In our opinion and also in that of 
Grandpa’s [wartime pseudonym for the Comintern] we should be in the centre of the 
Balkan countries, both in the military and political sense.”80 Tito’s long-term 
interests about Greece continued after the implementation of the Marshall Plan and 
he continued to provide assistance to Greek guerrillas. In contrast, Stalin was aware 
of the fact that since the U.S. was involved in the Greek affair directly it was clear 
that Greece was lost to the Western camp. From a general point of view, the Marshall 
Plan meant the division of Europe into Soviet and American spheres. Tito was 
slower to get the message and the war went on in Greece.81 As opposed to Truman’s 
open declaration, the Soviet Union vetoed the Resolution on the Greek Case 
Considered by the Security Council on July 29, 1947 regarding the restoration of 
peace in the Balkan Peninsula.82 Tito’s support of the Greek guerrillas became 
systematic in time and as early as summer 1947 it was clear that it would become a 
problem between Belgrade and Moscow. 
The influence of US intervention into the Greek Civil War by Marshall Aid 
was felt in the short run in Soviet-American relations. The shift in Soviet policy 
                                                 
79 Report to the Security Council by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier 
Incidents: Section B, Movement to Detach Macedonia from Greece, May 27, 1947, in Staff of the 
Committee and the Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, 
757. 
80 Nora Beloff, 142, n. 19. 
81 Ibid. 143 
82 Resolution on the Greek Case Considered by the Security Council and Vetoed by the Soviet Union, 
July 29, 1947, in Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Basic 
Documents, 1941-1949, 762. 
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regarding Greece is clear: “At the end of 1947, the Soviet Government was unwilling 
to recognize General Markos’ newly-proclaimed Provisional Democratic 
Government of Greece.’’83 Unlike Stalin, who was dealing with greater problems, 
Tito was determined to realize his objective, and aid to Greek guerrillas was 
formalized in August 1947 in an agreement between Yugoslav, Albanian and 
Bulgarian representatives, under which a joint Balkan Staff was formed to help the 
Greek guerrillas.84  
 
3.3.2 Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 
Yugoslav-Albanian relations were the other component in Tito’s future-
Yugoslavia. Just like his intentions regarding Bulgaria, Tito wanted to see Albania as 
the seventh constituent republic of Yugoslavia. “It was assumed that Yugoslavia’s 
Kosovo region, with its large Albanian component, would become part of Albania, 
which would in turn become either seventh unit of the Yugoslav federation.”85 On 
this subject Beloff says that Yugoslav-Albanian rapprochement was reciprocal and 
Albanian leader Enver Hoxha was sure to subjugate his country. She adds “if we are 
to believe Enver Hoxha, Tito treated Albania as a ‘carbon copy’ of what Stalin had 
done to Yugoslavia later.”86 This summary is a bit general, as Yugoslav-Albanian 
relations were closer and more complicated than what Beloff presents. Wilson makes 
a more detailed explanation of the big-brother relationship which was established 
during the war continued in the post-war environment: 
The Albanian Army, economic administration and Party were controlled 
by men who were either nominated by CPY [Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia] or notoriously acceptable to it. Joint Yugoslav-Albanian 
                                                 
83 Wilson, 37. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Pavlowitch, Tito: Yugoslavia's Great Dictator, 53. 
86 Beloff, 143; Dedijer says, Yugoslavia, however, in joint-stock companies at the request of the 
Albanians, concentrated on promoting Albania’s productive resources. Dedijer, 195. 
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companies for the development of Albania’s resources were established 
in 1945-6, in accordance with Soviet practice, and in November 1946 a 
commercial treaty was signed which linked the Albanian economy very 
closely with that of Yugoslavia.87  
 
By any means, without Stalin’s support Tito could not freely act like that 
towards Yugoslavia’s neighbors. Besides, while Stalin was trying to strengthen his 
position by linking up all Communist parties with Moscow, it would be hard for Tito 
to Yugoslavize Albania since Soviet intelligence was acting everywhere. Ironically, 
Tito treated Yugoslavia’s neighbors just like Stalin did Eastern Europe. It seems like 
being another Stalin in the Balkans was Tito’s unintended fate, because there were 
grounds for acting like the way he did. First of all, the communist system in 
Yugoslavia was not established by the Soviet Union, it was not of a top-down kind. 
Secondly, Tito, as the sole ruler of Yugoslavia, together with his partisan comrades, 
established a working economy, administration, and had an army which was one of 
the largest in Europe at that time. Coupled with Stalin’s support, Tito perceived 
Stalin’s encouragements as a justification of his expansionist intentions in the region. 
Maybe he over-exaggerated his position in the Soviet orbit; because Stalin’s support 
was limited to issues which did not involve any confrontation with the West and in 
line with Soviet interests in the region. A report compiled by Aleksandr Lavrishchev, 
the chief of the Balkan Sector in the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
“On the question of Yugoslav-Albanian Relations,” summarizes Soviet cautiousness 
regarding the signing of pacts and alliances between Albania and Yugoslavia as, 
“this position was based on the need to avoid a possible negative reaction from the 
                                                 
87 Wilson, 35-36; General Hoxha, with a numerous suite, arrived in Belgrade on the 23rd June. It 
appears that the visit is merely in the nature of a political demonstration. I have been assured by the 
Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs that tendency to bestow friendship and co-operation was not 
contemplated and a Bulgarian press report of an impending Yugoslav-Albanian federation has been 
indignantly denied. On the other hand, Hoxha has, in a press statement, spoken of the certain 
conclusions of an agreement without specifying its nature. Clutton to Bevin, June 29, 1946, Belgrade  
Jarman, Robert L. ed. Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 693. 
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West which would have complicated Yugoslavia’s and Albania’s positions in the 
international arena.”88 In reality, while Stalin was cautious about his relations with 
the West, he did not want to go against his wartime allies, and at least wanted to 
protect the status quo in his relations by trying to avoid unnecessary conflicts which 
would arise from such cases in the Balkans.  
 
3.4 Yugoslavia and the U.S. 
In the post-World War II environment, Tito had gradually accelerated his 
aggression towards the United States; two American airplanes were attacked by 
Yugoslav fighters on Yugoslav territory in August 1946 which led to unintended 
tensions. In detail, on August 9, 1946, Yugoslav fighters forced down a U.S. C-47 air 
transport on a flight for the reason that plane had violated Yugoslav airspace. On the 
10th August the United States Charge d’Affaires was handed by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs a note protesting strongly against alleged unauthorized flights of 
American aircraft.89 On August 19, a second C-47 was attacked for the same reason, 
but this time the plane crashed. Based on Ambassador Patterson’s report to the State 
Department on August 20, Yugoslavia did not accept any responsibility for the 
reason that “since Yugoslav government has repeatedly drawn attention to 
unauthorized flights and consequences which might arise.”90 On the 19th, the U.S. 
Embassy rejected the Yugoslav note of protest relating to the first such incident and 
protested, demanding access to the passengers and crew of the first aircraft. After the 
                                                 
88 Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on 
Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” CWIHP 10, 
(March 1998): 114. 
89 Peake to Bevin, Aug. 19, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 
1918-1965, Vol. 3:1938-1948, 707. 
90 Patterson to Byrnes, Aug,, 20, 1946, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS),1946, 6:925; quoted in Lees, 14. 
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second incident the State Department sent the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington a 
particularly strong note of protest.91 
Dedijer also deals with the reasons of this event as “our shooting down of 
American planes that had flown over our territory without permission despite 
numerous protest notes from our authorities.”92 Whatever the reason was, plane 
incidents would affect the Yugoslav image in the US negatively, while Yugoslavia 
was a country receiving aid from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation. 
Coupled with this, the timing of these incidents coincided with the Paris Peace 
Conference where Yugoslavs were not satisfied with the ongoing process about the 
Trieste dispute.93 However, Tito’s independent moves and aggressiveness was also 
perceived negatively in Moscow. On the timing of these incidents Lorraine M. Lees 
says that “the Yugoslavs probably aimed their show of force at the Soviet Union as 
well as at the West, to indicate that the Yugoslavs would act unilaterally to secure 
their territorial demands if the Soviets did not adequately support them.”94 Yugoslavs 
wanted to give the same message to the Westerners and Soviets simultaneously that 
they may act unilaterally if necessary. During the Paris Peace Conference, Trieste 
was not only a problem for the Yugoslavs. Secretary of State, Byrnes summarized 
the importance of this territory in his report that: 
The prosperity and welfare of Trieste are linked not only with Italy but 
with Yugoslavia and the countries of Central Europe. It is the natural 
outlet of central Europe to Mediterranean. The only railroads entering 
Trieste come through Yugoslavia and are controlled by Yugoslavia…If 
the area were joined either with Italy or Yugoslavia, its political and 
economic relations with the other would suffer.95 
                                                 
91 Peake to Bevin, Aug. 24, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-
1965, Vol. 3: 1938-1948, 709. 
92 Dedijer, 92. 
93 For further information on the Italo-Yugoslav conflict see, Gaetano Salvemini, “The Italo-Jugoslav 
Frontier” Foreign Affairs 24, No.2 (Jan., 1946): 341-346. 
94 Lees, 19. 
95 Report by Secretary Byrnes from the Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers July 15, 
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Nonetheless, Yugoslavs could find strong support from the Soviet Union when even 
Stalin did not want to enter a major quarrel with the Western powers, but Yugoslavs 
were not satisfied with the Trieste settlement.96 By this instance, Tito saw the extent 
of Soviet support in Yugoslav relations with the Western states. On the contrary, 
Trieste settlement strengthened Yugoslavs’ anti-Western thoughts. According to 
Dedijer “the conflict over Trieste in 1945” and “the American delegation’s lack of 
understanding of our demands at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946”97 were the 
main factors why relations with Washington were obstructed.  
While did American side did not want Trieste to fall under Yugoslav rule and 
the Soviet Union supported Yugoslavia to a certain extent, Yugoslavs did not give up 
their claims on Trieste and avoided Soviet suggestions. If Yugoslav and Soviet 
documents regarding the discussion on Trieste are compared, it is seen that the 
Yugoslavs did not take into account the Soviet proposal about the future of Trieste. 
The Yugoslav record of Tito-Stalin conversation on 27-28 May 1946 shows that: 
S[talin]: “The English and Americans don’t want to give you 
Trieste!” (chuckling). 
T[ito]: thanked for the support, [said] that the people send their 
greetings to Stalin and Molotov, [speaks] of the great political 
significance [of Soviet support]. 
Molotov: “But you still do not have Trieste... 
                                                 
96 Summary: Molotov’s first proposal was that Trieste should be ceded to Yugoslavia, satellite of the 
Soviet Union, as a “reward” for that country’s “great sacrifices” in the war. Byrnes and Bevin would 
have none of that. They finally agreed to the internationalization of the city under an administration to 
be set up by the United Nations. Molotov had to agree. His next move was to agree to 
internationalization, but the boundaries he proposed to draw would have converted Trieste into an 
enclave wholly within Yugoslavian territory. Byrnes and Bevin would have none of that either, 
insisting that the projected “free city” of Trieste must have a frontier with Italy, which, unlike 
Yugoslavia, is very much under the Anglo-American thumb. Molotov had to climb down again and 
agree to boundary lines proposed by Bidault, acting as mediator between the Anglo-American and 
Soviet representatives. “The Big Four at Paris (August 1946)” Fourth International, No.7 No.8, 
(August 1946): 242-245; Belgrade has witnessed this week two “spontaneous” demonstrations. The 
first took place on the 16th July as a protest against the Foreign ministers’ decision on Trieste. It was 
organized by the trades unions and the demonstrators marched in a moist orderly manner past the 
French, American and British Embassies but not, of course, past the Russian. Clutton to Bevin, July 
21, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1918-1965, Vol. 3: 1938-
1948, 699. 
97 Dedijer, 92. 
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T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support] is of great pol[itical] 
importance...”98 
 
The Soviet document of the same meeting is more detailed and included Stalin 
and Molotov’s suggestions on the solution of Trieste problem: 
At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance 
of Trieste being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just 
the city itself or the city suburbs, and which status would be better – 
along the lines of Memel [Klaipeda, Lithuania] or those of Danzig 
[Gdansk, Poland].99Tito replied that the suburbs of the city are inhabited 
by Slovenians. Only the city itself would be acceptable. Though he 
would like to continue to argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. 
Further, Tito, in the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed 
gratitude to com. Molotov for the support that the Soviet delegation 
showed in the discussion of the question of the Italian- Yugoslav border 
at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris.5 Com. Molotov 
gave a report on the differences in status between Memel and Danzig, 
pointing out that the status along the lines of Memel is more 
acceptable.100 
 
Yugoslav concerns regarding the United States were not limited to the Trieste 
issue. During the Paris Conference, the Yugoslav press concentrated on the “justice 
of Soviet line, and everywhere contrasted with injustice of the West.”101 Yugoslav 
perception was the same with the Soviet Union. In the Marxist-Leninist sense, 
Yugoslavs perceived the United States and other Westerners as ideological enemies, 
and mistrust was growing against every single U.S. move. Tito told Stalin that - 
regarding the question of economic cooperation- “Yugoslavia did not want to turn to 
                                                 
98 Appendix II. 
99 Under the Versailles treaty of 1919, Dazing (Gdansk) and an adjoining region, up until that time 
under claim by Poland from Germany, were given a special status under the protection of the League 
of Nations. Danzig had the status of a demilitarized free city with its own laws and government 
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to whose customs system it also belonged. Memel (Klaipeda) and its adjoining region, until 1919 
having also belonged to Germany but now claimed by the new Lithuanian state, was at first put under 
the control of the Entente, and then transferred to Lithuanian authority under the conditions of the 
special convention of 1924. It stipulated significant autonomy for Memel in its internal affairs, laws 
and executive organs, but which nevertheless had to operate under the parameters of the Lithuanian 
constitution. Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival 
Documents on Stalin’s Meetings with Communist Leaders of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 1946-1948,” 
CWIHP 10, (March 1998): 123, n. 14. 
100 Appendix I. 
101 Clutton  to Bevin, May 18, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 
1918-1965, Vol. 3: 1938-1948,  682. 
 45 
 
the United States for credit. If America were to agree to provide loans, then this 
would be tied to demands for political concessions from Yugoslavia.”102 The Trieste 
problem and Paris Peace Conference strengthened Yugoslav anger towards the U.S. 
Most importantly, Yugoslavs, too, perceived the Marshall Plan as an American 
move to divide the Communist camp and blockade Yugoslav interests, and most 
probably it was this thinking that played a role in their maintenance of support to the 
Greek guerrillas. As opposed to the U.S. Ambassador Patterson’s early comments 
about Tito and his regime,103 Yugoslav-American relations were moving backwards. 
Yugoslavs openly criticized American presence in Yugoslavia, and even accused 
American Embassy staff of espionage and “On 17 September 1946 Ambassador 
Kosanović [of Yugoslavia to the U.S.]…claimed that U.S. planes had been 
smuggling arms into Yugoslavia to those opposed to the regime.104 In the upcoming 
months, Tito blamed the Americans and gave an interview on the October 14 to 
representatives of the New York Times, Life and Time, and argued that the United 
States Government was responsible for the present deterioration of Yugoslav-
American relations.105Another example for the Yugoslav behavior is from John 
Moors Cabot from U.S. Belgrade Embassy:  
Belgrade is about as difficult and exasperating a post as I have ever had 
and I must confess it is a depressing experience to be here. However I see 
                                                 
102 Appendix I. 
103 Ambassador Patterson: I said, Mr. President, Tito is colorful, dynamic, hospitable, a military 
genius, but a thorough communist and his political and economic policy is not ours. Nevertheless 
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reasonably well; quoted in Beloff, 133, n. 10. 
104 Sava Kosanović to Byrnes, Sept. 27, 1947, Byrnes Papers; Byrnes to Kosanović, Sept. 28, 1947, 
Byrnes Papers; Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold 
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incident when a United States officer attempted to prevent the arrest of Yugoslav engineer who had 
constructed the cemetery. The Yugoslavs, who were evidently afraid that the cemetery would produce 
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June 8, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 1938-1948, Vol. 3: 1938-
1948, 687 
105 Peake to Bevin,  Oct. 19, 1946, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed. Yugoslavia-Political Diaries, 
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a few small projections in the monolithic mass which I may be able to 
grab hold of and I shall do my best to do so. At the moment the Jugs are 
conducting a charming campaign to harass, humiliate and intimidate the 
Embassy by pinching Jug employees, giving officers the runaround, etc. 
Give me, oh Lord, a long temper!106 
 
In short, Yugoslavia had been a problematic state for the US and its diplomatic 
personnel until the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. This was also true for other Western 
diplomats; Sir Charles Peake of Great Britain confirmed Cabot’s feelings and made a 
comparison between Soviet and Yugoslav behaviors by quoting from Dean Acheson 
in his summary of 1946 for Yugoslavia. He also points out the fact that Yugoslav 
aggression had strengthened Western perception of the communist camp as 
monolithic:  
In the sphere of foreign affairs, Mr. Dean Acheson’s characterization of 
Russian policy as “aggressive and expanding nationalism” could as fitly 
be applied the views and purposes of the Yugoslav government. 
Throughout the year they have kept their mouths wide open, and have 
spared no effort to make themselves the greatest possible nuisance at 
every conference which their representatives have attended. That this has 
been so as no doubt been due partly to the fact that it suited the purpose 
of the senior partner in Moscow; partly to an attempt both to assuage 
popular discontent at home and to keep the allegiance of someone who, 
while unsympathetic to communism are enthusiastic for territorial 
expansion.107 
 
 
 
3.5 Resurrection of Cominform 
 
The year 1947 was marked with two developments in Europe: first, the Truman 
Doctrine and Marshall Plan, second, the resurrection of the Comintern – it was much 
larger - under the name of Communist Information Bureau  (Cominform) by the 
Communist Parties of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, France, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Rumania, Italy and Hungary. It was not a coincidence that the Marshall Plan 
                                                 
106 Cabot to Sidney E. O’Donoghue, Feb 20, 1947, in the Diplomatic Papers of John Cabot Moore, 
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and Cominform followed each other. In 1943, Stalin dissolved the Comintern as a 
result of wartime conditions since “the end of the war was still far off and he thought 
that the masses in various countries would rally to the struggle against Germany 
more fervently if communist parties were allowed greater independence.”108 In 
particular, the establishment of Cominform had different meanings. It was a reaction 
against the Marshall Plan; on the other hand Moscow “first considered participating 
in the project together with its allies, so that it could blunt the plan’s political thrust 
while taking advantage of its economic benefits,”109  then, “the creation in September 
1947 of the Cominform as an organization of their dependent communist parties 
designed both to supervise their campaign to destabilize the pro-American 
governments in Western Europe and to consolidate Soviet control of Eastern 
Europe.”110  Marshall Plan was perceived by the Soviet Union as a political offensive 
and their response took the same line. Andrei A. Zhdanov openly stated the doctrine, 
“Moscow's perception of two hostile blocs along with its determination to fight the 
capitalist one by any means short of war - the essence of the Cold War,”111 during  
the founding meeting of the Cominform.  
                                                 
108 Dedijer, 118. 
109 "Direktivy Sovetskoi delegatsii na soveshchanii ministrov inostrannykh del v Parizhe" [Directives 
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The establishment of Cominform centered in Belgrade was not a coincidence 
either. “In the initial meeting in September 1947 [Edward] Kardelj and [Milovan] 
Djilas were cast in star parts and Belgrade was selected as the seat of the projected 
Cominform secretariat.”112 While Tito acted independently of Moscow, it was a good 
decision to establish the center of the Communist world in the Yugoslav capital and 
put a much closer eye on Tito. Pavlowitch comments on the Belgrade centered 
Cominform as Yugoslavia held an “important role in this new coordinating body of 
Europe’s main Communist parties, which was a good camouflage for Soviet control, 
and one that would help to harness the Yugoslavs’ pro-dynamism to the collective 
aims of the Soviet camp that was being set up.”113 According to Beloff’s perception, 
“Stalin still evidently hoped that he could satisfy his protégé’s appetites within the 
Soviet orbit.”114 The main objective that lied behind Cominform was not to appease 
Yugoslavia, but the Cominform actually allowed the Soviets to expand their control 
over Communist parties. The Cominform centered in Belgrade meant more control 
of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In this case Pavlowitch’s view is more plausible. 
Till that time Tito had tried to act in accordance with Soviet foreign and 
domestic policy115 which actually fit with Yugoslavia, or harmonize his plans with 
Moscow; but long before the Tito-Stalin split, Tito and Dimitrov defied Stalin by 
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declaring that they had agreed on signing a treaty of friendship, cooperation and 
mutual assistance at the end of the 1947. Based on the information from a document 
on the secret Soviet-Yugoslav-Bulgarian meeting of February 10, 1948, the Soviets 
perceived this behavior as it was the first of defiance of Tito and Dimitrov of the 
Soviet Union.116 The Soviet record of the Tito-Stalin conversation of May 27, 1946, 
indicated clearly that Stalin was against any sort of treaty or alliance until the signing 
of a peace treaty with Bulgaria, but this option was outside of Soviet plans:   
Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During the initial stages 
things could be limited to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, 
though indeed, more needs to be done. Tito agreed with this. Com. 
Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the fact 
that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was 
perceived as a former enemy. Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not 
be of significant importance. For example; the Soviet Union signed a 
treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland was even recognized by 
other countries.117 
 
British Foreign service reports referred to this diplomatic process as a mere 
technical detail. Charles Peake, on Yugoslavia’s completion of treaties of mutual 
assistance with every country in the Soviet orbit, said that “treaties were concluded 
with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary as soon as the ratification of Peace Treaties 
made such action technically possible.”  He maintained that these new treaties were 
different from the previous ones in that “they no longer provide for common action 
in defense against Germany and her former or future allies and associates, but 
impose instead obligations of common defense against Germany or any 
aggressor.”118  
                                                 
116 Report of Milovan Djilas about a Secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav Meeting, Feb. 10, 1948,  in 
Leonid Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War: Archival Documents on 
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3.6 Background to the Crisis: From Secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav 
Meeting of February 10, 1948 to the Tito-Stalin Split 
 
Whatever the reasons of mutual assistance treaties, it is understood that they 
had to be signed with the consent of Moscow. Later it was observed that, Stalin’s real 
intention was to maintain coordination with these states in Balkan affairs. In this 
regard, the secret meetings of three states’ delegates indicated the root of the 
problems and reasons of Soviet dissatisfaction with Yugoslav and Bulgarian actions. 
Leonid Gibianskii’s work for the Woodrow Wilson Institute - Cold War International 
History Project provides archival documents and is extremely helpful for a clear 
understanding of the reasons of changing Soviet behavior towards Yugoslavia and a 
Balkan federation, and causes of the Tito-Stalin split.  
Accordingly, the first Soviet critic targeted the Yugoslav-Bulgar treaty, and the 
reason why it should not be signed. Molotov stated that:  
The Soviet government informed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian 
governments—and they agreed to this—that one should not conclude a 
treaty with Bulgaria until the expiration of limitations imposed by the 
Peace Treaty [with Bulgaria in 1946]. However, the Yugoslav and 
Bulgarian governments concluded the treaty, and the Soviet government 
learned about it from the newspapers.119 
 
This issue was presented as one of the examples of Molotov’s statement of 
“this was already a matter of serious disagreement between them [the Soviets] and 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These disagreements were inadmissible both from the 
party and the state point of view.”120 This meeting and Soviet discords were 
extremely important for the future of possible Balkan federation and these countries’ 
relations with Moscow. Another example for Moscow’s disagreements was 
witnessed after the ratification of Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty of mutual assistance in 
                                                 
119 Appendix III 
120 Ibid. Also, on the first point [of disagreements] he [Kardelj] says that it was not a treaty that was 
published, but only a communiqué about the discussion leading to a treaty; he adds that we 
[Yugoslavs and Bulgarians] were too hasty. 
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Belgrade, continued. Sir Charles Peake informed that, after the meeting “the 
speeches made no reference to the Federation or Macedonia.”121 In addition, Dedijer 
informed that:  
…toward the end of January, Georgi Dimitrov, Prime Minister of 
Bulgaria, visited Rumania and at a press conference answered questions 
as to whether a Balkan federation or confederation would be formed. 
Dimitrov said the question was premature, but added, “When it comes to 
creating such a federation or confederation, our people will not ask the 
imperialists and will not heed their opposition, but will solve the question 
themselves, guided by their own interests bound up with the interests of 
other peoples and the international cooperation necessary to them and to 
other nations.122  
 
As a result of this, on February 10, 1948, the Bulgarian side was accused by 
“the declaration of Dimitrov about a Federation of East European and Balkan 
countries, including Greece - lack of coordination between the USSR, on one side, 
and Bulgaria, on the other.”123 It looked like Moscow perceived both the signing of 
the treaty and Dimitrov’s explanations as disturbing elements against Moscow’s 
stand in the Communist camp and in the international scene. In this regard, Molotov 
added the Soviet complaint that “comrade Dimitrov grew too fond of press 
conferences. Meanwhile, if Dimitrov and Tito make announcements for the press, the 
whole world believes that such is also the view of the Soviet Union.”124 Milovan 
                                                 
121 Peake to Foreign Office Feb. 5, 1948, Belgrade, Jarman, Robert L. ed., Yugoslavia-Political Diarie 
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was put forth of creating a federation or a confederation, a customs union that would include both 
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Djilas added that Stalin jumped on the federation question and said that “the Poles 
who were in Moscow in those days, spoke against [the Federation].” Djilas viewed 
Stalin’s explanation as: 
That means that the Soviet representatives first asked them what they 
thought of Dimitrov’s declaration. And they said that they agreed, but 
when Stalin told them that the Soviet Union was against it, they also said 
that they were against, but they had previously believed that this was a 
position and request of Moscow.125  
 
Soviet opposition to a timeless and a non-Soviet initiated federation continued 
through the meeting. Stalin stated “that the subsequent clarification by Dimitrov (he 
probably had in mind the announcement of the Bulgarian telegraph agency) 
explained nothing.” Even Stalin made a comparison with the previous efforts 
towards a customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia and said, “how Austria-
Hungary had thwarted a customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia, and adds that it 
means - the Germans had worked against a customs union, and now we do (i.e. the 
Soviet Union).” Lastly, Stalin accused Dimitrov of “diverting attention from 
domestic issues to foreign affairs-Federation, etc.” At some point, he even said that 
he was aware of Bulgarian and Yugoslav perception of Soviet behavior: “the 
                                                                                                                                          
Poland and Greece. Com. Georgii Dimitrov speaks of all these things without being granted authority 
by anyone concerned. This is misguided in principle and is tactically harmful. This eases the burden of 
the creators of the Western bloc.” And further: “We must take the position in such a way that all 
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Bulgarians and Yugoslavs think that the USSR stands against a unification of 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but it does not want to admit it.” 126 
In this meeting, a last criticism touched the Yugoslavs. The issue was “the 
introduction of a Yugoslav division into Southern Albania - lack of coordination 
between the USSR, on one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other.”127 Molotov told that 
“they [in Moscow] accidentally learned about the entry of the Yugoslav troops into 
Albania. The Albanians told the Russians that they thought that the entry of the 
Yugoslav troops had been coordinated with the Soviet Union, and meanwhile it was 
not so.128” Furthermore, Molotov pointed out to a message from [Soviet ambassador 
in Yugoslavia] Lavrent’ev on his meeting with Tito. According to the message, “a 
decision about the entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania-coordinated with Hoxha-
really exists.”129 The most interesting part of this message was “Tito said that he does 
not agree with Moscow that in case of an entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, the 
Anglo-Americans would intervene beyond a campaign in the press.”130 Tito 
maintained that “if it came to anything serious, Yugoslavia and the USSR would sort 
it out [raskhlebivat kashu] together, however, after the Soviet demarche about this 
issue he would not send a division [to Albania].”131 Molotov explains Tito’s action as 
a mistake: “Tito did not inform them about his disagreement with Moscow.” 
Molotov concluded that “disagreements are inadmissible both from the party and 
                                                 
126 Appendix III; Before these statements by Stalin, the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov’s 
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state viewpoint and that disagreements should be taken out [for discussion], and not 
concealed, and that it is necessary to inform and consult.”132 
Vladimir Dedijer explained Soviet behavior as being shifty. A Yugoslav 
military delegation was in Moscow since the beginning of January to discuss military 
aid to Yugoslavia. Moscow invited Milovan Djilas with this delegation (the 
significance of this invitation will be discussed later) with special reference to 
Albania and they met before the Yugoslav-Soviet-Bulgarian meeting; late January 
developments played a ole in the tripartite meeting:  
At their first meeting Stalin told Djilas that Yugoslavia “should swallow 
up Albania” and ask him to cable Tito along these lines. (Later, in 
Belgrade, Stalin’s move was interpreted as an attempt to compromise 
Tito’s government as having imperialistic designs on Albania.) Stalin 
also promised that the military delegation would get everything it was 
asking, but the stalemate did not break.133 
 
Eventually, Stalin’s accusations on Yugoslav behavior looks like Yugoslav 
actions were ordered from Moscow first to in order to accuse Tito of aggressive 
behavior. Pavlowitch comments that “these were typical Stalinist moves, designed to 
test the Yugoslavs.”134 This seems logical as Stalin’s other statements regarding 
Albania proves. At one point, Stalin drew attention to the consequences of a possible 
Yugoslav invasion of Albania: 
The three world powers—the USSR, England, and America guaranteed 
Albania’s independence by a Special agreement. Albania is our weakest 
spot, because other states are either members of the United Nations, or 
recognized, etc., but Albania is not [recognized]. If Yugoslav troops 
entered Albania, the reactionaries in England and America would be able 
to use it and step forward as defenders of Albanian independence.135 
 
More than this focus change, Stalin proposed the opposite strategy towards 
Albania and said, “Instead of sending troops we should work intensely to build up 
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133 Dedijer, 30. 
134 Stalin said half-jokingly that the Yugoslavs are afraid of having Russians in Albania and because 
of this are in a hurry to send their troops. Pavlowitch, 24. 
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the Albanian army, we should teach the Albanians, and then, if they are attacked, let 
the Albanian Skupcina [parliament] appeal to Yugoslavia for help.”136 Actually, the 
Albanian issue was directly linked to the ongoing Greek Civil War and the possible 
invasion of Albania by Greek monarcho-fascists appeared in discussions before. 
When Edward Kardelj “mentioned the constant Greek provocations, the weakness of 
the Albanian army” Yugoslavia was “linked to Albania economically” and 
Yugoslavia underwrite its army,” Stalin interrupted and mentioned that “one should 
not have any faith in the Albanian army, and added that the Albanians must be taught 
and their army must be built up;”137 he repeated his non-interventionist tone towards 
Albania again.  Molotov was more critical on this issue when he said “they have no 
information about any kind of attack on Albania and wondered that we [Yugoslavs] 
withhold our information from them”; and argued that “the anti-Albanian campaign 
in Greece is worsening.”138  
In this meeting, Stalin changed his stance on the issue of assisting the Greek 
communists. He mentioned that he had doubts about the success of these guerillas 
and told “if there are no conditions for victory, one must not be afraid to admit it.” 
He also said that “[Yugoslavs] should not link the future of [Yugoslavia] with a 
victory of the guerrillas in Greece.”139 Several times in this conversation, Stalin 
implied his negative behavior regarding the support of Greek communists. This was 
a clear warning to Yugoslavia, but they chose to sustain their support.  
One last point is through the end of the meeting Stalin made one more 
maneuver and talked about Soviet plans of establishing three federations, and stated 
that “Bulgaria and Yugoslavia may unite tomorrow if they wish.” When the 
                                                 
136 Ibid. 
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Yugoslav delegate responded that Yugoslavia was “not in a hurry to unify with 
Bulgaria and Albania,” Stalin insisted on saying that “it should not come too late, 
and that the conditions for that are ripe,” he even said “one [should] even beg[i]n a 
discussion about the name of [a united] state.”140 This kind of a shift in Stalin’s 
policy cannot be explained except that he wanted to know the other side’s response. 
Dedijer noted that Stalin’s sudden demand created question marks in the Yugoslav 
representatives’ minds; they “felt that something else was going concealed 
behind”.141 Dedijer also called Stalin’s move the first round of “silent strangulation” 
of Yugoslavia. As a result, after a session of Central Committee on March 1, 1948, 
Yugoslavia rejected the option of federation with Bulgaria and Stalin lost. 
 
3.6.1 Last Phase: Cold War Crisis and the End of Tito’s Balkan Dream 
Tito was suspicious of Stalin. He was invited to Moscow, but excused himself 
and instead sent his comrades. They returned with a treaty on mutual consultation on 
foreign policy matters and Moscow’s criticisms. Just like he was treating Albania as 
part of Yugoslavia, Stalin treated Yugoslavia as his dominion. Tito did not hate 
Stalin; but he wanted, at least, to control his domestic affairs independently. The 
situation of Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia represented the beginning of open 
conflict with Belgrade. Soviet officials and experts were living in Yugoslavia under 
better conditions than ordinary Yugoslavs. “As early as 1946 Tito had told the Soviet 
government that the number of Soviet specialists in Yugoslavia would have to be 
reduced for financial reasons.”142 Additionally, just as Yugoslavia increased its 
control over Albania by economic ties, Stalin tried to control Yugoslavia by 
                                                 
140 Appendix III; When Dimitrov says there are important economic issues, Stalin cut him short by 
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142 Ibid. 104. Dedijer informs that Soviet staff’s salaries were four times as high as Yugoslav army 
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establishing joint-stock companies totally controlled by the senior partner, 
exploitation through manipulating prices, and infiltration into the military and 
political apparatus. Dedijer made an interesting comparison with Soviet policy 
towards Yugoslavia and U.S. policy during the Theodore Roosevelt era; he said that: 
…looking at Stalin’s method in perspective, I cannot but conclude that he 
was not very original. Quite some time back, when American Marines 
were conquering some Central American state or other for the benefit of 
American companies, Teddy Roosevelt had said: “Speak softly and carry 
a big stick!143 
 
Stalin started to use his stick just after Yugoslav rejection of a Moscow 
oriented Balkan federation. On March 18 and 19 Stalin ordered all Soviet military 
and civilian experts to withdraw from Yugoslavia for the reason that they were 
surrounded by hostility.144 On March 20, the Communist party of Yugoslavia sent a 
letter to the Central Committee of The Communist Party of the Soviet Union trying 
to explain that there were misunderstandings.145 On March 27, Stalin’s ultimatum-
letter was delivered by the Yugoslavs. It was full of accusations meaning 
degeneration of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and his discomfort about anti-
Soviet statements in Yugoslavia.146 For instance: 
The majority of members of the central Committee of the party were not 
elected but co-opted… Capitalist elements are growing in the rural 
                                                 
143 Ibid. 95-96. 
144 Four days before Marshall Tito was informed of the Soviet Government’s decision to withdraw its 
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Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Tito et al., March 27, 1948, in Robert Bass 
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districts, similarly in the cities, but the party leadership is not taking any 
measures to restrict them… We think that the political career of Trotsky 
is sufficiently instructive…”147 
 
The tone and content of letter was both warning and offensive. The Central 
Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party sent its response on April 13, 
addressing with all accusations, and reminding the merits and achievements of 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia.  But the tone of their letter was softer as compared 
to Stalin’s; in general Yugoslavs were defending themselves that everything was a 
result of misinformation and accordingly misunderstandings, and glorified Stalin 
with compliments.”148 On April 24, the Soviet government cancelled the treaty 
concerning foreign policy matters signed in February. On May 4, a much more 
offensive letter was received by the Yugoslavs. This time it was underrating 
Yugoslav communism, accusing Tito and Kardelj of their previous letter and 
reminding of Soviet support during and after the war: 
No one can deny the merits and achievements of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party… But it must be said that the merits and achievements 
of, say, the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania are not less than those of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party… At a time when the people’s liberation movement in 
Yugoslavia was in the throes of a severe crisis…the soviet Army came to 
the aid of Yugoslavia…If comrades Tito and Kardelj would take this 
[sic] circumstances into consideration as an indisputable fact, they would 
be less noisy about their merits and would behave with more deference 
and modesty.149   
 
Yugoslavia was not the only country that constituted problems for the Soviet 
Union. Tito and Yugoslavs were trying to appease Stalin, which meant that Yugoslav 
responses to Stalin were not a sort of open rebellion. In contrast, Czechoslovakia was 
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a more problematic country in the implementation of Soviet power. Most 
interestingly, the Czech government indicated its readiness to participate in the 
Marshall Plan, then reversed it. On February 25, 1948, Czech communists took 
advantage of the disorder among their political opponents and unstable social 
environment, and seized power in Prague.150 This action and Soviet role in the coup 
attracted attention in the international platform. UN intervention into the event was 
blockaded by the Soviet Union based on the idea that the Greek Civil War was also a 
domestic affair. Ambassador Warren R. Austin, The United States representative in 
the Security Council, stated on April 12, 1948, even stated that “there are groups of 
men outside of Czechoslovakia who were leaders in the political life of this country 
prior to the coup.”151 Communist parties of Eastern Europe were curious about 
possible loss in the elections, and in these circumstances the Soviet Union intervened 
into the affair by every means possible. For instance, the same situation appeared in 
Hungary and the U.S. criticized electoral procedures and suppression of opposition in 
Hungary harshly. The U.S. Department of State protested this sort of activity as 
being “unable to achieve their political ends through normal constitutional processes, 
the Hungarian Communists, together with other members of the Leftist bloc” applied 
apolitical measures.152 Later, the U.S. representative of Allied Controlled 
Commission for Hungary sent a note to Soviet Acting Chairman on June 11, 1947, 
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and protested the “Soviet interference in political affairs in derogation of the 
continued exercise of democratic rights.”153  
Whereas, during the secret Yugoslav-Soviet-Bulgarian meeting, Stalin blocked 
Tito’s own plans regarding Albania and Bulgaria because of a possible Western 
opposition. As seen from Czech and Hungarian examples, he did not care about this 
much; he cared more about consolidating his control in these states to strengthen his 
position against Western moves. Soviet moves in the Western European states also 
failed. “The communist attempts to paralyze French and Italian governments by 
violent demonstrations and strikes failed.” 154 In addition to that “Soviet efforts to 
dissuade the Western occupation powers from proceeding with the economic 
separation of their zones in Germany in preparation for a political separation of the 
part of the country they controlled”155 could not be achieved. As a repercussion, 
Soviet attempts fastened Western defense alliance plans and most importantly 
communist seizure of power in Prague had unwittingly given to Western alliance-
building a sufficient reason to encourage the process.156  
On May 19, 1948, the Central Committee of CPSU demanded that a delegation 
of the Yugoslav Central Committee attend the Cominform meeting and Stalin would 
attend too; they also wanted Tito to attend.157 Tito refused to attend, and one more 
provocative letter received by Tito on May 22, asserted that the Cominform had the 
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power to pass judgment upon the Yugoslav Communist Party.158 Tito did not go to 
the Cominform meeting in Bucharest, chose not to defend himself, and did not 
witness Stalin’s kick against Yugoslavia.  
On June 28, 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform for several 
reasons, not different from those reasons stated in Stalin’s letters. Ironically, the 
Yugoslavs were blamed for being not real Communists. The Cominform 
Communiqué included that “there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-
Leninism, to the international traditions of the Yugoslav Communist Party and to the 
United Socialist front,” and followed with “Their task is to compel their present 
leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break 
with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the 
united socialist front against imperialism.” The communiqué not only expelled 
Yugoslavia, but also left an opening for Yugoslavs to compensate for their faults. In 
particular the way of Yugoslav purification Cominform suggested was to replace of 
the Yugoslav leaders: “Should the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party 
prove incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new 
internationalist leadership of the Party.” On the contrary, Stalin’s feelings about the 
Yugoslav administrators and their situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
were realized as “Information Bureau considers that such a disgraceful, purely 
Turkish, terrorist regime cannot be tolerated in the Communist Party. The interests of 
the very existence and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party demand that 
an end be put to this regime.” 159 This part indicated that the real problem was about 
the Yugoslav administration, specifically Tito, not about Yugoslav communism. 
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Furthermore, Soviet-Yugoslav conflict in the spring of 1948 was shadowed by 
other incidents in Eastern Europe. According to Pavlowitch, Westerners initially, and 
paradoxically, perceived the Tito-Stalin split as “the Soviet dictator’s attempt to rein 
the more reckless elements in his camp as another of his tricks to dupe his enemies, 
and then mistook it for a Yugoslav declaration of independence.”160 Nevertheless, 
nobody expected the expelling of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in the summer of 
1948, even Tito himself. Based on Dedijer’s notes, Tito said: “Only then did 
everything become clear to me. All those elements I had considered accidental, for 
which I had found a thousand excuses, came together to form a whole, took on their 
true meaning…”161 The Cominform Communiqué, simply, shocked the world. It was 
both a surprise and an invitation to suspicious behavior. For the U.S., it was a victory 
for the Truman Administration without any effort, without any cost, even without 
implementing any policy; a victory beyond imagination.162 The division in the 
monolithic Communist Bloc found considerable attention in the world press while 
people had no idea about its causes. Even George Kennan and his Policy Planning 
staff called this event an “entirely new problem.”163  
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3.7 Conclusion: Entirely New Problem 
June 29 was a significant day for the Cold Warriors, but not for Yugoslavs 
themselves. The Yugoslav Communist Party maintained its defensive stance, and 
met in a plenary session, replied to all criticisms and accusations, and even published 
them together with Cominform resolution.164 Between July 21-27 at its Fifth 
Congress, where Tito gave an eight-hour speech and repeated their achievements, the 
Communist Party re-elected its Central Committee and “messages of loyalty and love 
were addressed to Stalin,” and Tito “rounded off the proceedings with the cry ‘Long 
live the Soviet Union! Long Live Comrade Stalin!”165 Yugoslavs were both hailing 
Stalin and insisting on the rightness of their actions and communism. Looking at 
Tito’s Yugoslavia’s initial reactions to Moscow, Western Press’ responses proved 
true; on June 29 Reuters reported that “a Washington correspondent of the New York 
Times says that informed persons in Washington do not see any break between 
Moscow and Belgrade and that Marshall Tito will either meet the Kremlin’s 
demands or be replaced.”166 G. Frederick Reinhardt’s confirmed that “there was a 
good deal of skepticism at first. In fact, there was a great deal of skepticism in the 
United States that this separation of Yugoslavia from the Moscow group was 
genuine. I think some people went so far as to say it was a trick.”167 However, at the 
end of July 1948, the prospects of reconciliation of relations between Moscow and 
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Belgrade seemed to have deteriorated, which will be dealt in the next chapter. As 
opposed to Yugoslav maintenance of seeking ways for the restoration of relations, 
Stalin maintained a different line.  
For the Yugoslav leadership, maintaining a successful appeasement policy 
towards Moscow, and simultaneously preserving the existence of Yugoslav ruling 
elites, was a dilemma.  Namely, to prove Yugoslav communists’ correctness, and 
legitimize and reinforce Tito’s position was a hard task on the domestic side. 
Pawlowitch commented that “they realized that the slightest sign of weakness would 
have a negative effect on their followers, and Tito himself knew what awaited him if 
he gave in.”168 The week of the Party Congress passed in the atmosphere of 
celebration and enthusiasm. It looked like the Congress was to prove that there was 
no problem regarding the Cominform issue, streets of Belgrade were decorated with 
huge portraits of Stalin, Lenin and Tito. Western observers noted that while 
Yugoslavs were passing counter- resolutions against Cominform as “inexact, 
incorrect and unjust,” but still expressed that the Russians would come and 
investigate the situation in the spot”169.  As George Kennan said later, Tito “had 
taken a bold and heavy responsibility upon himself by breaking with Stalin;”170 that 
all these efforts to maintain order in Yugoslavia were consequences of their surprised 
reaction.  
Surprisingly, the attitude of Albania and Bulgaria towards Yugoslavia changed 
rapidly after witnessing the extent of the outcome of Stalin’s temper. They left 
Yugoslavia alone just after the communiqué and joined CPSU criticisms against 
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav press devoted considerable space to wordy protests at the 
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attitude taken up by Albanian and Bulgarian communists.171 The Cominform 
communiqué itself represented the formal end of the dream of a Balkan federation, 
but the shift in the Bulgarian and Albanian approach to Yugoslavia meant the signal 
of Yugoslavia’s isolation in the Communist camp. Albania cut all its ties with 
Yugoslavia just after the Communiqué and denounced economic and financial 
treaties, and implemented an anti-Yugoslav propaganda. For Bulgaria, the situation 
was similar, even in the end of 1948 Macedonia papers had reported that it was “a 
crime in Bulgaria to read ‘Nova Macedonia’ or listen to Radio Skopje.”172 Yugoslavs 
realized the extent of opposition against themselves and held a similar stand 
immediately. During the meeting of the Congress of Communist party of Yugoslavia, 
it was also mentioned that “the problem of Macedonia has been a serious source of 
conflict between the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist Parties from the beginning 
of the war to the present day.”173 The end of federation plans during the first years of 
the Cold War brought an end to the possible settlement of the Macedonian problem. 
Returning to a similar pre-World War II situation in the region, Yugoslavs accused 
Bulgaria of “denying national rights to the inhabitants of Pirin Macedonia,” and, in 
turn, Bulgarians argued that the “Yugoslav Government were not interested in South 
Slav federation, but only in the annexation of Pirin Macedonia.”174 These moves did 
not only symbolize the end of the Balkan federation, but also the end of good 
neighborly relations. In Moscow, federation plans were automatically lifted. As D. F. 
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Fleming said, “the original Balkan federation idea which had been blessed in 
Moscow had now become as threat.”175  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
175 D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1950 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961): 512. 
 67 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
TRANSITION PERIOD: WHEN THE DEVIL WAS SICK, THE 
DEVIL A MONK WOULD BE 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter covers the period from the Tito-Stain split through the signing of 
the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation - The Treaty of Ankara – between Turkey, 
Yugoslavia and Greece on February 28, 1953. In this period, the U.S. implemented a 
new policy towards Yugoslavia just after the Cominform communiqué and overall 
U.S. policy had been revised based on the course of the Cold War. In this period, the 
first phase of relations covers the establishment of economic and military ties 
between the U.S.A. and Yugoslavia. The Truman Administration witnessed several 
problems in supporting a Communist country independent of Moscow. As John 
Foster Dulles commented in his book War and Peace on Yugoslavia as a communist 
country facing Stalinist rule; “Marshall Tito is a Communist. But his communism 
differs from Stalin’s. It is a brand that Stalin and the leaders of the Soviet Communist 
Party consider to be rank heresy.”176 The second phase is the reorientation of 
Yugoslavia towards the West and efforts towards the association of Yugoslavia into 
the western defense structure. Overall, transformation of U.S.-Yugoslav relations 
played a leading role in Yugoslavia’s relations with other states. However, U.S. 
relations with its allies were the determining factor in the American approach to 
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Yugoslavia’s association with military planning, but only in a limited way with the 
strengthening of Yugoslavia’s defense capabilities. With the establishment of NATO, 
the necessity of Yugoslavia’s association became clearer, but the progress was very 
slow as a result of the timing, Italo-Yugoslav relations and NATO obligations of 
Turkey and Greece. In comparison, Yugoslavs were trying to avoid any political 
commitment in their relations with western governments, especially with the U.S. 
Growing relations between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia since 1950 provided a 
basis for Yugoslavs to attain NATO protection without making direct commitments, 
and for the U.S. to establish a tie with Yugoslavia. Eventually, lack of coordination 
between the NATO allies and the newly appointed Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles’ approach prevailed. The February 1953 treaty signed between two NATO 
partners and Yugoslavia did not include any military commitment between the 
signatories. In this period, American moves faced obstacles several times and 
Yugoslav behavior indicated a fluctuating trend towards regional arrangements.  
Although the final treaty did not bring military commitments to the parties, it was a 
significant step towards a military alliance, and provided U.S. policymakers to fill, or 
at least neutralize, the hole in NATO’s southern flank. In this respect, this chapter 
analyzes the development of tripartite relations mainly based on the U.S. approach to 
the events since Greek and Turkish sides maintained their moves parallel with 
American suggestions. It will be emphasized that the pace of tripartite relations in the 
Balkans played a leading role in the postponement of Yugoslav association with 
NATO.  
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4.2 Difficulties of Developing a Sound Policy Towards Yugoslavia 
Cominform Communiqué was the second important event in late-June 1948. In 
the same week, on June 24, the Soviet Army started setting up barricades in Berlin, 
the beginning of the Berlin blockade which lasted for 11 months. The significance of 
the blockade lied in the materialization of conflict between the Soviet Union and the 
West for the first time in Cold War history. On the contrary, as a result of Tito’s 
growing problems with Moscow and following Yugoslav rapprochement with the 
Western Bloc, Yugoslavia would become the possible battleground in the first 
military clash. In the summer of 1948, the Soviet threat on Yugoslavia, based on 
Khrushchev’s account, reflected the extent of Stalin’s temper. Khruschev said “I’m 
absolutely sure that if the Soviet Union had a common border with Yugoslavia, 
Stalin would have intervened militarily….He [Stalin] was afraid of the American 
imperialists would have actively supported the Yugoslavs.”177 On the contrary, Stalin 
was very aware of the fragility of the situation in Europe, and his main objective was 
to make Yugoslavs obey his orders by means of economic isolation and anti-Titoist 
propaganda which began long before. The probability of Soviet military intervention 
into Yugoslavia increased in 1949 and 1950, not in the summer of 1948. Shortly, 
Berlin blockade was the center of attention when the Tito-Stalin split broke out. 
President Truman commented on the same line:  
We had to face the possibility that Russia might deliberately choose to 
make Berlin the pretext for war, but a more immediate danger was the 
risk that a trigger happy Russian pilot or hot-headed communist tank 
commander might create an incident that could ignite the powder keg.178  
 
As a result, American attitude had to be very carefully-designed towards the 
Yugoslav incident since the Berlin blockade was sensitive enough and had already 
raised tensions in Europe. For the U.S. policy-makers, previously Yugoslavia had 
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been perceived as the most loyal state of Moscow and it open clashed with the 
Western governments. Besides, as it is understood from Yugoslav Communist 
Party’s letters to the Soviet Union and the defenses published, June 28 meant no 
change in Yugoslavia’s perception of the Western world; Yugoslavia was still hostile 
towards the West.  
On June 30, 1948, Thomas G. Cassady, the Chief of the Special Procedures 
Group, sent a memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral 
Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, entitled “Covert Propaganda to Exploit Tito-Stalin Split.” 
He referred to the Cominform communiqué as “the first major open break in the 
satellite front which the Soviet Union has established in Central Europe.” The 
memorandum included few points but touched the possible advantages of the Tito-
Stalin split: 
The situation arising therefrom tends to arouse dissension and confusion 
in the world structure of Communism and invites exploitation by prompt, 
effective propaganda measures through every available medium, with the 
idea of achieving:  
a. A lessening of Moscow control over satellite governments.  
b. An increase of friction between leading Communist groups and 
individuals, with consequent decline in the effectiveness of world 
Communism as an agency of Soviet expansion.  
c. Conditions more favorable to the overthrow of Communist 
governments in satellite nations and to the strengthening of non-
Communist governments.179  
 
It should be noted that, these early premises played a role in shaping U.S. 
policy towards Yugoslavia. On June 29 and 30, Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter 
sent the first estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency to President Truman and 
these assessments prepared a basis for the planning of U.S. foreign policy regarding 
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Yugoslavia. According to Hillenkoetter’s letters, the Cominform Communique was a 
“desperate attempt” to “restore strict international Communist control over the more 
nationalist Yugoslav Communist Party.”180 There was also a section regarding the 
possible consequences of Yugoslav move as “the other satellites could not readily 
follow Tito’s example, but if Tito survived it would be hard for Kremlin to discipline 
other “nationalist” factions within the bloc.” George F. Kennan and his Policy 
Planning Staff‘s report (PPS 35) provided the basis for the development of U.S. 
Foreign Policy towards Yugoslavia. The report emphasized the significance of the 
break as: 
For the first time in history we may now have within the international 
community a communist state…independent of Moscow…A new factor 
of fundamental and profound significance has been introduced into the 
world communist movement by the demonstration that the Kremlin can 
be defied by one of its own minions. 181  
 
This report had become National Security Council (NSC) Report No. 18, and this 
series guided American-Yugoslav relations and Cold-War-wedge-strategy for the 
next several years.182 One interesting point was “normal development of economic 
relations” were related to Yugoslavia “willing to adopt a more cooperative 
attitude.”183 Overall, supporting a Communist country outside the control of the 
Soviet Union became a policy concern before Yugoslavia started to experience 
economic problems, and sought support from the Western countries. Together with 
this report, NSC 20/4 of November 23, 1948 "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the 
USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," represented the lines of U.S. 
foreign policy until the adoption of NSC 68 in 1950. One of the main clauses in this 
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document was, to “strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-
Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an 
important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political 
stability and their military capability.”184 Since Yugoslavia was a non-Soviet 
Communist country, it was in the frame of NSC 20/4, but re-orientation had to wait 
for a while. In contrast, under these circumstances supporting the Tito regime should 
become the main objective of U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia, but the problem was 
still lying in the materialization of a this policy. John C. Campbell informs that NSC 
18/2 was the paper which included the easing of trade restrictions for export to 
Yugoslavia and was a very minor action, “but the symbolic importance of it was 
considerable because this was the beginning of the whole thing.”185 Direct U.S. 
support had to wait for a while for a variety of reasons. The major obstacle was, as 
Campbell commented on the realization of the benefits of Tito-Stalin split and the 
difficulties of developing a clear-cut strategy towards Yugoslavia, that “it was 
terribly difficult to get anybody in Washington to move on this.” Campbell stated 
that: 
It wasn't clear, of course, what we could do, because the Yugoslavs were 
not running to us… Many of the aspects of the quarrel which had to do 
more with state relations and especially economic relations between the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia hadn't come out in the open yet. It wasn't 
easy for the United States to see how anything we could do or any 
pronouncement we could make would be useful to anybody. We simply 
had to wait until we got some indication that the situation was one which 
could be exploited in some way by the United States. But there was a 
tendency in Washington not really to think of it even in those terms.186 
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The Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in July 1948 was an 
indicator of the Yugoslav situation, where Belgrade was seeking some way of 
reconciliation of relations with Moscow. The Yugoslav Communist Party’s efforts 
were towards responding to Moscow’s criticisms, proving that Yugoslavia was still a 
Communist regime and showing their continuing respect to Stalin.187 One incident 
can be taken as a Yugoslav move towards the West, but compared to speeches 
glorifying Stalin, it was less significant. During the meeting of the Congress, Sir 
Charles Peake reported that: 
Many observers regarded it as significant of Yugoslav intentions that 
Tito found time during Congress to give a long interview to Mr. Olson, 
an ex-governor of California, to whom he said that Yugoslavia would 
like a trade agreement with America “but without any political strings.” 
He also allowed himself to be photographed by the press in cheerful 
conversation with Mr. Olson.188  
 
 
4.2.1 Danube Conference and the Early Symptoms  
The Fifth Congress was followed by the Danube Conference, which was 
planned to be held in Belgrade months ago. Based on Dedijer’s account the Yugoslav 
position in the Conference was shaped under the slogan “Refute the accusations by 
our deeds.” Eventually Yugoslav delegates maintained a pro-Soviet line and “voted 
unreservedly for all Soviet proposals, including one that the official languages of the 
conference be only Russian and French, not English.”189 While Yugoslavia was still 
defying Stalin, the attitude of its representatives in the Conference was the indicator 
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of the extent of Yugoslavia’s break with the Communist camp. Consequently, 
solidarity among the Communist states was perceived by the Western representatives 
as a means of Soviet effort to maintain a monopoly on the Danube regime.190 John C. 
Campbell’s account of the Danube conference is a summary of Yugoslav behavior 
and U.S. perception of the events during the Conference: 
We tried to put the Yugoslavs on the spot, to see if there would be any 
way in which they would assert themselves against the Soviets. It was 
interesting that their representative there was doing quite the opposite. He 
was trying to be more Russian than Vishinsky, to show that on foreign 
policy questions they were still loyal. Tito was making speeches, at that 
very moment that we were meeting in the conference hall, telling Stalin 
that Yugoslavia was going to insist on its own independence, but that on 
foreign policy questions, of course, the Socialist world had to see that the 
imperialists didn't get any footholds in the Danube Valley.191 
 
In the case of Yugoslavia, U.S. policy-makers had to wait for a more 
cooperative attitude until the summer of 1949, when Stalin achieved the isolation of 
Yugoslavia. Until that time, Tito gradually had turned to the Western governments 
and changed his rhetoric against the Soviet Union. For instance, in September 1948 
Yugoslavia wanted to purchase oil-drilling equipment from the U.S. In late 
December 1948, the impracticality of a restoration of relations between Yugoslavia 
and the Cominform became clearer in Tito’s speeches when he stated that “the 
Yugoslav government must sell its raw materials elsewhere in order to buy necessary 
machinery.”192 Although these maneuvers towards the West were not an indication 
of a slight change in Yugoslav foreign policy, they were the first symptoms of 
economic problems that Yugoslavia would suffer in the future. As Pavlowitch 
commented, “for fear of an economic collapse creating a power vacuum, which 
would be filled by a regime completely subservient to Moscow, it was decided in the 
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autumn of 1948 (in the words of Ernest Bevin) to keep Tito afloat.”193 Soviet 
propaganda and worsening economic conditions in Yugoslavia might result in the 
repetition of the outcome of events in Czechoslovakia. Naturally, in making a choice 
between Tito or a Moscow tool, supporting the latter - the betrayer of Stalin - was 
decided.   
 
4.3 Good-bye Uncle Joe - Welcome Uncle Sam 
Since the beginning of the conflict the attitude of other Cominform states was 
not conformist towards Yugoslavia, which means anti-Yugoslav rhetoric was not 
limited only to Yugoslavia’s neighbors. Beginning from the Communiqué day, 
Cominform countries initiated anti-Yugoslav propaganda, in line with Moscow, and 
treated Yugoslav citizens in their countries “undemocratically.”194 In the early 
months after the communiqué, Yugoslav reaction was quite harsh against these states 
as compared to their responses towards Moscow. The Yugoslav press had maintained 
publishing articles about the rightness of Yugoslav cause and counter-propaganda 
against these states to protect social solidarity. In comparison, in December Borba 
celebrated the Russian leader’s birthday with a long editorial on “Sixty-nine years of 
the Great Stalin,” while Stalin’s collected works were on the publication schedules of 
all Yugoslav major publishing houses. On January 20, 1949, on the anniversary of 
Lenin’s death Borba wrote that the Yugoslav Communist Party had been governed 
by the “teachings of Lenin and Stalin and had won great victories.”195 It is clear that 
the key to restore relations was in Stalin’s hands, but as opposed to their attempts the 
Yugoslav situation was getting worse. It can be argued that Yugoslavs resisted more 
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than they could. Even, when troop concentrations near Yugoslav borders were 
published in the world press in the spring of 1949, Yugoslavs themselves rejected the 
existence of such activities.196 
In fact, as opposed to Yugoslav repudiation of such activities the invasion of 
Yugoslavia became more than a possibility in mid-1949. Beloff argued that when 
Stalin “discovered that he could not destroy Tito by shaking his little finger, he shook 
everything else he could shake.”197 For instance, General Béla Király of the 
Hungarian People’s Army and Commander of the Infantry and also the designated 
commander in chief of the Hungarian contingent of the Soviet controlled 
multinational forces that were to invade Yugoslavia in 1949-1950, informed that, 
“the last year of the 1940s and the early 1950s were a period when life in Hungary 
was completely geared to the coming of war: politically, economically, militarily and 
psychologically.”198  Based on Tito’s own list, taking into consideration the 
possibility of exaggeration in these numbers, the number of incidents near Yugoslav 
borders were quiet high in 1950: 936; in 1951, 1,517; and in the first ten months of 
1952, 1,530.199  
In the first half of 1949, as a result of propaganda and increasing troop 
deployments in Yugoslavia’s neighbors, Yugoslav attitude towards the Soviet Union 
gradually left its defensive character, but it was still unclear. For instance, in January 
1949, “Borba published that it was absurd for the “people’s democracies” to make 
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capital out of difficulties which were partly caused by the economic sanctions which 
they themselves were imposing.”200 On the contrary Soviet Army day was celebrated 
in February 1949 by laying wreaths on the memorial to fallen Soviet soldiers in 
Belgrade and concluded with the cry of “Long live the brotherhood in arms of the 
Soviet and Yugoslav armies.”201  
In June 1949, the Yugoslav attitude was strictly different, even the 
anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union was celebrated in rather 
happier circumstances than Victory Day.202 In July 1949 it was clear that there was 
no escape from economic blockade when Poland, the only Cominform country left 
maintaining trade with Yugoslavia, announced its “unilateral and arbitrary” cessation 
of all deliveries to Yugoslavia under existing trade agreements,203 while Yugoslavs 
were trying to escape from economic problems coupled with a bad-harvest by 
establishing economic relations with non-Cominform countries. Consequentially, in 
July 1949 Yugoslavs lost hope about the possibility of reconciliation with the 
Cominform. M. Pijade’s comments reflected the mood of Yugoslav leaders in this 
period: 
…the Soviet leaders returned in their diplomacy and their foreign policy 
to ‘the policy and methods of Russia before the October revolution’. 
Yugoslavia had no intention of becoming anybody’s ‘gubernia’ (a pre-
revolutionary Russian word for ‘province’), nor was it true that small 
peoples must ‘jump into the mouth of one shark to avoid being 
swallowed by another.’204 
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4.3.1 American Support Without Strings Please! 
 The first American aid to Yugoslavia was initiated in September 1949. Lees 
wrote that beginning from May 1949 Yugoslavs had requested 200 million dollars in 
loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction (IBRD), the Export-Import 
bank, and various private institutions.205 Yugoslavia had been ready to establish 
economic relations with non-Cominform countries since December 1948, and when 
they completely lost hope, finding credits and funds would not be a difficult task 
since the U.S. administration was ready to support Yugoslavia but was waiting for a 
loyal attitude. Initiation of the American assistance was a matter of discussion all 
through the summer and before Poland cut its economic ties with Yugoslavia, 
Yugoslav and American representatives were discussing the possibility of American 
help. Most interestingly, in a conversation between Yugoslav Foreign Minister, 
Edward Kardelj, and U.S. Ambassador, Cavendish Cannon, which was held in early 
June “Kardelj confirmed that his government was not sending materiel to the 
guerrillas in Greece.”206 This was followed by Tito’s announcement of closing the 
Yugoslav-Greek border in July, at a time when the outcome of the Greek Civil War 
was already obvious.207 This bilateral action of Yugoslavia can be taken as a 
concession, or a loyal and cooperative attitude, made for the implementation of 
American support. It is questionable to what extent Tito’s action was loyal and 
cooperative, but it is clear that his action shortened the already ending conflict in 
Greece. In addition, on August 19 and September 28, Yugoslavia received two harsh 
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ultimatums from Moscow accusing Yugoslavia of pursuing an aggressive policy in 
its region.208  
 Coincidentially, in September the Export-Import Bank granted Yugoslavia’s 
request for a $20 million credit and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also 
approved a $3 million drawing for Tito’s government, and the U.S. and Yugoslavia 
formally announced the licensing of a steel mill.209 This was the beginning of a series 
of aid to Yugoslavia.  Financial support was followed by military aid later, and until 
mid-1955 the U.S. “paid out nearly $1.2 billion to Yugoslavia in military and 
economic aid, of which only $55 million was to come back in the form of repaid 
loans.”210 Yugoslavia was not included into the Marshall Plan since Tito was 
obsessive about political strings and it was nearly impossible for the U.S. 
Administration to advocate it against American tax-payers. So, the Yugoslav 
government had no debt to democratize itself, liberalize its economy and provide 
military support when necessary like its future allies Turkey and Greece, but this did 
not mean that Tito did not make any concessions. As Milan Bartos wrote in 1950, the 
aim of the Soviet Union in this period was clear, “an economic blockade would 
produce the economic collapse which mere political propaganda had failed to 
achieve.”211 Therefore the solution lay in avoiding this possibility. Jacob D. Beam 
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stated that the U.S. was not so concerned about Yugoslavia being a free enterprise 
economy as it was about Yugoslavia being independent of Moscow.212  
 
4.4 NSC 68 and the Korean War 
 NSC 18/4 of November 17, 1949, stressed the consequences of Yugoslavia’s 
situation that it had improved the security of the West. Briefly, the possible loss of 
Yugoslavia would mean the loss of political gains in the Cold War and Yugoslavia’s 
already increasing relations with the West. In particular, Yugoslavia’s “increasing 
dependence” on the West would “enhance chances for a Trieste settlement, and a 
general accommodation with Greece and Turkey.”213 Although the question of 
economic aid to Yugoslavia was solved, the defense of Yugoslavia in case of a 
satellite or Soviet attack had been the matter of discussions since there was no 
working solution.   
 In 1950, two important events influenced the course of the Cold War, actually 
they coincided. The first was the completion of NSC 68 in April 1950, approved as a 
national security policy in September, which would shape the U.S. Cold-War policy 
in the next decades According to this document, Yugoslavia’s position as an outcast 
in the Cold War emphasized once more as: 
The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples is likewise 
vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most potent emotional-
political force. The well-known ills of colonialism are compounded, 
however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites 
accept not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe in 
and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of the Kremlin. 
These excessive requirements can be made good only through extreme 
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coercion. The result is that if a satellite feels able to effect its 
independence of the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break 
away.214 
 
Secondly, while Soviet military threat reached its zenith towards Yugoslavia, war 
broke out in Asia: North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950. Based on 
Belá Király’s account “North Korea launched the war…exactly when the Soviet Bloc 
in Europe was ready to initiate the aggression against Yugoslavia” and “there was a 
direct relationship between the timing of the Korean aggression and the completion 
of preparations for war against Yugoslavia.”  He argues that, “the aggression towards 
Yugoslavia would surely have begun in the fall of 1950 or in the spring of 1951 at 
the latest had the United States and the United Nations not intervened in Korea .”215 
Lees wrote that in August 1950, the NSC decided that “emergency military 
assistance could be provided to Yugoslavia under Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program (MDAP).”216 In November, President Truman formally asked the Congress 
to authorize aid for Yugoslavia and both houses approved “The Yugoslav Emergency 
Relief Act of 1950.”217 In June 1951, an agreement on the “rapid shipment of 
military goods to Yugoslavia”218 was achieved after bilateral consultations between 
the American and Yugoslav sides. Yugoslav dependency on the American support 
reached its peak with the signing of “Military Assistance Agreement Between the 
United States and Yugoslavia, November 14, 1951.”219  
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4.4.1 What about aiding a Communist Country? 
It should be noted that the greatest obstacle for the U.S. support of Yugoslavia 
and an efficient integration of Yugoslavia into the Western defense system was the 
declared war against the spread of Communism. In the age of anti-Communism, it 
would be absurd for tough-Cold-Warriors to find general support for a Communist 
country and even thinking of fighting with Communism arm-in-arm with another 
communist. Most of the U.S. foreign-service-officers agreed on the difficulty of 
extending any aid to Yugoslavia in this period.  For instance, James W. Riddleberger, 
U.S. Ambassador in Yugoslavia between 1953-1957, pointed out the extent of anti-
Communism by giving an example from his experiences. On the timing of the U.S. 
aid to Yugoslavia he said that:  
We gave it as soon as we saw there's a possibility of it… I think it took 
courage particularly, because these were the days of the Cold War and if 
you persuade any American Congress to vote money for a Communist 
dictator… it's a pretty rough affair. As I found out later myself when I 
had to come back and testify… I think Truman was absolutely right and I 
think it showed, as is customary with him, a lot of courage.220 
 
Willis G. Armstrong made similar comments on the difficulty of finding 
support on aiding of Yugoslavia.  He agreed that “in the atmosphere in 1949, with 
McCarthyism, this [aiding Yugoslavia] wasn't always the easiest thing to do.” 221 
Philip Kaiser asserted that, “Truman was afraid people would say that he was soft on 
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communism;”222 aiding hungry-communists would be a clear signal of softness. 
Apart from continued war against Communism, the Korean War was still going on, 
and Campbell clearly stated that when searching for more aid to Yugoslavia one 
should be ready to face the argument of, "Why should we help a Communist? We've 
been fighting communism; we're fighting a war now in Korea and a Cold War 
everywhere else all over the world. Now you come and tell us to give special aid and 
send our food to keep Communists going."223 In addition to that, Campbell indicated 
the major legal obstacles on aiding Yugoslavia and he questioned the inclusion of 
Yugoslavia into the Military Defense Assistance Act as:   
I remember we used every way around and through the existing 
legislation, none of which directly authorized aid to Yugoslavia. We got 
grain and other goods, which had been shipped to Italy, transferred from 
Italy to Yugoslavia. We got Butch [Adrian S.] Fisher, who was the Legal 
Adviser, to interpret the Military Defense Assistance Act in a way which 
would enable us to get food under that act on grounds that it was good for 
the Yugoslav army. Then, presumably, other stocks would be made 
available for the civilian population. This was a very dubious legal 
interpretation, I think, but, nevertheless, we were willing to take the 
chance, if Secretary [Dean] Acheson at that time approved of it. He too 
was willing to take the chance.224 
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4.5 The Road to the Balkan Alliance is Opened 
 
While the situation in the Balkans became clearer month by month in 1948 and 
1949, another development affecting the course of the Cold War was on the scene: 
the establishment of NATO. Just after the Prague Coup in March 1948, on March 17, 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom signed The 
Brussels treaty which in September 1948 became Western Union Defense 
Organization. In addition, negotiations for the Atlantic Pact began in June 1948 and 
concluded in December of that year. On April 4, 1949, NATO was established as a 
military defense organization. While the possibility of linking Yugoslavia to NATO 
grew later, the importance of Yugoslavia’s independence from Moscow in military 
terms gave the Western defense system a direct advantage over the Soviet Union. For 
instance, “in February 1951, false reports about the presence of American and British 
warplanes on Yugoslav airfields jolted the Romanian general staff.”225 The same 
possible threat was felt by the neighboring satellites.  
The Bulgarians, too, constantly worried about a Yugoslav attack, 
building defenses and exercising troops to repel it. From unidentified 
sources, they received the disturbing information that in case of a Soviet 
attack in Central Europe NATO would retaliate in the Balkans by 
unleashing on them the Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks.”226  
 
 Nevertheless, as early as June 1951 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, NATO's 
first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, wrote in his diary that the problem of 
European security would only be solved by the creation of “a United States of 
Europe” whose membership would include the NATO countries as well as “West 
Germany and (I think) Sweden, Spain, Jugoslavia, with Greece definitely in if 
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Jugoslavia is.”227  In the same period “PPS estimated the combined forces of 
Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece to be greater than all of the European members of 
the Atlantic alliance and a ‘formidable bastion against aggression in the 
Mediterranean area’.”228   
In August 1951, Eisenhower told US Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, 
before Collins left for a trip to Yugoslavia, that “every time NATO discussed ‘plans 
and forces required for the defense of Southern Europe, especially Italy’ the 
‘contribution that Yugoslavia can make towards the security of my southern flank is 
brought into focus’.”229  Eisenhower was right in his complaints but the inclusion of 
Southern European countries into NATO was problematic task mainly as a result of 
remoteness of these areas230 and the question of qualifications of these governments 
for the NATO membership. In the case of Yugoslavia it was the most difficult. For 
instance, a CIA report indicated the extent of the difficulty that the association of 
“Greece, Turkey, Spain, Yugoslavia and Western Germany” with NATO, which 
“should be consummated in the coming period will be a major increment in NATO 
strength.” However, the existence of “numerous political and and psychological 
obstacles” was pointed out delaying the full contribution of the later three 
countries.”231 Consequently, the plans for the association of Yugoslavia into the 
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western defense system had always been supported by various people during the 
Truman presidency. Campbell summarized the priorities of U.S. strategy as: 
Our whole approach to the military program was, first, that its principal 
purpose was to increase Yugoslavia's defensive strength; second, that 
somehow it was a very important beginning for the association of 
Yugoslavia with Western defense in general. Certainly from the point of 
view of the Pentagon, if they were supplying military equipment to the 
Yugoslavs and there was going to be war, they would want to see that the 
Yugoslavs were helping to defend the right places and not retreating to 
the mountains to defend themselves alone. So, there was, in the backs of 
the minds of many in the United States who were concerned with 
Yugoslav policy, the idea that somehow we would gradually bring the 
Yugoslavs to a closer association with NATO.232 
 
To achieve this end re-orientation of Yugoslavia was necessary, and it had 
already begun by improving its relations with the non-communist neighbors and 
other states, and in media. For example, an article by Fitzroy Maclean, published in 
Foreign Affairs in January 1950, depicted Tito and Yugoslavia much differently 
from three years ago: 
The key to what had happened and to what is likely to happen in the 
future must be sought first and foremost in Tito himself. Without his 
leadership, without his ruthless determination, without the personal 
devotion of which he inspires in his followers, such a rebellion would 
have had little chance of succeeding.233 
 
In addition, on Yugoslavia’s relations with other states, as early as January 
1950, Yugoslav officials announced that Yugoslavia had trade with forty-six 
countries and had trade agreements with twenty-four.234 For instance, on January 
1950, a new trade agreement was signed between Turkey and Yugoslavia.235 The 
problem in Greece was rapidly resolved after Yugoslavia closed its borders,236 and in 
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the first months of 1951 the two countries signed treaties about transportation. 
Relations between the three countries improved quickly since their threat perception 
was the same. Nevertheless, development of closer relations between the three 
countries was much faster than policy planning in the U.S. and among the NATO 
circles. Even, in September 1951, Marshall Tito “specifically emphasized the point 
that, as Yugoslavia would be ‘imperiled by an attack on Greece and Turkey’ the 
question of cooperation between these countries and Yugoslavia would arise in the 
event of aggression, and even maybe before.”237  
 
4.5.1 Passionate Neighbors: Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia 
In the early months of 1952, the possibility of a Balkan alliance was realized as 
a result of meetings among the representatives of the Yugoslavia, Greece and 
Turkey, without any formal proposal and agreement. In February, the U.S. 
Ambassador in Ankara, George C. McGhee informed the State Department that “in 
subsequent discussions, Venizelos and Turk officials agreed desirability their 
attempting jointly to develop closer relations with Yugo, with objective of reaching 
agreement hold secret staff discussions, probably at subordinate level, re military 
coordination in event of attack by Russia.” There was even the possibility that these 
discussions would “develop naturally within two or three months.” In addition, he 
also reported that, “Italian Amb recently commented that NATO command 
containing Italy, Greece and Turkey will present irresistible attraction to Yugo which 
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his govt hopes, of course, will result immediately in Yugo association.”238 These 
moves might be an excellent beginning for the U.S. policy makers to facilitate 
discussions among the parties, but the Acting Secretary of State responded that “our 
strategic planning has not yet progressed to point where coordination with Yugo may 
be undertaken,” and also added that the Department of State “does not wish to 
discourage any efforts by Grk or Turk may themselves wish to make to estab closer 
relationship with Yugo” and also “greater cooperation between the three 
countries.”239 This answer would be repeated several times in the next two years.  On 
the other hand, the encouragement of the U.S. on the strengthening of relations 
between three Balkan countries was important because on February 18, 1952, Greece 
and Turkey became NATO members and their new status would change the meaning 
of trilateral relations in the Balkans.  
On May 6, 1952, the U.S. Ambassador in Greece, John E. Peurifoy, following 
the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes’ visit of Greece, informed the 
Department of State that military talks between three states were possible, except the 
fact that Yugoslavs were waiting for “initiative for mil talks must come from Grks or 
Turks.” According to the information coming from Turkish and Greek 
representatives “Tito wants mil talks but fears to begin them because of his delicate 
internal sit.” In this regard members of Greek parliament planned a goodwill visit to 
Belgrade without delay.240 In fact, the Yugoslav situation was not clear enough on 
allying itself with Turkey and Greece. For instance, during the Greco-Turkish 
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conversations241 in Athens, Marshall Tito made it “abundantly clear that Yugoslavia 
is not interested in concluding any paper pacts and has explained that identity of 
interests is the only real and satisfactory guarantee that Yugoslavia will march with 
the West in time of war.”242 In the same month, Yugoslavia also extended its rule of 
law into the Yugoslav controlled Trieste region, Zone A.   
On the contrary, on June 6, the U.S. Ambassador in Yugoslavia, George V. 
Allen, commented on the ongoing moves from Turkish and Greek sides that “caution 
shld be exercised lest Greeks and Turks step on each other’s toes or make too bold 
approach to Yugoslavs,” but he also drew attention to the “advantage of present 
Yugoslav willingness to improve relations with both those two countries.” Further, 
Yugoslavs viewed dealing with Turkey and Greece more preferable, “whom they can 
meet on the basis of equality.”243 Allen was right in his comments on the momentum 
of talks between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia; any initiative, unplanned or 
without the consultation of NATO members, should be avoided and much smaller 
steps had to be taken.  In addition, it became clear that Marshall Tito’s previous 
comments did not reflect the reality. In response, Dean Acheson described the 
situation as it is “not yet ripe to take such step in NATO, and Dept was concerned 
lest possible rebuff in NATO wld prejudice progress on bi or trilateral basis between 
Greece, Turkey and Yugo.”244 Parallel to this approach, the following months of 
1952 passed with reciprocal-visits of military delegations and political 
representatives of the three countries. In addition, Yugoslavia’s American visitors 
were quiet significant persons in the summer of 1952. In mid-July, two high-ranking 
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officers from the United States Department of Defence, Generals Edelman and 
Holmstead, and then the Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Nash, and all three 
called upon Marshall Tito at his summer residence in Slovenia.”245 In August the 
U.S. Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, paid a two day visit to Yugoslavia and 
“attended some military exercises near the capital before going on to Bled, where he 
saw Marshall Tito.”246  
These visits allowed the U.S. to implement a bold approach to Yugoslavia on 
military matters, of course in connection with the U.K. and France. In November, the 
U.S. sent General Thomas T. Handy to discuss defense matters and learn about the 
military capabilities of Yugoslavia in detail. However, the Yugoslavs did not want to 
take responsibility without a clear defensive commitment from the West. In tripartite 
Balkan negotiations the situation was the opposite. On November 24, Ambassador 
Allen informed the Department of State of the implications in Belgrade that “Yugos 
had definite mil commitments in mind” just before the visit of Greek military 
delegation. In his conversation with Greek Minister Capitanides, Allen told “Yugos 
may hope to obtain indirect NATO commitment through getting Grks and Turks to 
sign reciprocal assurances of support in case of attack.”247 The integration of 
Yugoslavia into NATO military planning became a serious matter of discussions in 
December 1952 since three Balkan countries were moving towards some sort of a 
cooperation level. However, intra-NATO relations still prevailed and there was no 
clear plan for a Balkan alliance. Coupled with this, and probably the leading factor, it 
should be noted was that the presidential election was the most important event in the 
U.S. in the last months of 1952. On November 4, 1952, the Republican Eisenhower 
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won a decisive victory, and swept every region, but the South. It is questionable to 
what extent Eisenhower was making his plans based on his possible presidency in 
that period, but it can be argued that the election process itself played role in the 
slowing down of American dealings with the outside world.  
In the Balkans, representatives from the three Balkan countries continued 
their visits; a Turkish military delegation visited Belgrade after Greeks, on December 
20;248 and on December 27, a Yugoslav delegation visited Athens. The general 
tendency of the U.S. during these visits was towards a military commitment of forces 
of mentioned states “must be left to governmental decision at time emergency arises 
in light all circumstances and in consultation NATO allies as appropriate.”249 
Limiting collective action with a precondition ‘whenever emergency arises’ meant 
the U.S. and NATO were not ready for cooperating with Yugoslavia on an alliance 
basis. Regarding Yugoslav delegates’ visit to Greece, Ambassador Peurifoy wrote 
that Yugoslavs were pressing for an agreement, namely a “formal tripartite 
agreement with Greece and Turkey that others will assist in case of attack upon any 
one of parties,”250 Yugoslavs’ desire to strengthen their position against Italy was 
seen as the constant contributory factor. In particular, Ambassador Allen related 
Tito’s gradually changing attitude towards “regional blocs” and “advance concept of 
formal military commitments on a governmental level as a precondition to further 
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progress in military talks” to Tito’s growing confidence. He also commented, making 
comparison to Handy talks in November, that “Tito began process of moving under 
NATO umbrella by attempting to secure alliances to south.”251 It was similar to what 
the Americans were planning, but the progress of this should not be left to the 
Yugoslavs. 
 Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Köprülü, summarized his views towards the 
developing rapprochement between Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece after his visit to 
Paris, Rome and Athens, and before he left for Belgrade, to Ambassador McGhee. 
For him, Italy desired closer association of Yugoslavia with the West and that “their 
present tactics are calculated as a price for their agreement [to] a solution for Trieste 
favorable to themselves”, and to “regain their former position as principal outside 
power in the Balkans.” He also mentioned that Yugoslavs would be in a position to 
accept direct entry to NATO soon, and current Yugoslav moves were the 
consequence of intentions towards solving the Trieste problem favorable to 
themselves, just like the Italians.  He also proposed that if direct entry into NATO 
would not be the case, “an alternative solution should be sought through creation of 
separate three-power alliance,” and requested advice from the United States just like 
his counterpart in Greece.252    
 In response, the suggested line to take with Foreign Minister Köprülü upon 
Yugoslavia was clear and pointed out the NATO obligations of Turkey. Based on the 
record, the U.S. did not have a definitive view on “encouraging Yugoslavia to join 
NATO” and on “a separate tripartite security organization linked with NATO,” 
because of the reason that these matters “must be considered at the highest level in 
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light of an evaluation of all pertinent factors,” and most importantly with other 
NATO members.  In addition, “maximum possible progress in contingent military 
planning”253 on a bilateral basis was favored. On January 28, 1953, Turkish Foreign 
Minister Köprülü informed British, French and American Ambassadors in Athens 
about his meeting with Tito and the latest situation of Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav 
negotiations: Tito assumed initiative in proposing a treaty of friendship asserting that 
“such a treaty would also produce helpful psychological and propaganda effect 
internationally vis-à-vis Soviets;” and Köprülü, in line with American suggestions,  
responded that such a treaty should not be “in contravention with Turkish obligations 
under NAT.” In this meeting, Köprülü also raised “eventual adherence of Italy,” and 
his sympathiess regarding Italy’s “delicate position internally” regarding the Trieste 
issue. Köprülü also informed Ambassador Peurifoy that he “saw no reason why 
tripartite working level drafting party could not meet” since the proposed treaty 
would be an extremely simple document.  In detail, the proposed treaty would 
involve “no specific commitments and obligations provide for tripartite consultation 
in event of threat to security of one of members” and “be so drafted as to make clear 
that none provisions proposed treaty would conflict with or derogate from 
obligations Greece and Turkey as members NATO.” 254 Köprülü’s proposal on 
Italy’s adherence was appreciated, even leaving “the door open to later Italian 
adherence should the Italians be interested” was welcomed in Washington in the 
State Department. The proposed formula as outlined by Köprülü, which did not 
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challenge NATO obligations nor brought extra commitments, was viewed 
positively.255    
For the first time, general consensus occurred among the big-three and in 
their relations with Turkey and Greece on the creation of a limited agreement. 
Actually, a treaty not challenging with NATO obligations of Turkey and Greece 
would not include clauses about collective defense between the three states.  
However, a much bigger problem occurred after achieving this harmony, and this 
was the actual realization and completion of this pact. Ambassador McGhee advised 
the Department of State on the early completion of this pact. Based on his analysis: 
(a) If more direct association Yugoslavia with NATO not 
possible in immediate future, delay in any substantive step in 
that direction would probably tend to discourage Yugoslavs 
and might in fact militate against their eventual effective 
collaboration with west. Turks feel Yugoslavia now 
psychologically ripe for such a role through fear of being 
isolated. Notwithstanding practical limitations in terms of 
proposed pact, Yugoslavs should as result of pact feel more 
closely linked with west. 
(b) Proposed pact, although general in nature, will meet 
immediate need for some formal basis upon which 
collaboration between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia can be 
continued and intensified in fields of contingent military 
planning, economic and cultural relations, as well as in 
advancing general political understanding. 
(c) Proposed pact affords opportunity, apparently with little risk 
of effective Soviet retaliation, for positive step or 
‘psychological offensive’ in general cold war relations. 
Elements within satellite countries which are hostile to Soviet 
domination, particularly those in Bulgaria, should be 
encouraged by pact. 
(d) Encouragement of three countries at this stage in 
development of pact should have salutary effect on our 
relations with them. With little advice or encouragement 
from western powers, three countries have on their own made 
commendable progress in worth while project. It is believed 
that we should encourage such constructively led initiative 
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which serves to relieve US of direct responsibilities and 
charge cold war is only US-Russian struggle.256  
 
McGhee was also aware of the consequence that the creation of this pact 
would inevitably be perceived by Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece as a step towards 
Yugoslavs’ association to NATO. In this regard, McGhee commented on this issue 
both from military and political point of views; militarily, “without assurances that 
there will be coordinated defense of Thrace” by these three countries, in case of a 
possible Soviet attack, Thrace would be lost and Turkey would be separated from its 
allies; politically, “proposed pact can be no more than stop-gap, since limitations 
upon practical effects will soon become clear.”257 One day later, the Acting Secretary 
of State Matthews, pointed out the limits of this friendship agreement, regarding the 
relation of this treaty to the UN and NATO, and to avoid unintended results defined 
in the UN Charter he emphasized that the term “regional arrangement” was not the 
right term to label this treaty. He added that, continuing military planning should be 
maintained distinct from the Friendship Pact as a result of well-known “political 
commitment.” Lastly, as a result of Köprülü’s suggestion to have an American 
observer during military talks, he instructed to avoid the issue for the reason that 
“coordinating Greek, Turk, Yugoslav military planning with our own cannot be 
separated from larger and more complex problem integration of military planning for 
Yugoslavia into Western defense structure, a problem still requires considerable 
study by all concerned.”258  
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4.6 Conclusion: 
Great Expectations and Unsatisfying Results 
 In February 1953, tripartite military talks between Turkish, Greek and 
Yugoslav authorities began. Ambassador Peurifoy noted his doubts on “whether it is 
realistic to believe that military negotiations of character already assumed by Greek-
Yugoslav conversations can avoid tendency towards creation certain implicit 
obligations.” Actually, Peurifoy was right in that tripartite military talks were going 
at a pace faster than the political ones. Then he pointed out the possible 
consequences of an interruption in this momentum by the U.S., UK and France at 
this stage. He acknowledged that avoiding undertakings of any sort by Greeks and 
Turks would revive Tito’s suspicion, leaving the impression that the “West intends to 
let him fight alone.” For Greeks and Turks, this would be another “empty gesture 
along lines of ineffective prewar Balkan entente.” For him, strengthening of Balkan 
defense was in favor of Yugoslavia’s protection in case of an attack, and the 
rapidness of these talks presented an advantage for NATO military authorities “to 
bring Yugoslavs indirectly within scope of NATO strategical planning in way that 
may not otherwise be possible for sometime to come.”259 
 During the tripartite-political-discussions in Athens on February 20 Yugoslav 
representatives presented a draft of a friendship treaty which was more likely a door 
opening the way towards mutual security. Article 4 of this draft comprised: 
The agreements or recommendations concerning military collaboration, 
accepted by common accord by the chiefs of the general staffs (or their 
plenipotentiaries), shall, after being approved by the governments of the 
Contracting Parties, form part of this treaty.260 
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Actually, the Balkan issue was one of the first tasks for the newly assigned 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.261 In his first month in this post he had to deal 
with three states waiting to sign a treaty. On February 21, he instructed the Embassy 
in Athens that “there may be merit in argument that political accord has no 
significance unless formally related to military understandings,” but, he went on 
defending that two aspects should be separated, and NATO and other implications 
should be avoided by going “no farther than commitment to consult as to such 
common measures as might be required, and not extend to commitment to lend 
assistance no matter how qualified by references to the United Nations.” Further, he 
emphasized the importance of this issue for NATO and the necessity of consultation 
with the British and French. Dulles ordered that American reservations to the 
aforementioned treaty “must not be construed as watering down our approval of the 
concept of Greek-Turk-Yugoslav rapprochement.”262 While both sides were ready 
and did not want to face a delay in the conclusion of this treaty, Dulles’ approach 
delay and it overwhelmed all.  
On February 28, 1953, Yugoslav, Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers 
signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation263 - The Treaty of Ankara - 
covering a five-year period of time, which would enter into force upon ratification of 
Greek and Yugoslav parliaments on March 23, and Turkish Parliament on May 18. 
The last version of the Treaty covered much less than initially expected, military 
provisons were carefully removed from the treaty. Even on February 28, British, 
French and American sides still had questions concerning NATO military planning, 
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continuing tripartite military planning and on the NATO commitments of Turkey and 
Greece.264 Ambassador Peurifoy summarized the dissatisfaction of parties in his 
telegram to the Department of State on February 26, just before the signing of the 
treaty: Yugoslav Foreign Minister criticized the “great powers” of not fully 
understanding the “importance of this part of world nor necessity of organizing its 
defense on concrete and firm basis” since “it was clear that Greeks and Turks had 
made apparent to Yugoslavia that they were revising critical paragraphs at insistence 
of the United States and United Kingdom.” During a conversation between American 
and Greek representatives, the importance of organizing the defense of the Balkan 
area was once more emphasized, but it was repeated again as had been stressed many 
times in the past, “unnecessary apprehension” among NATO members as a result of 
“premature and hasty action” should be avoided.265  
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CHAPTER V 
CACOPHONY: 
 
THE ROAD TOWARDS A MILITARY ALLIANCE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 After the Treaty of Ankara, U.S. policy became more of a determinant in the 
developments of tripartite military relations in the Balkans. In line with U.S. 
suggestions, Turkey and Greece maintained their moves remaining on contingent 
basis until the end of 1953. However, a crisis occurred between Yugoslavia and Italy 
on Trieste. The Trieste negotiations coincided with the Balkan pact discussions. It 
was a difficult task for the U.S. Government to harmonize the pace of these talks and 
seek for solutions which satisfied both parties. On the one hand, Yugoslavia would 
be associated with the western defense directly; on the other hand the U.S. was a 
mediator during the Trieste negotiations together with the U.K. In the spring of 1954, 
Balkan partners had already passed beyond the contingency stage. Marshall Tito 
played his cards well against the Italians, and he acted as the accelerator of the 
Balkan pact. Yugoslavia perceived this treaty as an advantage against Italy during the 
Trieste negotiations. In this period, the U.S. deliberately slowed down the progress in 
the Balkan Pact and gave priority to the settlement of the Trieste problem. However, 
in the summer of 1954, there was no way left for a further delay. At this stage, Tito’s 
clever moves played a role in reaching a consensus among the Balkan partners. On 
August, 1954, the Balkan pact was ready after some last-minute revisions. 
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 This chapter will focus on the major factors from one treaty to the other. It 
will argue that despite all work done and accomplishments achieved, the treaty itself 
was a dead letter, but had a symbolic meaning in the Cold-War. The last part of this 
chapter will consider the reasons why the treaty failed, namely the rise of the Cyprus 
question and Khrushchev’s intervention into the growing alliance in the Balkans.   
 
5.2 One Alliance Born, One Leader Dies 
 An event in the first months of 1953 seriously affected the course of the Cold 
War. On March 3, 1953, just a few days after the signing of the Treaty of Ankara, 
Stalin died. The impact of this incident on the Balkan developments was not felt 
immediately since Moscow was still dominated by Stalin’s team, but “the death of 
Stalin was the most shattering experience for communists between 1945-1953.”266 
For the Yugoslavs, Stalin’s death did not affect their view of Moscow and 
maintained their efforts towards a forward alliance. Even, after the signing of the 
treaty, Ivo Mallet informed that the Yugoslavs were “obviously interested in the 
possibility of Bulgaria and Albania being included to leave the Russian fold and join 
the pact so as to make Balkan unity a reality.”267 On March 5, Tito left for a visit to 
England. According to Dedijer, the timing was perfect “not only because of Stalin 
but because he was going to London with the Pact in our [Yugoslav’s] pockets. The 
Pact was important in case of a possible attack from the East, but also because of 
Italian appetites in the West.”268  
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In the following months, Moscow implemented a peace offensive to restore its 
relations with other states worsened by Stalin’s behavior. Soviet Foreign Ministry 
internal report to V. M. Molotov, prepared by M. Zimianin dated May 27, 1953, 
indicated that there was not even a slight change in the Soviet perception of 
Yugoslavia and its cooperation with the Western states in the aftermath of Stalin’s 
death:  
The internal policy of the Tito clique, after breaking with the USSR and 
peoples' democratic countries, aimed at restoring capitalism in 
Yugoslavia, at the liquidation of all the democratic accomplishments of 
the Yugoslav people, and at the fascistization of the state and army 
personnel. In foreign policy, the efforts of the ruling circles of 
Yugoslavia aim at broadening economic and political ties with capitalist 
states, first and foremost with the USA and England. This has made 
Yugoslavia dependent on them and has drawn it [Yugoslavia] into 
aggressive blocs organized by the Anglo-American imperialists....269 
 
On the Balkan side, neither Stalin’s death nor the dissatisfaction of the 
signatory parties with the existing treaty influenced the schedule of military talks. 
The American side was still seeking a way to adjust the maintenance of military talks 
by using Greece or Turkey, avoiding any linkage between NATO and the Balkan 
Pact. Just a few weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Ankara, in a conversation 
between Ambassador McGhee and Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü, McGhee 
asked whether the Greek side “had different concept of objectives,” more specifically 
“conversations to result in tentative agreement to specific military plans which, after 
approval by appropriate NATO authorities, might be officially adopted by three 
governments.” Köprülü stated that “certain elements in Greek Government…wanted 
to go much further in tripartite talks”, but he added that “Turks would able insure 
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Greeks would not go far in talks as actual agreement to military plans”270 since it 
should be a tripartite negotiation.  
On May 25-28, 1953, John Foster Dulles paid a visit to Ankara and Athens 
and met with senior officials. When he left Ankara, New York Times reported that 
“United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles left for Greece this morning 
with Mutual Security Director Harold E. Stassen and other members of his party 
after assuring the Turks the United States favored integration of Yugoslavia into the 
European defense system” 271 Actually, the Dulles-Köprülü conversations were very 
constructive in nature and indicated the zeal of the Turkish side towards the 
strengthening of the Balkan alliance in line with the U.S. Dulles’ visit can be taken as 
a sort of control-tour to coordinate allies. Just after Dulles’ visit, on May 30, the 
Soviet attitude towards Turkey indicated a slight change after years of denouncing its 
earlier claims against Turkey. However, Turkish reaction was not as friendly as the 
Soviet move. Zafer wrote that “the abandonment of such claims does not constitute a 
concession on the part of the Soviet government. It can only be interpreted as a 
return to common sense.”272 In short, the Soviet move was perceived as another 
Communist trick. In comparison, Yugoslavs accepted the Soviet offer to establish 
ambassadorial relations in June since the Tito-Stalin split. But this did not mean the 
reconciliation of friendly relations between the two states.  
 
5.3 Military Talks and Turkish-Greek Competition 
The second meeting of the military discussions under the tripartite pact was 
held in Athens on June 3-12, and established the framework of cooperation. The 
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Turkish side stated in the initial meeting that the Turkish “government opposed any 
change” on the summary report of February meetings,273 and noted that “tripartite 
military consultations based on hypothesis attack against one would be considered 
attack against others,” and added that the Turkish government “considered it 
desirable this hypothesis recorded.” Greek representatives advocated that there was 
“no reason [to] put this assumption [in] writing.” While the discussions started to go 
beyond contingent basis and military conversations were proceeding on the 
assumption of collective defense, Greek refusal was meaningless. According to 
Ambassador Peurifoy, as a natural consequence of Köprülü’s recommendations to 
Dulles on the incorporation of Yugoslavia into NATO during his visit in Ankara, and 
later the Turkish proposal on the attendance of a NATO observer in the tripartite 
talks, Greeks found themselves “in difficult position in that they believe Turks 
proceeding at much too fast a pace in direction of developing friendship into firm 
military alliance.” But, the Greeks had to be in line with Turks because “if they 
appear cool towards Turkish suggestions, Yugoslavs might question depth of Greek 
interest.” The Greek side was also suspicious towards Turkey, and the following 
Greek speculation was, as stated by Peurifoy, “(colored by distrust comparatively 
aggressive foreign policy Balkans and Middle East)….Turks making plea for Italian 
support by endeavoring smoke out Yugoslavs with respect their intentions regarding 
defense areas adjacent Italy.” Greek dissatisfaction expressed in later discussions 
among the circles as Greek Foreign Office stated “Yugoslav position in closer 
conformity with realities of delicate NATO political problem than its Turkish 
position.” On the other hand, on Köprülü’s proposal regarding the participation of 
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NATO observers during these meetings, Yugoslavs responded that Greek-Turkish 
consultation of NATO was appropriate and there was no need for a NATO 
commander’s presence in these meetings.274 As opposed to some problems, the 
significance of these meetings was the maintenance of discussions on the collective 
defense of the Balkan area in case of an attack, which indicated the firm stand of the 
parties against the Soviet Union when no military alliance existed. On July 4-11, 
another meeting was held in Athens at the Foreign Ministerial level and 
establishment of a Permanent Secretariat, which was proposed by the Yugoslavs, was 
agreed upon. Also, this development was an indicator of the consensus between the 
Pact members to strengthen the relatively weak pact by non-military means.  
While Balkan partners were progressing in discussions, the autumn of 1953 
witnessed rising of tensions from Trieste between Yugoslav and Italian troops.275 On 
October 6, “Eisenhower had approved a compromise plan with the British whereby 
both countries would agree to remove their troops from Zone A and place the 
territory under Italian control at the earliest possible date.”276 This was unacceptable 
for the Yugoslavs at that time. Finally, the settlement of dispute near the border was 
achieved in mid-October, but a permanent solution in Trieste was still far-away since 
both parties were seeking a solution favorable to themselves. Accordingly, any 
development towards a military alliance between the Balkan partners, which would 
strengthen Yugoslavia’s position on the international arena, had been perceived 
                                                 
274 “The Ambassador in Greece to the Department of State,” June 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 
VIII, 631. 
275 On August 30 the Italian government had moved troops to the Yugoslavian border, in the area 
immediately north of the free territory. The Yugoslav government had demanded the removal of these 
forces, threatening to mobilize its own troops in opposition (FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. VIII, 243; 
Roberto G. Rabel, Between East and West: Trieste, the United States, and the Cold War, 1941-1954 
(Durham, N.C., 1988), 146-47, in Eisenhower, Dwight D. To John Foster Dulles, 30 September 1953. 
In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 441. World Wide 
Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-
papers/first-term/documents/441.cfm (Aug. 6, 2004); New York Times, Sept. 5-6, 1953. 
276 Department of State Bulletin  29,  no. 747 (October 19, 1953): 529. 
 105 
 
skeptically by the Italians. For instance, the Permanent Secretariat of the Balkan Pact 
was established by a treaty signed in Belgrade on November 7 and afterwards the 
Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister paid a visit to Ankara to discuss the 
Trieste issue.277 Additionally, Oral Sander wrote that Yugoslavia was trying to 
strengthen its position in the Western defense systems to provide a favorable solution 
for itself in the settlement of the Trieste problem. He even argued that this intention 
was the leading factor in Yugoslavia’s signing a military alliance with Turkey and 
Greece in August 1954.278 As it will be seen from the following parts, Yugoslav 
hurry for signing a treaty proves Sander’s assessment.   
 
5.3.1 Full Throttle 
From November 10 to 20, 1953, the third meeting of military delegates of the 
Balkan partners was held in Belgrade, to discuss specific military plans. A tripartite 
emergency plan of action, submitted by Greek representative, was adopted in this 
meeting. Based on the working paper, the purpose of the plan was limited to the 
coordination in the defense of “Yugoslavia area facing Bulgaria, Central and Eastern 
Greek Macedonia, Greek and Turkish Thrace” against the “invasion Bulgarian forces 
or Bulgar-Soviet or satellite forces.”279 Apart from this, it is seen from Cavendish 
Cannon’s report, the U.S. Ambassador in Greece, to the Department of State that the 
Greek side maintained bilateral talks with Yugoslavs and informed them of Greek 
perception. The Greek Foreign Minister listed the Greek views as, “Greece agrees, in 
principle, that military cooperation should take form of military agreement; this 
would be incorporated into Ankara Pact and be integral part of it; it would define 
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conditions under which military cooperation would be possible.” Cannon also noted 
that Greeks, Turks and Yugoslavs “have come to believe something along these lines 
is essential to their national security.” According to him the reason why this time the 
Greek side took the initiative and needed to formulate a Greek position was 
“[because the] Greeks found Turkey so far in advance and so impatient [with] 
coordination, either with Greece or with NATO, that the formulation of a Greek 
position has become imperative.”280 The summary of evaluation of the acting 
Secretary of State Smith was not much different from previous views, included the 
importance of NATO obligations and relations between Italy and the Ankara Pact 
countries.281 
In the first months of 1954, rumors about likely Soviet-Yugoslav 
rapprochement were the focus of attention among the tripartite circles.282 On January 
31, New York Times wrote “the official organ of the Cominform invited Yugoslavia 
today to ‘restore the ancient bonds’ with Russia.” One day later, a high ranking 
Yugoslav official stated that “President Marshal Tito's regime had gone so far with 
its economic and political decentralization that to scrap it would mean a 
convulsion.”283 Yugoslavia’s position towards Soviet maneuvers was viewed by its 
partners as if nothing had changed about Yugoslavia. The Greek Foreign Minister 
informed Ambassador Cannon about “Yugoslavs’ eagerness conclude firm military 
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alliance with Greece proof Tito’s good faith.” Further, he informed that Yugoslavia 
“desired mutual assistance agreement to replace present contingent planning” and 
postponement of this issue would result in Yugoslavs’ “cool-off towards whole 
scheme”284 and Tito’s probable rapprochement with the Soviet bloc. According to 
the State Department, the U.S. perceived the  “normalization” of relations between 
Yugoslavia and the Eastern bloc countries was not a threat, and “US best judgment 
continues to be that Tito sees balance his interest in continued cooperation with 
West.” The Secretary stressed the solution to the “Trieste situation would permit 
thorough re-examination of military situation in Balkans without all political 
repercussions which would result if this problem were prematurely approached.”285 
Since the Yugoslavs accepted negotiating the Trieste issue, and American, British 
and Yugoslav representatives maintained their meetings in London from February 2 
to May 31. 
 
5.4 U.S. Increases Control and Tito’s Maneuvers 
While the Greek side was contemplating on the details of the extension of 
Ankara Pact into an alliance on their own initiative, Tito surprised the Greeks and 
paid a visit to Ankara on May 12-16.286 When the Yugoslav and Turkish 
representatives announced the possibility of the transformation of cooperation into a 
military alliance was decided, the Greek side was “shocked and hurt.”287 According 
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to Ambassador Cannon, the Greek reaction included “surprise, anger and 
embarrassment at what they consider to be Turkish irresponsibility and conjecture 
regarding US position vis-à-vis Turkey.” The Greek perception was “Greeks not 
Turks have most at stake in developing effective military cooperation with 
Yugoslavs” and strongly objected “to inconsiderate action of partners in issuing 
statement of such importance in bilateral basis.”288  The pact was not the case after 
all. Greek-Turkish relations prevailed while Tito was watching his future-allies who 
competed with each other over him.  
Cannon described this situation as “Turks have consistently endeavored 
secure political advantage with Yugoslavs by promoting alliance concept when they 
knew that Greece, in support US position, was endeavoring postpone action.” Also, 
the Greeks felt “placed in anomalous position of appearing less friendly to 
Yugoslavs” as a result of the Turks’ recent move. As previous and later 
developments had indicated, diplomatic competition prevailed between Turkey and 
Greece, and both sides tried to develop ties with Yugoslavia much faster than the 
other. Cannon also noted that this issue did not seriously threaten the Ankara Pact, 
but a problem occurred in the coordination between U.S., Greek and Turkish 
policies. Taking into consideration the delay of further developments towards a 
military alliance for about six months, Cannon suggested to Washington that unless 
the Trieste issue would be settled by fall, the “necessity of separating question of 
Ankara Pact military alliance from Italian question” would have to be taken into 
consideration. He also put forward that “identical representations should be made to 
all three Ankara Pact nations setting forth frankly Department’s objections to 
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excessive speed in direction of alliance.”289   He also warned of the possible 
unintended consequences of not taking preventive measures. The Italian government 
was also aware of the possible advantageous outcomes of a Balkan military alliance 
for Yugoslavia, and tried every means to blockade it.  On May 13, New York Times 
wrote “Italian determination to prevent the formation of a Balkan military alliance 
was clearly expressed today when Foreign Minister Attilio Piccioni made a report to 
the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.”290  
 
5.4.1 The Question of How to Slow Down the Process 
Greek-Turkish competition towards making an alliance became the driving-
force of the tripartite negotiations. On May 10, it was reported that the Greeks “felt 
compelled to ‘match’ the Turk-Yugoslav position on a military alliance during the 
forthcoming visit of Tito to Greece” and acknowledged that they “no longer felt able 
to propound the US position on the Balkan Pact.”291 On May 17, Dulles instructed 
démarches on the ground of Yugoslav-Italian relations. He appreciated the 
developments between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, but linked it openly to the 
Trieste issue. Based on the record: 
US feels constrained to draw attention of Greek (Yugoslav) Government 
to fact that over-hasty furtherance of this cooperation at this time might 
well upset the very delicate Trieste negotiations which have now reached 
most sensitive moment and thus serve to perpetuate a situation which has 
represented real obstacle to the development of the very relations which 
the three Balkan nations and the US consider are essential in our 
common interest and objectives.292 
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Most importantly, Tito linked the Trieste settlement and possible Italian membership 
to the Balkan pact, and this made Italians angrier. “Italian official circles refused to 
be ruffled by what is considered here to be a trap laid for them by the Yugoslav 
Government in connection with the Trieste issue.”293  Dulles’ instructions were in 
line with these developments, and he was aware of the fact that “while we do not 
wish to argue the question of whether or not Italian reaction could be permitted to 
delay the development of cooperative relations between Yugoslavia, Greece and 
Turkey…we must all recognize that the Italians will react strongly to any public 
indication,”294 shortly he expressed the pressure of time to resolve the Trieste 
problem before the conclusion of the pact. 
 Since Turkey and Greece were already NATO allies, it should not be difficult 
to persuade them to postpone the talks or slow it down to calm down Italy; however 
Yugoslavia, as a party to the Trieste dispute, was also looking for an advantageous 
position in the Trieste settlement, and the Balkan Pact already presented a  trump for 
the Yugoslavs. Washington-Belgrade correspondence signified the difficult task of 
U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade, James W. Riddleberger, in this period. Yugoslavs 
perceived U.S. policy-shift as an attempt to slow-down the Balkan Alliance, while 
the Secretary of State had tried to assure the Yugoslav representatives of their 
“misunderstandings” and “misperceptions”295 on the nature of American thinking 
and motives. In Belgrade, the necessity of démarche was questioned by the Yugoslav 
Foreign Secretary, that the “Yugoslav government cannot recognize as valid US 
argument re formalization of alliances as the timing could not be based upon an 
irresponsible attitude by Italian government.” He asserted that Trieste and Balkan 
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alliance were independent of each other; and he continued criticizing Italian 
behavior. More clearly, Riddleberger perceived the Yugoslav approach to the 
démarche positively and reported to the Department of State that , “if as now appears 
probable US-UK-Yugoslavia agreement on Trieste is concluded in next few days, 
perhaps we can influence developments re Balkan pact in less heated atmosphere.”296  
On May 27, U.S. Embassies in Greece and Turkey were instructed “discreetly 
to emphasize the desire of United States that any new military pacts entered into by 
those countries be submitted to the North Atlantic Council.”297 On May 29, 
Embassies in Greece and Turkey were instructed again “to request the governments 
of these countries to cease publicly placing the entire responsibility for the Trieste 
impact of Italians.”298 These precautions were necessary before Marshall Tito’s visit 
to Athens. Ambassador Cannon informed Washington that “we shall be lucky if 
public oratory can be kept reasonably close to level set by Ankara visit some weeks 
ago.” In this regard, the text of communiqué, “which should satisfy everyone,” was 
written in French text and “it would state alliance project determined on but details 
would be ‘etabli’ by meetings of Foreign Ministers,” without giving any detail about 
date for meeting and signature.299 The text was just like it was intended to be, but it 
was much harder to control speeches than making corrections on paper. Based on the 
information provided by Ivo Mallet “the official communiqué issued in Athens on 
June 5 announced that agreement had been reached between the Yugoslav 
Delegation and the Greek Government on the desirability of transforming the Balkan 
pact into an Alliance,” and added that, “it was agreed that a Balkan Consultative 
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Assembly should be established.”300 To the contrary, after Tito’s visit, the Yugoslav 
Foreign Minister stated that:  
The Alliance, which would be concluded at the meeting in the first half 
of July, was to be formed on a broad basis between completely equal 
countries and that it was made necessary by the continued, although 
reduced danger of aggression from the East…Conclusion of this alliance 
was in no way related to the settlement of the Trieste problem and 
criticized the Italians for trying to link the two questions.  
 
In comparison, when the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes visited Washington 
in the first week of June and brought the latest situation in the Balkan discussions to 
Eisenhower, he pointed out that “it would be a very fine thing for the safety of the 
region if Yugoslavia could be included in NATO” but also acknowledged that “under 
[the] present conditions such a development is impossible” and he volunteered to “do 
all he could do to promote a peaceful solution of Trieste.”301 The first week of June 
was the beginning of American, British and Italian talks in London when the initial 
Italian reaction was cautiously optimistic about the issue.  
 
5.4.2 Big Brothers and the Text of the New Treaty 
On June 11, Balkan Alliance Working Group, composed of British, French and 
American representatives, met in London to discuss the process of realization of the 
Balkan alliance. The basic issues, again, revolved around the link between the 
alliance and its timing. In the first meeting, consensus was achieved on following 
points: 
1. North Atlantic Treaty does not contain any absolute prohibition 
military alliance between NATO and non-NATO country. 
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2. NAT does not give NATO member right of veto such an alliance 
negotiated y other member. 
3. Greek-Turk-Yugoslav military alliance inevitable and not likely be 
delayed indefinitely. 
4. Balkan Alliance could, depending upon terms, have direct effect 
extending NATO commitments. 
5. Development alliance terms should be closely followed with a view 
to corrective action in event of (a) any possible conflict with NAT 
and (b) any possible imbalance especially relative to NATO 
implications.302 
The second meeting was held on June 17, and the discussions began on the 
limits of the geographical area alliance would cover and possible consequences. The 
British and French representatives pointed out their approach to a link with the 
Balkan Alliance and NATO. According to them, “the objective would be to 
coordinate military arrangements of Balkan partners with those of NATO and ensure 
that Yugoslav participation commensurate with benefits.” As parties were aware of 
the fact that this move mould mean the integration of Balkan plans with those of 
SACEUR and it would happen probably through SACEUR. Thus, the necessity of a 
mediating organ, a committee or staff, was stressed. But, they did not mention any 
exact procedure about the timing.303  
On the third meeting, on June 18, discussions began on the timing of approach 
to Greeks and Turks about the views of US/UK/France on the process of Balkan 
alliance. French representatives proposed that “Greeks and Turks should be informed 
that West’s ultimate objective is integration of Yugoslavia into western defense 
structure.” U.S. and the British representatives agreed on such a statement would go 
further than expected at that time. It was agreed that drafting of a “text of possible 
statement for use if it should be decided to make representations to Greeks and/or 
Turks.” Based on the record, it would include: 
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…general reassurance that development of Balkan military alliance is 
welcomed by US/UK/France as step toward closer political and military 
association of Yugoslavia with West, reminder that it must be carefully 
and properly presented to NATO partners for consultation, explanation 
that US/UK/France wish to assure satisfactory handling with NATO, and, 
to this end, general questions or suggestions on points which are of 
concern to US.304 
 
At about the same time, the Commissions of Balkan partners started to work 
out an agreed draft of the proposed Balkan Alliance. On June 28, a committee of 
Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish representatives met in Athens to draft this alliance.305 
Secretary Dulles had concerns about the timing of this meeting. According to him the 
possibility of the conclusion of this meeting with full agreement on final text before 
July 5, and accordingly presentation to the NAC prior to the Belgrade meeting of 
Yugoslav, Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers in Belgrade between July 12 and 18 
would create a great problem. “This would mean NAC discussion would occur at 
most sensitive times of Trieste negotiations, compelling Italy take unfavorable 
position on Balkan Alliance.” This timing would badly effect the Trieste issue and 
create problems among the NATO members and Italy. Italy’s stand was suspicious 
towards these developments. Rome perceived the coincidence of these discussions 
negatively, and even confidentially asked for harmonizing timing of Athens and 
Belgrade meetings with Trieste negotiations and for U.S. and UK support in this 
case.306 However, Dulles pursued a strategy of no comment on the Balkan alliance, 
namely not to undertake démarches, until the draft agreements became available. The 
tripartite Balkan committee concluded their work on July 5, and reached full 
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agreement on the text.307 This text was to form a basis for discussions between the 
Foreign Ministers of the three countries at a meeting to be held at Bled later in the 
month, in the course of which it was expected that the Treaty of Alliance would be 
signed. It was announced on July 8, and confirmed in Belgrade the next day, that the 
signature would take place on July 21.308 
 
5.5 Happy End: Dulles’ Scheduling and the Balkan Pact 
On July 8, after the draft military treaty was concluded, Secretary Dulles was 
ready to implement a clearer strategy towards the alliance. In his telegram to the U.S. 
Embassy in the United Kingdom, he repeated that the Balkan alliance should not be 
in conflict with NATO, but support possible goals of Western solidarity. He stressed 
the appropriate drafting of the text would be welcome by NATO members. The main 
criticisms of the draft were on the “automatic” nature of the pact, which was 
perceived as going beyond the North Atlantic Treaty, would give greatest trouble to 
NATO members and “would tend to create impression in Soviet mind of division on 
Balkan Alliance and would present cause of friction within NATO;” and on the 
references to the U.N. Charter. These criticisms also stated that while there were still 
technical problems and unresolved issues between the signatories, presentation to 
NAC was “premature and prejudicial.” Dulles added that “US UK and French 
support for an alliance could be given if these problems resolved on expert level,” 
and maintained that “this may upset time table of signing treaty at Ministers meeting 
on July 20” but had to be done.309  
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On the same day, Dulles instructed unilateral U.S. démarche to Ambassador 
Riddleberger of Yugoslavia. Apart from the substance of the proposed alliance, he 
once again stated the Italo-Yugoslav problem. He put more emphasis on the solution 
of the Trieste problem than the conclusion of the Pact, and most importantly he 
commented that “Trieste solution is just first step which must pave way for creation 
of necessary interrelationships between the Alliance, US, UK, French –Yugoslav 
military planning, Italian-Yugoslav planning, possible Italo-Yugoslav treaty 
relation…” while adding that there was no “clear-vision of how these relationships 
should develop.” At the end of his telegram, Dulles instructed Riddleberger how to 
detain Tito:  
Ambassador can, by speaking of broad issues rather than directing 
himself to factual or drafting points in the text of the Alliance itself, 
accomplish…persuading Tito that we are not in fact trying to booby-trap 
him but are really concerned at the overall effectiveness of the regional 
arrangement we all wish to see created.310  
 
On July 14, while Ankara requested a delay in the signing of treaty and assured 
the U.S. representatives that they “would do all they could do to make consistent the 
articles of the alliance with those of the North Atlantic Pact,”311 The U.S. Embassy in 
Belgrade reported that “the Yugoslavs were bitter about the delay in signing the 
military pact and that they attributed this delay to U.S. pressure,”312 On July 15, a 
brief communiqué was issued in all three capitals announcing that the Foreign 
Ministers’ meeting would be postponed, as preparations for it could not be completed 
on time. The Yugoslav press hinted that “non-Balkan influences are responsible for 
this postponement and several suspicious and irritated, if vaguely worded, editorials 
have been published, suggesting that the delay is due to attempts to link the signing 
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of the Alliance with the settlement of the Trieste dispute.”313 In comparison, the 
Greek side was ambiguous; U.S. officials in Greece reported that “the Greeks were 
much more pessimistic about the chances for the early conclusion of a military pact 
than were the Turks.”314 Secretary Dulles maintained a wait-and-see approach in 
these circumstances and instructed that when they saw the final draft they would 
support it before NATO and with Italians, but also added that “we hope Greek, Turk, 
Yugoslav negotiations on revised text will be terminated expeditiously in order to 
allow presentation to NAC a suitable period prior to Ministerial meeting and 
signature which we now understand scheduled for July 30.” Dulles, also instructed 
the Foreign Service to “suggest US representatives Athens and Ankara seek occasion 
express our appreciation that the Greeks and Turks accepted our observations in the 
spirit that they were intended, and that they successfully undertook the difficult task 
of bringing the Yugoslavs around to an acceptable position.” His instruction to 
Yugoslavia was different and included that “Greeks and Turks would now appear to 
be on the threshold of agreement on text which can meet NATO problem.”315 This 
was called delaying, not postponing. 
In particular, Turkish request for a delay about the signing of the treaty caused 
indignant behavior on the Yugoslav side, but was welcomed in Washington. The 
U.S. Ambassador in Ankara, Avra M. Warren, informed Washington that “unlike 
their partners Turks have shown themselves willing, largely on basis of our 
influence” in the timing and conclusion of the pact. For the Turks and Greeks, 
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coordinating their policies with each other was much easier than coordinating their 
moves based on U.S. suggestions. As an appraisal, the major problem between 
Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece was not the lack of consensus among matters related 
to the Pact, but lack of coordination and timing as opposed to a series of meetings 
between each other and the U.S. For instance, as Warren reported, Italian entrance 
into the pact was a matter of discussions and “Balkan partners decided as long as 
Brione meeting Italy must be brought into pact at earliest.” While Americans had a 
different schedule for the pact and synchronized negotiations with the Trieste 
discussions, and while Yugoslavs were trying to sign an alliance as soon as possible, 
it was a difficult task to harmonize three Balkan states’ initiatives. Accordingly, 
“Turks have in fact proposed nothing to Greeks and Yugoslavs due to failure Italian 
Government to realize and grasp opportunity discussed with their Ambassador”316 in 
Ankara. When Italians failed to respond, Turks informed their partners of these talks. 
On July 17, Washington instructed the Embassy in Rome to “encourage the Italians 
to negotiate directly with the Balkan pact parties”317 to avoid U.S. appearance as the 
agent of the Italian government. Warren’s overall assessment of the situation in the 
Balkans was “Italian vacillations, Greek impetuousness, and Yugoslav 
suspiciousness have already cost the West a chance for a major victory in the Cold 
War.”318  
While there was a rumpus among the Balkan partners, Italians were 
contemplating on both Trieste and joining the alliance. The U.S. Chargé in Italy 
informed that Italians were not too worried about Trieste since “they had not 
expected Yugoslavia to cheer about their counterproposals as Italians had not 
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cheered about Yugoslav proposals.”319 Americans tried to assure Italians that 
resolution of the Trieste issue would provide them a freer hand in many matters 
including joining the pact and in Yugoslav-Italian relations. However, on July 22 and 
27, it was reported that “the Italians were prepared to accept the Balkan military 
agreement so long as provisions were made for the coordination of planning between 
NATO and the parties to the agreement.”320 On July 27, the draft text of the new 
treaty was ready and it was more consistent with the NAT. Decisions of U.S. British, 
and French decisions on representatives to the NAC to make independent statements 
at the meeting of July 29 became clear. British and French representatives had been 
“instructed to point out the difficulties of coordinating political decisions between the 
use of NATO and Balkan pact military forces.”321 On the same day, it was reported 
that “the Turks were prepared at the NAC meeting to emphasize the necessity of 
political coordination between NATO and the Balkan Pact,”322 and a Turkish 
communication to the NAC was transmitted “distinguishing sharply between 
collaboration of the Balkan pact with NATO and the inclusion of Yugoslavia into 
NATO.”323  
Consequentially the Balkan issue was brought to the NAC. The Greeks 
maintained their emphasis on the Yugoslav attachment to the West and the 
importance of Yugoslavia to the West, and also added that “alliance committed 
Yugoslavia to be on our side if attack made on other NATO power without formal 
commitment to Yugoslavia by NATO.” The Turkish side pointed out the necessity 
on taking “further steps for complete integration between Balkan alliance and NATO 
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of legal and organic character similar to that established between EDC and NATO by 
special protocol and arrangements for joint sessions.” Also, the Turks added Italy’ as 
a partner to the Ankara pact, and military alliance. According to the report by U.S. 
Permanent representative on the North Atlantic Council, Hughes, to the Department 
of State, although the Trieste issue was not settled yet, Italy stopped acting as an 
obstacle and “emphasized importance alliance to her in view her Yugoslav border 
and geographical location in relation other alliance partners.”324 After a period of 
cacophony, collective defense in the Balkans was formally achieved by this treaty. 
On August 9, 1954, Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance 
between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's 
Republic of Yugoslavia was signed, covering a 20 years period of time.325 According 
to the Article II of the treaty: 
The Contracting Parties agree that any armed aggression against one or 
more of them in any part of their territories shall be considered an 
aggression against all the Contracting Parties, who, consequently, in the 
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, shall jointly and severally 
go to the assistance of the Party or Parties attacked by taking 
immediately and by common accord any measures, including the use of 
armed force, which they deem necessary for effective defense.  
 
This article openly established the frame of collective defense between the 
signatories. On the other hand, Article X made a reference to the NATO membership 
of Turkey and Greece. According to this article, “The provisions of the present 
Treaty do not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights 
and obligations of Greece and Turkey resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty of 
April 4, 1949.” This simple clause drew the limits of this treaty by taking into 
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consideration priority of NATO memberships of two signatories. During the NATO 
meeting, this article brought an end to the discussions about the Pact. In case of an 
aggression, NATO obligations would override the Treaty of Bled. However, in other 
circumstance, Yugoslavia was indirectly bound to NATO defense. 
 
5.6 Surprising Developments in the Cold War and the Balkans. 
 In the summer of 1954, two independent developments affected the course of 
the Cold War and the relations between the signatory states of the Balkan Pact. First, 
the Tito-Khrushchev correspondence which began during the negotiations. Second, 
the rise of Cyprus issue between Greece and Turkey just after the signing of the 
treaty. Tito-Khrushchev correspondence can be examined in the Soviet strategy on 
restoring relations with other states which were broken during Stalin era. The timing 
of these letters indicates that the Soviet Union tried to prevent Yugoslavia’s forward 
attachment with the West. However, the Cyprus issue was completely independent 
from the Cold War relations. It has been an unresolved conflict in Greek-Turkish 
relations.  
 
5.6.1 Tito- Khrushchev Correspondence 
In June 1954, while Dulles was trying to postpone the Balkan developments a 
new factor came into play, and this was Khrushchev himself. On June 22, he wrote a 
letter to Tito and the Central Committee of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia. This letter was the first highest level contact from the Soviet Union 
since 1948. He openly indicated his desire to establish friendly relations with 
Yugoslavia and emphasized the change in Soviet view of Yugoslavia since 1948:  
From our side, we deem regrettable the circumstance that at the time, 
both sides did not use all available opportunities in an effort to regulate 
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all contentious issues and grievances that emerged in 1948, all the more 
so as some facts, which were the immediate causes for the break between 
the CC CPSU and the CC CPY, now look different.326 
 
Remembering the experience of 1948 and taking into account the ongoing 
progress towards the Balkan pact and Trieste solution, Tito had to be cautious about 
this Soviet offer. Also, the letter was from Khrushchev himself, not an official letter 
from the CPSU. According to Svetozar Rajak, Edvard Kardelj informed 
“Khrushchev in mid-July via the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade that Yugoslavia had 
received the initiative favorably, but was in no position to respond for the time 
being.”327 Khrushchev’s initiative followed by a letter (Cable) from the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Tito and the Central 
Committee of the League Of Communists Of Yugoslavia on July 24. As Rajak 
pointed out, the timing coincided with the closing discussions regarding the Balkan 
pact. Actually, before the postponements of the Foreign Ministerial Meeting of the 
Balkan partners, the meeting would be held in mid-July.  In the second 
communication, CPSU displayed its understanding of the importance of the recent 
situation for Yugoslavia:  
The CC CPSU is aware of the great importance of the question of Trieste 
to Yugoslavia. We too consider it propitious that it be resolved in 
accordance with justified interests of Yugoslavia. Should, for 
Yugoslavia, there exist a possibility of a resolution of this question in the 
nearest future then it is perfectly obvious and understandable to us that it 
must not be encumbered by premature publication of our negotiations.328 
 
Two days after the signing of treaty, on August 11, Tito responded and sent his 
first letter to Khrushchev and Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. Khrushchev’s timing was determined by the further alignment of 
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Yugoslavia with the West, and as pointed before by the U.S. Ambassador McGhee 
NATO membership of Yugoslavia would be perceived as the next step when 
Yugoslavia joined in a collective defense alliance binding itself to the Western 
defense system. In comparison, Tito’s timing was driven with the ongoing Balkan 
treaty negotiations, and this letter of him just after the signing of the treaty proved his 
real attitude to his new alliance, since the aggressor defined in the text of the treaty 
referred to the Soviet Union and the satellites. He agreed on the normalization of 
relations and emphasized his feelings towards the world socialist movement: 
With regard to contacts between the CC of the Communist Party of 
Soviet Union and the CC of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, in 
principle we are not against them. The League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia never rejects cooperation with any organizations and 
movement that wish to fight for peace in the world and cooperation 
among nations, in particular not with socialist movements and parties. 
However, before some progress in normalization of government relations 
is achieved, the meeting you are suggesting, would not prove efficient in 
eliminating everything that instigates material and political damage to 
both countries.329 
 
The Tito-Khrushchev letters prove that the Balkan Pact lost its significance on 
the day it was signed. While Tito emphasized the necessity of gradual progress 
towards normalization, both parties agreed on the restoration of relations. As Rajak 
pointed out, “this initial exchange between Tito and Khrushchev set the pace and the 
character of normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations: The process of 
normalization would be gradual and confined to improvement of government 
relations.”330 In contrast, as seen before, Yugoslavs were more provocative in their 
speeches during the last stages of the Balkan pact negotiations, especially against 
U.S. moves towards the postponement of the signing of the treaty. The timing of the 
Tito-Khrushchev correspondence benefited Tito in strengthening his stand during 
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this period.  On this matter, Rajak concluded that “Khrushchev’s offer for Yugoslav-
Soviet normalization helped to solidify Yugoslavia’s position in the closing stages of 
the Balkan Pact negotiations.”331  
From a more general perspective, these letters were written long before 
Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade on May 26, 1955, and the Joint Soviet-Yugoslav 
declaration on June 2, which were taken as significant mile-stones in the 
normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and also marked 
the beginning of another phase in the history of the Cold War. Therefore these letters 
were the first step in the process of Khrushchev’s Belgrade visit. In addition, the 
summer of 1954, provided Yugoslavia an environment to develop relations with the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. simultaneously and a maneuvering space in the Cold War, 
which was to become the non-aligned movement worldwide. 
 
5.6.2 The Cyprus Issue 
 Geographically Cyprus is not located in the Balkans, but as a result of its 
importance for Greece and Turkey it cannot be separated from Balkan politics. Given 
the historical background, Cyprus has been mainly populated with Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots, and it had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire from 1571 to the 
change of administration to the British in 1878. As dealt in Chapter I, Megale Idea 
was the driving force in Greek invasion of Asia-Minor during World War I. The 
vision of a Hellenic world included the attachment of this island to the Greek 
homeland, namely Enosis. The Greek Enosis campaign became clear after the 
annexation of Cyprus by the British in 1914. Since Cyprus was under British rule, 
the issue did not seriously affect the relations between Turkey and Greece in the 
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interwar period, but Greek intentions about Megale Idea never disappeared. As noted 
by Ioannis Stefanidis, “on the eve of [the] World War II, young pupils were 
instructed that they, contemporary Greeks, ‘could never forget the glory and 
grandeur of the Greek Empire and do not cease to believe that one day the dreams of 
the race will be fulfillment, namely, what is usually called Megale Idea’.”332 In the 
aftermath of the war, enosis demands of Greece continued, for instance on April 28, 
1947, the Greek Parliament resolved on the unification of Greece and Cyprus, but 
these demands were rejected since Cyprus was one of the last assets of the UK in the 
eastern Mediterranean and consequently its strategic importance increased as a result 
of the Cold War.333  The first important sign of Enosis came from Cyprus in late 
1949 by the Progressive Party of Working People of Cyprus, AKEL, brought the 
issue to the United Nations and accelerated efforts towards an Enosis plebiscite. On 
January 15, 1950, the Enosis plebiscite was hold under the monopoly of Church 
committees, under Archbishop Makarios. On the extent of Greek nationalism during 
this period Stavrinides wrote that: 
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It is not easy to draw any definite conclusions from this event since the 
population was persistently urged by the nationalists to vote and the 
voting took the form of signing one's name under a petition in public. If a 
Greek was to vote on this issue at all it was as embarrassing and risky for 
him to vote against Enosis as to declare in public that he was not a 'True 
Greek'.334 
 
For the Greek Administrations, it was a difficult period because any problem 
rising from Cyprus would affect its relatively smooth relations with Turkey, the UK, 
the U.S., and accordingly the NATO alliance. It was the same for Turkey, even in 
January 1950, Turkish Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak commented in the 
National Assembly that, “"There is no such question called the Cyprus question, 
because Cyprus today is under the sovereignty and rule of the British and we are sure 
that Britain has no intention to hand over the island to any other state.”335 Actually, 
the Turkish Administration associated its foreign policy with NATO and preferred 
regarding Cyprus as a British problem. Turkey’s maintenance of a moderate policy 
towards Cyprus was not passivism, instead it was to prioritize its foreign policy 
matters. In addition, Greece had tried to achieve a satisfactory solution regarding 
Cyprus in its bilateral relations with the British, but could not.  
 However, on August 16, 1954, the Cyprus question was internationalized by 
the initiative of Greek Prime Minister Alexander Papagos when he brought the issue 
to the U.N. General Secretary336 requesting the application of the principle of self-
determination to the people of Cyprus; only ten days after the signing of the treaty. 
The Greek Government’s move can be regarded as the beginning of decades-long 
Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece. When the Greek application was 
                                                 
334Zenon Stavrinides, The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood (Wakefield, England: the 
author, 1976), 28. 
335 Ayin Tarihi (Jan. 1950) 
336 Greeks in U.N. Ask Cyprus Plesabiscite; Want Island to Decide Issue of Union With Mainland -- 
British to Oppose Bid Greeks in U. N. Ask Plebiscite In Cyprus on the Union Issue. New York Times, 
Aug. 20, 1954. 
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rejected in December 1954,337 Athens switched to other means to achieve Enosis: 
EOKA terror -National Organization of Cyprus Fighters- started on April 1, 1955, 
and took many lives from both sides.338  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 When the treaty was entered into force on May 21, 1955; ratified by 
Yugoslavia on February 25, 1955, by Greece on April 30, 1955, and by Turkey on 
May 21, 1955; it was already a paper-pact.  Overall, while the road to the Balkan 
Pact was influenced by several factors such as the Trieste negotiations, the impact of 
the Cyprus issue was felt immediately on the Balkan alliance. The final solution 
regarding Trieste was achieved in October 1954; Zones of Free Territory of Trieste 
were partitioned between Yugoslavia and Italy with very minor border changes. 
While the American side was extremely satisfied with the end of the Trieste problem, 
they faced another conflict in Cyprus which would affect the solidarity of the North 
Atlantic Alliance.  
 On the other hand, while the Trieste settlement was almost achieved, on 
September 23, Khrushchev wrote another letter to Tito emphasizing “the cause of the 
Soviet and Yugoslav peoples coming together is moving forward because thus 
demand the interests of both countries and interests of peace and socialism.”339 A 
Soviet report prepared by the Head of the IV European Sector of the Foreign 
Ministry Zimianin dated Oct. 21, 1954, concluded that “The Soviet Union's policy on 
Yugoslavia has produced serious positive results, has increased the influence of the 
                                                 
337 Ümit Haluk Bayülken, Cyprus question and the United Nations (Lefkoşa: Cyprus Research & 
Publishing C.: 1975) 
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USSR among the peoples of Yugoslavia, has helped explode the aggressive, anti-
Soviet plans of the USA in the Balkans.”340 Eight months later, Khrushchev would 
be in Belgrade cheering with the Yugoslav leader. In turn, Tito was in a position to 
benefit from the Cold War opposition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and 
traveled his own path in the Cold War. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
340 “On Recent Yugoslav Foreign Policy (second half of 1954), Oct. 21, 1954,” in Andrei Edemskii, 
“The Turn in Soviet-Yugoslav Relations: 1953-1955,” CWIHB 10, (March 1998): 138. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The early years of the Cold War have always been a very fruitful period for 
historical studies and research. When the Cold War is studied in parallel with the 
Balkan history and relations, this combination provides very rich knowledge for the 
historian. The Cold War was felt in the Balkans before many parts of the world, and 
the early years after World War II witnessed crisis in this region caused by the Cold 
War policies of both sides and the inherent problems in the region. The plans for a 
Balkan federation and the end of the Balkan Pact verifies the continuity of historical 
tendencies and problems in the Cold War environment. 
 The first half of the twentieth century, witnessed bloodshed and series of wars 
in this part of the world. The gradual withdrawal of the Ottoman and Habsburg 
Empires from the region had brought new states into play and caused continuing 
territorial disputes. In the end of the Great War the Balkan territorial picture was 
finalized with treaties, but post-war settlement could not bring an end to ethnicity 
and border disputes.  Coupled with continued romantic expansionist feelings, the 
dissatisfaction of some states marked the line of status quo during the interwar years. 
The rise of the Nazi regime in Germany and Mussolini’s expansionist tendencies 
increased the feeling of insecurity in the Balkans. The alliances made during this 
period were targeted against both inside and outside powers. Although it was a weak 
sort of cooperation, the Balkan Entente of 1934 was a significant alliance because it 
was the indicator of possible further cooperation in the Balkans.  When the World 
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War II broke out, the Balkans fell in turmoil again. During the war, the dissatisfied 
belligerents of the Great War invaded their neighbors to fulfill century-long desires.        
 The end of the wars saw winners and losers. However, although the war 
ended in the battlefields, it continued between the wartime allies on the post-war 
settlement in other areas. A non-continental power, the U.S., was having a say in 
Europe. In this post-war world, the Balkan states had to take sides because of their 
adjacency with one of the winning powers, the Soviet Union. In addition, Yugoslavia 
was the only country which has no debt to the Soviet Union in its liberation. Its 
position was obscure during the war, even Churchill and Stalin agreed on the 50:50 
deal. Marshall Tito chose Stalin’s way and Yugoslavia became the leading 
representative of Soviet interests in the Balkans. It was perceived by the western 
governments as the most loyal state of Moscow.   
 Yugoslavia occupied a privileged state in its relations with the Soviet Union. 
However, Tito over-exaggerated his status in this relation. During the war, 
Yugoslavia, together with Bulgaria, indicated their own desires regarding the future 
of their states and the region. The solution of ethnicity disputes between the two 
states would be resolved by the merging of Macedonian parts of the two, then the 
establishment of a federation, and the final solution would be the annexation of 
northern Greece. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, together with Albania, supported the 
ongoing civil war in Greece to achieve this end. In the name of expanding Soviet 
influence in the Balkans, Stalin himself supported the intentions of these Balkan 
states. On the other hand, Tito’s vision of a Balkan federation was simply the 
expansion of Yugoslav control on the other states under the label of a federation. 
Beginning with 1946, the divergence of opinions between Tito and Stalin started to 
become clear. Stalin was playing a greater game of the Cold War and had to be 
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careful about the moves of his satellite states, but Tito was expecting concessions on 
the federation subject. However, Tito maintained his path towards the materialization 
of his plans of a Balkan federation, or Greater Yugoslavia.  
In 1947, the U.S. intervened in Yugoslavia’s plans with the Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Aid. U.S. interference had brought a new dimension into the Cold 
War in the Balkans, but its meaning could not be perceived by Tito. Stalin’s 
responses to the American move was the further strengthening of his power among 
the satellites and try to expand his influence by establishing the Cominform. In the 
beginning of 1948 Stalin openly criticized, even warned, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and 
Albania of their independent moves from Moscow. Especially, these criticisms 
touched Yugoslavia more than others. Consequently, Yugoslavia was kicked out of 
the Cominform in mid-June 1948 after a series of provocative letters from the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the middle of a Cold War crisis in Berlin. 
This incident surprised not only Yugoslavs but also the Western world. A piece of 
the supposed monolith was removed without any effort. In the regional politics, this 
was officially the end of the plans for a Balkan federation, and non-fulfillment of 
Yugoslav desires.  
U.S. policy makers immediately perceived the Tito-Stalin split as the first 
sign of the possibility of getting over the Communist camp. The main line of the 
policy towards Yugoslavia was the support of Tito and the preservation of 
Yugoslavia’s situation as an outcast. In a year, increasing burdens of Soviet and 
satellite propaganda, economic blockade and the threat of the military invasion of 
Yugoslavia led Tito to change his direction towards the West, specifically the U.S. 
This transfer in the Cold War was followed by enormous amounts of military and 
economic aid pouring into Yugoslavia until mid-1955. Yugoslavia’s privileged status 
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now continued in its relations with the U.S.  The American support of Yugoslavia 
was given without any reciprocal political and military obligations, except some 
concessions made by Yugoslavia such as the end of Yugoslav support in the Greek 
Civil War.  
With the establishment of NATO, the form of the Cold War reached another 
dimension. The formation of a military defense organization, the ongoing military 
threat against Yugoslavia since 1948 and accordingly the containment policy of the 
U.S. necessitated the association of Yugoslavia in the western defense structure. 
Therefore, the plans for Yugoslav tying with the western defense initiated during the 
Truman administration. The reorientation of Yugoslavia had already begun by 
developing relations with non-Cominform countries. However, its relations with 
southern neighbors, Greece and Turkey, developed at a mush faster pace. With the 
membership of Turkey and Greece in NATO, Yugoslavia’s neighbors became the 
part of NATO’s southern flank, and Yugoslavia became the hole in this flank.  
U.S. policy towards the association of Yugoslavia developed gradually and 
aimed at the creation of this tie by the establishment of some sort of cooperation 
between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The problem was, there was no opportunity 
for a further step as a result of internal NATO relations and political obstacles in the 
U.S. itself. In 1952, the increasing tensions between Italy and Yugoslavia on the Free 
Territory of Trieste made Yugoslavia seek a greater tie with the West which would 
aid its stand in international relations. In order to avoid premature and hasty action 
which would cause problems among the NATO members, the newly elected 
Eisenhower Administration pursued limiting the scope of the treaty between Turkey, 
Greece and Yugoslavia. The suggested line was the maintenance of relations while 
discussing political and military matters separately. The Treaty of Friendship and 
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Cooperation - The Treaty of Ankara – between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece was 
signed on February 28, 1953. 
The signing of this treaty coincided with the death of Stalin. New Soviet 
administration applied a policy of restoration of relations with other states broken by 
Stalin. The first targets of this policy were Yugoslavia and Turkey. Both states 
maintained improving their ties with the U.S. In late 1953, the problem in Trieste 
reached its peak, and the necessity of a permanent solution of the problem became 
clear. In the spring of 1954, Trieste negotiations began between Yugoslavia, U.S. and 
the U.K. At the same time, military talks between the Balkan partners reached its 
highest level, and the necessity of the establishment of a military Balkan alliance 
became a major subject. Playing his cards well, Marshall Tito accelerated the pace of 
these talks by making moves to the Greek and Turkish sides. In the summer of 1954, 
when Italy was negotiating the Trieste issue with the U.S. and the U.K., the U.S. 
maintained a policy of postponing the establishment of the Balkan Pact before 
reaching a solution about Trieste. However, a further delay would possibly cause 
deterioration of Yugoslavia’s relations with the West. Consequently, on August 9, 
1954, the Balkan Pact, as a collective defense alliance, was established between 
Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. When the treaty was signed, it was already a dead 
one.  
The main cause for this failure lies in two factors: Tito-Khrushchev 
correspondence and the rise of the Cyprus question. The first Soviet move towards 
the normalization of relations between Moscow and Belgrade came during the early 
stages of the negotiations for the Balkan Pact. This development directly 
strengthened Tito’s position at the discussion tables, and provided him an alternative 
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for the future. When the treaty of Bled entered into force in May 1955, Khrushchev 
was visiting Belgrade.  
As Yugoslav relations with either Cold War party offers different cases and 
needs to be taken separately, the same is true for Turkish-Greek relations. During 
mid-1950s, Turkey and Greece entered a period of conflict over the issues arising 
from Cyprus, an issue older than the Cold War.  Greece applied to the United 
Nations for a solution in Cyprus based on the principle of self-determination just a 
few weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Bled. Maintaining smooth relations 
became impossible for both Turkey and Greece when EOKA, defending Enosis, 
started violent activities against Turkish Cypriots. This brought an end to Turkish-
Greek cooperation and became a problem in NATO and for the U.S.  
As the Balkan Pact lost its significance in a short period of time, because of 
the rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, thanks to the efforts of 
the new Soviet president Khrushchev, and of the arising problems between Turkey 
and Greece, a new step was needed in the Balkans, but never came. Beginning with 
the second half of the 1950s communism began to lose its strict and solid presence in 
the Balkans. As Yugoslavia began to position itself among the “Neutralists” in the 
world, Albania chose an ‘isolationist’ policy and began to come closer to China, and 
Rumania tended to slide towards a more unique socialist regime different than the 
Soviet style the rigidity of bipolarity in the Balkans began to decrease.  
Compared to Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece could not maintain a separate 
road in the Cold War. Besides, when Moscow made a definite attempt to reduce 
tension and to improve relations, Turkey had an option to develop economic relations 
with the Soviets while the country was experiencing budget problems in mid-1950s. 
Certainly, history should not be written with “should” and “might,” but in Turkey’s 
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case, the policy of preserving distance with the Soviet Union, while its allies were 
initiating relations, was a missed opportunity for Turkey’s political and economic 
conditions. A decade later Turkey’s move towards a more flexible attitude resulted in 
the identification of some common ground in Moscow’s and Ankara’s position. In 
the following decades, Soviet economic assistance to Turkey represented the largest 
program of Soviet aid to any non-communist country. 
In comparison, Yugoslavia preserved its independent position in world events 
by maintaining ties with both the West and Khrushchev's de-Stalinized Russia. Tito, 
even, pursued his so-called "Policy of Nonalignment" to find more supporters 
outside either Cold War camps. Most surprisingly, he did. The non-aligned 
movement expanded to different parts of the world, to the states which did not want 
to be a party to the ongoing conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In addition to 
this third states’ stand in world events, establishment of that kind of an alternative 
provided non-aligned states to maintain economic activities and cooperation, and 
diminished the possibility of a blockade threat like that happened to Yugoslavia from 
1948 to 1954.  
Unlike these later developments, in order to comprehend the advent of the 
early Cold War in the Balkans, historical, ethnic and regional factors should be 
emphasized as equal to the Cold War policies. This is very clear in the fate of the 
cooperation efforts and alliances made in this period. Bringing an alternative 
assessment of the aforementioned period, this thesis tried to indicate the perceptions 
of the all sides not limiting with to single side. It is not only relevant for the history 
of the Cold War, but also applicable to the history of the mentioned states.  
For the history of the U.S., supporting a communist country was an 
extraordinary event while fighting a war against the spread of communism at home 
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and abroad. When studied in detail, the unexpected causes of some of the problems 
the U.S. faces today can be found in circumstances like the Tito affair. Yugoslavia 
was the same country the U.S. was seeking ways to support and laid full support in 
the early Cold War and viewed it as a national security matter. However, in the early 
1990s, when the same country was in turmoil, and when there was no Soviet threat as 
an obstacle, the support came too late.     
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX I 
 
Record of Conversation of Generalissimus I.V. Stalin with Marshal Tito 
27 May 1946 at 23:00 hours 
Secret 
 
Present: from the USSR side – [USSR Foreign Minister] V.M. Molotov, USSR 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrent’ev;from the Yugoslav side — Minister of 
Internal Affairs, A. Rankovich; Head of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General K. 
Popovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Serbia, Neshkovich; Chairman of 
the Council of Ministers of Slovenia, Kidrich; Yugoslav Ambassador to USSR, V. 
Popovich.  
 
At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance of Trieste 
being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the city 
suburbs, and which status would be better – along the lines of Memel [Klaipeda, 
Lithuania] or those of Danzig [Gdansk, Poland]. Tito replied that the suburbs of the 
city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself would be acceptable. Though he 
would like to continue to argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Further, Tito, in 
the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed gratitude to com. Molotov for the 
support that the Soviet delegation showed in the discussion of the question of the 
Italian- Yugoslav border at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris. 
Com. Molotov gave a report on the differences in status between Memel and Danzig, 
pointing out that the status along the lines of Memel is more acceptable. Com. Stalin 
asked Tito about the industrial and agricultural situation in Yugoslavia. Tito replied 
that all land had been sown the intermediate crop was awaited, and that industry was 
working well. After which, com. Stalin invited Tito to present the group of questions 
which the Yugoslav delegation wished to discuss this evening. Tito put forth the 
following questions: economic cooperation between USSR and Yugoslavia, military 
cooperation, and Yugoslav-Albanian relations. Regarding the question of economic 
cooperation, Tito said that Yugoslavia did not want to turn to the United States for 
credit. If America were to agree to provide loans, then this would be tied to demands 
for political concessions from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia does not have the means for 
further industrial development. The Yugoslav government would like to receive 
assistance from the Soviet Union, in particular, through the establishment of mixed 
Soviet-Yugoslav associations. Yugoslavia has a fair amount of mineral and ore 
deposits, but it is in no position to organize production, since it does not possess the 
necessary machinery. In particular, Yugoslavia has oil deposits, but no drilling 
machines. Com. Stalin said: “We will help.” Regarding com. Stalin’s questions, 
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whether Yugoslavia was producing aluminum, copper and lead, Tito answered in the 
affirmative, noting that Yugoslavia had many bauxite and ore deposits for the 
production of these metals. Com. Stalin noted that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had 
informed Yugoslavia of its readiness to participate in talks regarding the 
establishment of mixed associations, but no final answer had been received from 
Yugoslavia. As a result, the impression was created that Yugoslavia was not 
interested in forming such associations. Tito objected, stating that on the contrary, he 
had spoken several times with ambassador Sadchikov about the Yugoslav 
government’s desire to create mixed Soviet- Yugoslav associations. Regarding com. 
Stalin’s note whether it will not be necessary to allow other powers into the 
Yugoslav economy following the formation of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations, 
Tito answered that the Yugoslav government had no intention of allowing the capital 
of other powers into its economy. Subsequently, com. Stalin summarized, saying that 
in this way the Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation was being conceptualized on 
the basis of forming mixed associations. Tito affirmed this, stating that he was intent 
on presenting the following day his proposals, in written form, on this subject. With 
respect to the question of military cooperation, Tito said that the Yugoslav 
government would like to receive shipments from the Soviet Union to supply the 
military needs of Yugoslavia, not in the form of mutual trade receipts, but in the form 
of loans. Yugoslavia has a small military industry which could produce grenade 
launchers and mines. In a number of places there were cadres. But there were no 
corresponding arms, since the Germans carried them away. The Yugoslav 
government would like to receive some machinery from Germany as reparations for 
the reconstruction of certain military factories. But Yugoslavia cannot by itself 
provide for all of its military needs, and in this regard, the Yugoslav government is 
hoping for assistance from the Soviet Union. Com. Stalin said that Yugoslavia ought 
to have certain military factories, for example, aviation [factories], for Yugoslavia 
may produce aluminum given the presence of rich bauxite deposits. In addition, it 
was necessary to have artillery munitions factories. Tito noted that [artillery] gun 
barrels may be cast in the Soviet Union and then further assembly may be done in 
Yugoslavia. Touching upon the question of Yugoslavia’s water borders, com. Stalin 
said that, for the purpose of safeguarding them, it was important to have a good naval 
fleet. You need to have torpedo boats, patrol boats, and armored boats. Although the 
Soviet Union is weak in this regard, we will nevertheless, in the words of com. 
Stalin, help you. Regarding Albania, com. Stalin pointed out that the internal 
political situation in Albania was unclear. There were reports that something was 
happening there between the Communist Party Politburo and Enver Hoxha. There 
had been a report that Kochi Dzodzej wants to come to Moscow in order to discuss 
certain questions prior to the party congress. Enver Hoxha has also expressed desire 
to come to Moscow together with Dzodzej. Com. Stalin asked Tito whether he 
knows anything about the situation in the Communist Party of Albania. Tito, 
appearing unacquainted with these questions, replied that Hoxha’s visit to Belgrade 
was being proposed for the near future. That is why he, Tito, believes that the reply 
to the Albanians should note that Dzodzej’s and Hoxha’s proposed visit to Moscow 
will be examined following Hoxha’s visit to Belgrade. Com. Molotov noted that we 
were trying to hold back the Albanians’ efforts to come to Moscow, but the 
Albanians were determined in this. Com. Stalin noted that the Albanians’ visit to 
Moscow might bring an unfavorable reaction from England and America, and this 
would further exacerbate the foreign policy situation of Albania. Further, com. Stalin 
asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with including Albania in the Federation of 
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Yugoslavia. Tito replied in the affirmative. Com. Stalin said that, at the present time 
it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of 
Albania into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste. Tito agreed with this. As a 
result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the question of 
friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia. Tito said that, 
above all, this treaty must provide for the defense of the territorial integrity and 
national independence of Albania. Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a 
formula for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer together. Com. 
Stalin touched on the question of including Bulgaria in the Federation. Tito said that 
nothing would come of the Federation. Com. Stalin retorted: “This must be done.” 
Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, because the matter involved 
two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties, 
while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though] with the presence of other 
parties, is essentially in the hands of the Communist Party. Com. Stalin noted that 
one need not fear this. During the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of 
friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more needs to be done. Tito agreed 
with this. Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the 
fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was 
perceived as a former enemy. Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of 
significant importance. For example, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship 
with Poland before Poland was even recognized by other countries. Further, com. 
Stalin summarized the meeting, saying that what the Yugoslav government is 
looking for in economic questions and in military matters can be arranged. A 
commission must be established to examine these questions. Tito informed com. 
Stalin of Yugoslavia’s relations with Hungary, notifying of Rakosi’s visit to 
Belgrade. Tito declared that the Yugoslav government had decided not to raise the 
question of Yugoslavia’s territorial demands against Hungary (demands on the 
Ban’skii triangle [“Baiskii triangle,” the region along the Hungarian- Yugoslav 
border centered on the city of Baia.]) in the Council of Ministers. Tito expressed his 
satisfaction with Yugoslavia’s signing of an agreement with Hungary on reparation 
payments. Com. Stalin noted that if Hungary wanted peaceful relations with 
Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia had to support these endeavors, bearing in mind that 
Yugoslavia’s primary difficulties were in its relations with Greece and Italy.  
 
Recorded by Lavrent’ev. 
 
[Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 397, ll. 
107-110. Published in Istoricheskii arkhiv, No. 2, 1993. Translated by Daniel Rozas.] 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin and the Yugoslav Government 
Delegation Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May 1946 
In the Kremlin  
27.V.46*, 23:00 hours. 
[*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.] [Translator’s note: the brackets used in the text are 
from the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document. Any brackets and 
notes by the English translator will hereafter be denoted by “trans.”] 
 
[Present:] Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent’ev, Tito, Marko, Kocha, Vlado, Kidrich, 
Neshkovich. 
 
Stalin: “Beautiful people, strong people.” 
[Stalin:] “A hardy nation.” 
Molotov: agreed. 
Stalin: Asks how was our trip. 
Tito [says] it went well... 
Stalin (chuckling, ironically): “How is my ‘friend’ [Russian word used in 
text] Shubashich?” 
Tito (similarly) [says], he is in Zagreb, in the coop. And also Grol. 
Stalin (similarly): “And how is my `friend’ [Russian word used in text] 
Grol?” 
Tito (similarly): “He’s in Belgrade”... 
[Tito:] “We always had measures to suppress them. The parties exist only 
formally, though in fact they don’t exist. In reality, only the Communist party 
exists.” 
Stalin chuckled pleasantly at this. 
Stalin: “What kind of crop will you have?” 
Tito: “An especially good one. The land has been well sown. In the passive 
regions it will be good. The assistance of UNRRA will not be needed. There will be 
lots of fruit.” 
Stalin: “Have you sown everything?” 
Tito: “Everything has been sown.” 
Stalin: “What is your plan? What would you like to raise [for discussion]?” 
Tito: puts forth economic and military questions. 
Stalin during the whole time: “We’ll help!” 
* [Stalin] “How are Kardelj and Djilas?” [* Here a line was moved from 
below where it is denoted by *__*.] 
T[ito]: “Well. We couldn’t all come, and so only half of the government is 
here.” 
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S[talin]: “The English and Americans don’t want to give you Trieste!” 
(chuckling). 
T[ito]: thanked for the support, [said] that the people send their greetings to 
Stalin and Molotov, [speaks] of the great political significance [of Soviet support]. 
Molotov: “But you still do not have Trieste...”. 
T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support] is of great pol[itical] importance... 
* During the time that Tito [...]*. 
 
[** Recorded by K. Popovich.]       27.V.46** 
23:00 h. 
…1) S[talin]: “On our part we made a proposal to your comrades, responsible 
for eco[nomic] questions, whether you would agree to the establishment of joint 
enterprises. We will hold nothing against you if you decline. Poland, for ex[ample], 
declined on the grounds that the Americans may, in their turn, raise questions of 
establishing joint enterprises.” 
T[ito]: “No, such is not my opinion nor the opinion of other leaders - [on the 
contrary, we think] it is necessary.” 
2) S[talin]: “...I agree to the establishment of these enterprises as you see 
fit...”.  
(M[olotov]: “In those fields that are more beneficial both for you and for us...”) 
S[talin]: expressed interest in where our oil and bauxite deposits are located. 
“You have very good bauxite.” 
T[ito] explained where the deposits were, as well as the locations Bora, 
Trepcha and Rasha - and that we have good coal, but not coke for house ovens. 
3) M[olotov said that] one of the Italian economic arguments for receiving 
Rasha is the fact that without it Italy would only be able to meet 20% of its demand. 
4) The army. 
S[talin]: “This is right, that in the event of war, because of the difficulty of 
supply, that [there ought to be] as much military industry in the country as is 
possible. It would be good to develop the aviation industry, given the rich bauxite 
deposits, and, as for artillery, the forging ought to be done within the country.” 
S[talin]: “For coastal defense, you need to build formations of fast, light, and 
mobile ships, for Italy will be left with a sufficiently strong Navy (about two 
squadrons).” 
T[ito]: “... In Boka Kotorska  ships of 30,000 tons can be stationed.” 
S[talin]: “These days they build ships of 60,000 tons. Currently we are having 
great difficulties in naval fleet construction, but we must assist you. I agree to assist 
you with equipment for munitions and light firearms factories. We will also assist 
you with cadres, who will help to organize officer improvement schools, which 
would in 1-2 years be turned into an Academy (on the level of the Frunze 
[Academy]).  
Shipments for the Y[ugoslav] A[rmy] will be made outside the framework of 
trade agreements - that is, free and on credit. 
It is very important that you have a naval fleet. We will assist you in the 
construction of shipyards and bases and corresponding nav[al] cadres. We will assist 
you with the extraction of oil. Together with munitions factories, it is important to 
reestablish arsenals, with which we will also assist you. It is necessary to examine 
the possibility of constructing aviation-engine factories.” 
5) Albania*. 
 152 
 
[Further, two lines are crossed out:”S[talin]: “What do you think of [doing] 
with Albania?” 
T[ito]: “Sign...”.]T[ito] [with regard to the naval fleet]: “We must know 
whether our border will be along Albania or the coast.” 
S[talin]: “What exactly are you proposing?” 
T[ito]: “To sign one good treaty to help Albania – a treaty to defend 
independence, this will help both in the given situation and with regard to the naval 
threat.” 
S[talin]: “This is a new formulation, but it ought to be examined and worked 
out. You worked out a good treaty with Czechia and found a new formulation: not 
only against Germany and its allies during the war, but also against its future allies. 
But one needs to think about it more and find an appropriate formulation.  
Right now is not the time for a federation (not with Bulgaria either). Most 
important now is the question of Trieste, and this must be decided first. But if you 
want a treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at the same time” (at 
this he chuckled). 
T[ito]: “Three times we put off Enver Hoxha’s visit to B[el]g[ra]de, since we 
were planning on a meeting with you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an 
agreement with Albania assuring [its—trans.] “sovereignty.” ***. 
[***Here text has been inserted from below, marked by 
******__******.]S[talin]: “Do you know Enver? What kind of person is he?**** 
[**** Further text is crossed out: “They were trying to visit us, but they do not want 
to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej to accompany him.” This phrase 
is printed in a slightly altered form further below.] Is he a communist? Are there any 
internal problems of their own - what is your information 
on this?” 
T[ito]: “I did not see Enver Hoxha [sic—trans.], he is a young man, but in the 
course of the war he became popular... 
****** We  will work out an agreement and foster circumstances for greater 
closeness.” 
S[talin] agreed.****** 
T[ito]: “...and in general, the government consists of young people. As far as 
we know, there aren’t any kind of special problems.” 
 S[talin]: “They were trying to come here, but they do not want to send Enver 
alone, but Kochi Dzodzej wants to come with him - as some kind of restraint. What 
do you know of this?” 
 T[ito]: “We are not aware [of this] nor of the presence of some kind of 
disagreements.” 
 S[talin]: “We are constantly putting off their visit. What do you think, should 
we receive them? We think that there is no need.” 
 T[ito]: “Yes, we can take care of everything with them.” 
 S[talin]: “Right now it would be inconvenient for us and for them. Better if 
we help them through you.” 
 S[talin]: after this, expressed the opinion that something is amiss in the 
Alb[anian] Politburo. 
 Marko: “Comrades in the Politburo do not see Env[er] Hoxha as a sufficiently 
solid party member, and thus they always insist on him being accompanied by Kochi 
Dzodzej as the most senior party member in the Politburo. At the April plenum they 
discussed the question of the 
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party line, especially with regard to Yugoslavia and the S[oviet] Union, and 
ascertained certain mistakes, and excluded Seifulla Maleshov from the Politburo as a 
bearer of these mistakes. Since then, the leadership has been more consistent.” 
 T[ito]: “We can resolve this question with them.” 
 S[talin]: “Good.” 
 6) Bulgaria. 
 S[talin]: “Are you currently in favor of a federation with Bulgaria?” 
 T[ito]: “No. Now is not the time. For they have not yet definitively resolved 
many things: the army, the bourg[eois] parties, the monarchy and the Bulg[arian] 
position on signing a peace treaty.” 
 S[talin]: “Correct, but they must be offered help.” 
 7) Hungary. 
 T[ito]: “We have no territ[orial] demands. Since the int[ernal] polit[ical] 
situation has been corrected there, we have dropped our territ[orial] demands in 
accordance with your advice.” 
 S[talin]: “Right. If you have good relations with your nor[thern] neighbor, 
then Greece will also look at you differently... And does Greece raise any demands 
with regard to Yugoslavia?” 
 T[ito]: “There were provocations against us, but not in recent times.” 
 S[talin]: “The Eng[lish] maintain an army there in order to prop up the 
reactionary forces, and yes, possibly for other reasons as well.” 
 T[ito]: (laughs): “We have demands against them: Aegean Maced[onia] and 
Salonikki.” 
 M[olotov]: “Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You need access to the 
Aegean sea.” 
 S[talin]: “Damn it* [*Russian words used in document.] Many comrades 
have gone to Bulg[aria], but things are not moving, not developing as they should. 
The com[munists] have influence, but they do not hold corresponding positions in 
the state apparatus. We should have told them to remove Stainov. Currently we have 
there the Sec[retary] of the Min[istry] of For[eign] Affairs.”** [**Russian word used 
in document.] 
 T[ito]: “I later explained to Rakosi that we demanded Petchui because of 
strat[egic] reasons and in order to help the Hung[arian] communists, since the 
reactionary forces were beginning to raise their heads.” 
 S[talin]: “And did they really believe you?..” 
 S[talin]: “And what further plans have you for tonight?” 
 T[ito]: “We don’t have [a plan].” 
 S[talin] (laughing): “Leadership, but without a state* [*Russian word used in 
document.] plan!” (laughing). 
 Vlado: “We accommodated ourselves to meet with you.” 
 S[talin]: “Then we can have a snack.”** [**Russian word used in text and 
alongside in brackets an explanation in Serbo-Croatian is given: “to eat something”.] 
 M[olotov]: “If you are inviting us, then with great pleasure.” 
At the villa*** 
[*** Russian words used in text with explanations in Serbo-Croatian alongside in 
brackets.] 
S[talin]. Regarding Togliatti: theoretician, journalist, can write a good article, 
a good  comrade, but to gather people and “guide” them - this he cannot do; he has 
difficult circumstances there.  
Torres [Thorez] and Duclos: good comrades.  
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Jose (Diaz) 43 was good, intelligent. Passionaria is not the same, she cannot 
gather and lead; at this difficult time she is in no condition to govern. In Rumania 
there are good young comrades. 
In Germany F. is a good leader, Pieck - “the father”**** [****Russian word 
used in document.], is gathering people and resolving various questions... Germans 
are nothing without orders.  
The International - there’s nothing to say.  
Referenda - “but it’s nonsense”*****  
[***** Russian words used in quotes in the document.]  
Warlike people are trying to draw in the Greeks.  
“Do you want another war, to have your backs beaten again, to have Slavs 
lose another ten million? - If you do not want this, then the Slavs must unite in a 
single front with the Sov[iet] Union.”  
The idea of revenge in Italy. 
Realism and idealism of Benes: realist, when shown strength, but would be an 
idealist if he felt he was in 
possession of strength (this is an answer to Tito’s remark: Benes is an English 
person, though a realist).  
“Firlinger will go with the communists.” 
Relations between Czechia and Poland: Entertaining as a pre-election 
maneuver; fact is, they did not undertake any dip[lomatic] steps. 
Yugoslavia is a democracy* [*further crossed out: “new”] of a special type 
(non-Soviet type), different from all others.  
“We are Serbs, Molotov and I ... we are two Serbs...”** [**Phrase composed 
of Russian words.]   
“Slovenian*** [***Russian word used in text.] mercenary intelligentsia. 
 Eucalyptus.  
“Tito must take care of himself, that nothing would happen to him ... for I will 
not live long ... laws of physiology..., but you will remain for Europe...”  
Churchill told him about Tito..., that he is “a good man.” - St[alin]: “I don’t 
know him, but if you say so, that means he must be good. I will try to meet him.”  
Let Djido come, so I could rest under his care... “I will cure my migraine 
under his care.” “Bevin - an English Noske” Vlado inquired about Marko, and after 
Marko, about Vlado... 
“Beriia - Marko - who will subvert whom?” 
 
[Source: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita. Fond Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije. I-1/7. L. 6-11. 
Original. Manuscript. Document obtained and translated into Russian by L. 
Gibianskii; translated 
into English by Daniel Rozas.] 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Report of Milovan Djilas about a Secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav Meeting 
10 February 1948. 
Kardelj and Vacaric arrived in Moscow on Sunday, February 8, and until Tuesday, 
February 10, nobody gave them any news. On Tuesday before noon Baranov phoned 
to say that Kardelj and the others should stay put, because in the evening, at nine 
o’clock we would be invited to the Kremlin. Lesakov told us that the Bulgarians 
arrived on Monday, but stressed that these were “the top guys” from Bulgaria—
Dimitrov, Kolarov and Trajco Kostov. Indeed, we were invited to the Kremlin at 
nine o’clock in the evening. We arrived punctually, but since the Bulgarians were 
late, we sat for 10-15 minutes in Stalin’s reception room, and when they joined us, 
we walked in [to Stalin’s office]. So, the meeting took place on Tuesday, February 
10, at 9:15 Moscow time, and it lasted about three hours. When we entered [the 
room], Soviet representatives were already there. Those present at the meeting were: 
Stalin (at the head of the table), Molotov, Malenkov, Zhdanov, Suslov and Zorin (to 
the right side from Stalin along the table), and Dimitrov, Kolarov, Kostov, Kardelj, 
Djilas, Vacaric (to the left side from Stalin along the table). Molotov spoke first. At 
first, he stressed that this was already a matter of serious disagreement between them 
[the Soviets] and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These disagreements were inadmissible 
both from the party and the state point of view. As examples of the serious discord he 
gave three: firstly, the conclusion of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Union— lack 
of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on 
the other hand; secondly, the declaration of Dimitrov about a Federation of East 
European and Balkan countries, including Greece — lack of coordination between 
the USSR, on one side, and Bulgaria, on the other; thirdly, the introduction of a 
Yugoslav division into Southern Albania (Korcha) — lack of coordination between 
the USSR, on one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other. As to the first point, he 
stresses that the Soviet government informed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian 
governments—and they agreed to this—that one should not conclude a treaty with 
Bulgaria until the expiration of limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty [with 
Bulgaria in 1946]. However, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments concluded the 
treaty, and the Soviet government learned about it from the newspapers. With regard 
to the second point he stresses that comrade Dimitrov grew too fond of press 
conferences. Meanwhile, if Dimitrov and Tito make announcements for the press, the 
whole world believes that such is also the view of the Soviet Union. At this moment, 
Stalin cut in to remind [us] that the Poles who were in Moscow in those days, spoke 
against [the Federation]. That means that the Soviet representatives first asked them 
what they thought of Dimitrov’s declaration. And they said that they agreed, but 
when Stalin told them that the Soviet Union was against it, they also said that they 
were against, but they had previously believed that this was a position and request of 
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Moscow. Stalin adds that the subsequent clarification by Dimitrov (he probably had 
in mind the announcement of the Bulgarian telegraph agency) explained nothing. 
Stalin quotes from this announcement that says how Austria-Hungary had thwarted a 
customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia, and adds that it means—the Germans 
had worked against a customs union, and now we do (i.e. the Soviet Union). Stalin 
adds that Dimitrov diverts attention from domestic issues to foreign affairs—
Federation, etc. Then Molotov passes to a third point of disagreement and stresses 
from the very beginning that they [in Moscow] accidentally learned about the entry 
of the Yugoslav troops into Albania. The Albanians told the Russians that they 
thought that the entry of the Yugoslav troops had been coordinated with the Soviet 
Union, and meanwhile it was not so. At that moment Molotov began citing some sort 
of dispatches, and Stalin told him to read them aloud. He asks Stalin which message 
he should read. Stalin leans [over] and points out [one]. Molotov reads a message 
from [Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia] Lavrent’ev about his meeting with Tito. 
From this reading, it becomes clear that the message is an answer to the question of 
the Soviet government if there is a decision about the entry of Yugoslav troops into 
Albania, and it says that such a decision—coordinated with Hoxha—really exists, 
that the motive comes from the notification about a probable attack against Albania; 
then the message points out that Tito said that he does not agree with Moscow that in 
case of an entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, the Anglo-Americans would 
intervene beyond a campaign in the press. Tito, according to the message, said that, 
if it came to anything serious, Yugoslavia and the USSR would sort it out 
[raskhlebivat kashu] together, however, after the Soviet demarche about this issue he 
would not send a division [to Albania]. At the end, Molotov points out that Tito did 
not inform them about his disagreement with Moscow. He stresses that 
disagreements are inadmissible both from the party and state viewpoint and that 
disagreements should be taken out [for discussion], and not concealed, and that it is 
necessary to inform and consult. One must be cautious with regard to press 
conferences. Following Molotov, Dimitrov spoke. He, as well as the other Bulgarians 
and Kardelj (he was the only one among the Yugoslavs who spoke), did not give his 
reasons coherently, because Stalin kept interrupting him. He said that what 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria publicized at Bled was not a treaty, but only a statement 
that a future treaty had been agreed upon. Soviet representatives affirm that they 
learned about this affair from newspapers, etc. Dimitrov stresses that Bulgaria’s 
economic difficulties are so serious that it cannot develop without cooperation with 
other countries. It is true that he got carried away at a press conference. Stalin 
interrupts and tells him that he wanted to shine with a new word, and that is wrong, 
and it is a mistake because such a Federation is not feasible. Dimitrov says that he 
did not target the USSR by his assertion that Austria-Hungary had blocked a 
Bulgarian-Serb customs union. He stresses, at last, that there are essentially no 
disagreements between the foreign policies of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Stalin 
interrupts and asserts that there are substantial differences and there is a practice of 
the Leninists—to recognize differences and mistakes and to liquidate them. Dimitrov 
says that they make mistakes because they are only learning foreign policy, but 
Stalin replies to this that he [Dimitrov] is a senior political figure who had been 
engaged in politics for forty years, and in his case it is not mistakes, but a different 
perception [than the USSR’s] (he [Stalin] said it two or three times during the 
meeting, addressing Dimitrov). As to the repeated emphasis by Dimitrov on the fact 
that Bulgaria must get closer with other countries for economic reasons, Stalin says 
that he agrees if one speaks of a customs union between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 
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but if one speaks of Romania (later, as I recall, he also mentioned Hungary), then he 
is against it. In general, when he spoke about such ties of Bulgaria with which the 
Soviet Union disagreed, most often [he] cited Romania as an example. It happens as 
a result of a clause about the customs union in the Bulgarian-Romanian treaty and 
because, I believe, that the joint Bulgarian-Romanian communiqué calls for 
coordination of plans between Romania and Bulgaria. These issues were raised at the 
meeting and often referred to by Soviet representatives. They have in mind a 
forthcoming conclusion of the treaties between Bulgaria and Hungary, and [Bulgaria 
and] other countries. Thus, Soviet criticism of Romanian-Bulgarian relations touches 
on future Bulgarian-Hungarian relations, and, obviously, on the relations of 
Yugoslavia with Hungary and Romania. Then Kolarov began to speak. He says 
about this part from the Bulgarian announcement regarding a customs union between 
Serbia and Bulgaria, where nobody meant to hint at the USSR, and as to the customs 
union between Romania and Bulgaria, the Romanians are also all for it. Besides, the 
Romanian-Bulgarian treaty had been earlier sent to the Soviet government and it 
already made only one amendment so that an article [on the joint defense] against 
any aggressor would be replaced by an article against Germany or a power that could 
be in alliance with it, and there were no comments on the Bulgarian-Romanian 
customs union. Then a brief exchange between Stalin and Molotov occurs. Molotov 
confirms what Kolarov says. Stalin stresses again that he is against the Bulgarian-
Romanian customs union, although Bulgarians have a reason to think otherwise, on 
the basis of dispatches. He stresses that he did not know that there was an article 
about a customs union in the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty that had been previously 
sent to the Soviet government. Dimitrov says that that it was the very cause why in 
his statement he went further than necessary. Stalin says to him that he [Dimitrov] 
wanted to surprise the whole world and adds that it looked like the secretary of the 
Comintern was explaining tediously and meticulously what should be done and how. 
[Stalin] says that this gives food to American reactionaries [reaktziia]. He then 
speaks about the significance of the American elections and [says] that one should be 
careful to do nothing to give the reactionaries arguments that could facilitate their 
victory. In his opinion, we should not give the reaction anything to snatch at [nikakoi 
zatsepki]. The current American government still contains itself, but money bags 
[denezhniie meshki] and sharks can come to power. The reactionaries in American, 
when they hear such statements, say that in Eastern Europe there is not only a bloc in 
the making, but [the countries] are merging into common states. He tells Dimitrov 
and the others that they are overdoing it [perebarshchivaiut], like the Young 
Communists and then like women take everything to the streets. Then he makes a 
linkage to the issue of Albania. The three world powers—the USSR, England, and 
America guaranteed Albania’s independence by a Special agreement. Albania is our 
weakest spot, because other states are either members of the United Nations, or 
recognized, etc., but Albania is not [recognized]. If Yugoslav troops entered Albania, 
the reactionaries in England and America would be able to use it and step forward as 
defenders of Albanian independence. Instead of sending troops we should work 
intensely to build up the Albanian army, we should teach the Albanians, and then, if 
they are attacked, let the Albanian Skupcina [parliament] appeal to Yugoslavia for 
help. He makes an example of China, where nobody can reproach the USSR, but the 
Chinese are fighting well and advancing; he then adds that the Albanians are not 
worse than the Chinese and they must be taught. Then he adds that we should sign a 
protocol about joint consultations. He says that the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs do 
not report anything [to the Soviets], and they [the Soviets] have to find out 
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everything on the street, usually ending up faced with a fait accompli Kostov then 
begins to complain how hard it is to be a small and undeveloped country. He would 
like to raise some economic issues. Stalin cuts him short and says that there are 
competent ministries to do it, and this is the discussion of the differences Kardelj 
starts to speak. On the first point [of disagreements] he says that it was not a treaty 
that was published, but only a communiqué about the discussion leading to a treaty; 
he adds that we [Yugoslavs and Bulgarians] were too hasty. This triggers an 
Exchange similar to that when Dimitrov made the same point. [Andrei] Zhdanov 
intervenes and says that they [in the Soviet Union] learned about this matter from the 
newspapers. On Albania he says that not informing them on that was a serious error. 
Stalin cuts in and says that we [in Yugoslavia] oversimplify this matter, but it is a 
complicated matter.18 Kardelj then mentioned the constant Greek provocations, the 
weakness of the Albanian army, and that we are linked to Albania economically and 
that we underwrite [soderzhim] its army. Two or three times Stalin interrupted. For 
instance, regarding a Greek invasion of Albania, he said that it was possible. Then he 
asked if the situation was really such that one should not have any faith in the 
Albanian army, and added that the Albanians must be taught and their army must be 
built up. Molotov says that they have no information about any kind of attack on 
Albania and wondered that we withhold our information from them. Then, reacting 
to Kardelj’s explanation that the anti-Albanian campaign in Greece is worsening, 
Stalin demanded [to know] if we believe in the victory of the Greek guerrillas. 
Kardelj responds that we do. Stalin says that recently he and the rest of his 
collaborators have had grave doubts about it. He says that one should assist Greece 
[i.e. guerrillas] if there are hopes of winning, and if not, then we should rethink and 
terminate the guerrilla movement. The Anglo-Americans will spare no effort to keep 
Greece [in their sphere], and the only serious obstacle [zakavika] for them is the fact 
that we assist the guerrillas. Molotov adds that we are constantly and Justifiably 
blamed for assistance to the guerrillas. Stalin says that if there are no conditions for 
victory, one must not be afraid to admit it. It is not for the first time in history that 
although there are no conditions now, they will appear later. Then Kolarov speaks 
and tells that the American, British and French embassies appealed to them 
[Bulgarians] with a warning not to recognize the government of Markos. Kolarov 
says that the American ambassador is courteous, but the British ambassador is 
arrogant. Stalin cuts in and says that it means that the American is a great scoundrel 
and they [ambassadors of the US and UK] always trade roles. Stalin also said that we 
should not link the future of our state with a victory of the guerrillas in Greece. On 
Dimitrov’s comment that a victory of the Monarchists-Fascists would seriously 
aggravate the situation in the Balkans, Stalin says that it is not proven. Then 
Dimitrov and Kolarov spoke about other matters that did not relate to the agenda of 
the meeting. Among other things, Molotov cited a paragraph from the Yugoslav-
Bulgarian treaty which read that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria would act in the spirit of 
the United Nations and would support all initiatives directed at the preservation of 
peace and against all hotbeds of aggression. Molotov cites from the treaty to reject 
Dimitrov’s attempts at a linkage between the struggle against “hotbeds of 
aggression” with the actions of the United Nations. Stalin adds that it would 
mean a preventive war which is a Komsomol [i.e. juvenile stunt, a loud phrase, 
material for the enemy. Stalin then tells a story, hinting at the Komsomol behavior, 
that there was a seaman in Leningrad after the revolution who condemned and 
threatened the whole world by radio.2Molotov then spoke about oats that Albania 
asked the USSR for, and that Tito had told Lavrent’ev that Yugoslavia would give 
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oats, and after that the Yugoslavs are instructing the Albanians to buy oats in 
Argentina. Stalin said half-jokingly that the Yugoslavs are afraid of having Russians 
in Albania and because of this are in a hurry to send their troops. He also said that the 
Bulgarians and Yugoslavs think that the USSR stands against a unification of 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but it does not want to admit it. Molotov raised some kind 
of a point from the Bulgarian-Romanian communiqué about the coordination of 
plans and mentioned that it would have been essentially a merger of these states. 
Stalin is categorical that this is inconceivable and that Dimitrov would soon see for 
himself that it is nonsense, and instead of cooperation it would bring about a quarrel 
between the Romanians and Bulgarians. Therefore mutual relations should be limited 
to trade agreements. Then Stalin laid out a Soviet view that in Eastern Europe one 
should create three federations—Polish- Czechoslovak, Romanian-Hungarian and 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian-Albanian. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia [he said] may unite 
tomorrow if they wish, there are no constraints on this, since Bulgaria today is a 
sovereign state. Kardelj says that we were not in a hurry to unify with Bulgaria and 
Albania, in view of international and domestic moments, but Stalin reacts to it by 
saying that it should not come too late, and that the conditions for that are ripe. At 
first, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria must unite, and then let Albania join them. This 
should be agreed upon through People’s Skupcina [parliaments], by the will of the 
peoples. Stalin thinks that one should begin with political unification and then it 
would be difficult [for the West] to attack Albania. As to a Bulgarian-Yugoslav 
unification, Stalin repeatedly stressed that this question has ripened, and one even 
began a discussion about the name of [a united] state. Then Kardelj returned to the 
issue about what after all one should do in Albania, but [Stalin’s] answer boiled 
down to what Stalin said earlier, i.e., the Albanian army ought to be taught, and that 
Albania should ask for assistance in case of aggression. As to oats, Kardelj says that 
it is possible that the enemy interfered to spoil Yugoslav-Soviet relations (Molotov 
kept silent). Then Kardelj says that he does not see any big differences between 
Yugoslavia and the USSR in foreign policy. Stalin interrupts him and says that it is 
incorrect, that there are differences and that to hide them would mean opportunism. 
We should not be afraid to recognize differences. Stalin stresses that even they, 
Lenin’s pupils, many times disagreed with him. They would have a quarrel on some 
issue, then talk it over, work out a position and move on. He believes that we should 
put the question more boldly about the guerrillas in Greece. Then he mentions the 
case of China again, but now he raises another aspect. In particular, that they [the 
Politburo] invited the Chinese comrades and considered that there were no conditions 
for successful uprising in China and that some kind of “modus vivendi” [with the 
Guomindang] had to be found. The Chinese comrades, according to Stalin, in words 
agreed with the Soviet comrades, but in practice kept accumulating forces. The 
Russians twice gave them assistance in weapons. And it turned out that the Chinese, 
not the Soviet comrades, were right, as Stalin says. But he does not believe that the 
case of the Greek guerrillas falls into the same category. On China he says that they 
[the Soviets] do not have their people there, except in Port Arthur [Lushunkov] 
which is a neutral zone according to the treaty with the Chinese government. He 
spoke about the tactics of the Chinese who avoided attacking cities until they had 
accumulated sufficient strength. Kardelj speaks again and says it was a mistake that 
we [the Yugoslavs] failed to inform them. Stalin interrupts him and says that it was 
not a mistake, it was a system [a policy] and that we do not inform them on anything. 
Then Stalin and Molotov propose a protocol on mutual coordination of foreign 
affairs. Kardelj agrees with that. Stalin proposes that we inquire of them [the Soviets] 
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on all questions of interest to us, and that they would also inform us about 
everything. Then Dimitrov diverted the conversation to economic and other issues. 
When Dimitrov says there are important economic issues, Stalin cut him short by 
remarking that he would speak about it with a joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian government. 
During subsequent discussion Stalin raised a question about how the Albanians 
would react to such a union, and Kardelj and Djilas explained to him that the 
Albanians would accept it well, because it would be in their national interests, 
considering that eight hundred thousand Albanians reside in Yugoslavia. Stalin also 
said with regard to Albania that one on our side [u nas odin] has already committed 
suicide, and that we want to overthrow Hoxha and that it should not be done hastily 
and crudely—“the boot on the throat”—but gradually and indirectly. Stalin says 
again that at first Yugoslavia and Bulgaria ought to unite, and then Albania should 
join them. And Albania must declare itself about its desire to join. Then Kostov 
raised the question that the [Bulgarian-Soviet] treaty about technical assistance, also 
about patents, licensing and authors’ rights, is not favorable for the Bulgarians (he 
failed to mention if this treaty has already been signed). Molotov said that this matter 
will need consideration, and Stalin said that Kostov should submit a note [to 
Molotov]. Then we discussed the answer of the Sovinformburo to the slander of the 
Americans regarding [their] publication of the documents on Soviet-German 
relations. Kardelj gave a positive assessment to the answer published in Pravda and 
Dimitrov says that the Western powers wanted to unite with Germany against the 
USSR. Stalin replies that he had nothing to hide [on vse vynosit otkrito], and the 
Western powers did not speak openly, in particular that Europe without Russia 
means against Russia. Molotov remarks during the conversation that the Bulgarians 
do not put enough camouflage on the number of their troops and that it exceeds the 
clauses [about limits] in the Peace Treaty, and the Bulgarians may be criticized for it. 
Dimitrov said to this that, on the contrary, the number is even below the limit 
stipulated by the Peace Treaty. Molotov was satisfied with that [answer] and did not 
mention it again. Dimitrov raised the issue about the conclusion of a treaty on mutual 
assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria. He stressed that it would be of great 
significance for Bulgaria. Stalin agreed with this, but added that among the Quisling 
countries [the USSR] would first conclude treaties with neighbors: with Romania—
this treaty is almost ready, with Hungary and Finland. Then Stalin underlines that we 
(i.e. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) must build up our economy, culture, army, and that a 
federation is an abstraction. Suddenly Stalin asked about “our friend Pijade,” Kardelj 
told him that he is working on our legislation. Kardelj asked [the Soviets] about their 
opinion what answer should be given to the Italian government who asked the 
Yugoslav government to support Italian claims to govern their former colonies. 
Stalin said that these demands must be supported and asked Molotov how [the Soviet 
side] responded. Molotov says that they still have to respond and that he believes 
they should wait. Stalin told them that there is no point in waiting and the answer 
should be sent immediately. He said that former Italian colonies should be put under 
Italian governance [trusteeship] and remarked that kings, when they could not agree 
over the booty, used to give [disputed] land to a weakest feudal so they could snatch 
it from him later at some opportune moment, and those feudal lords invited a 
foreigner to rule them so they could easily overthrow him when they become fed up 
with him. On this note the conversation ended. I would remind [napominaiu] that the 
criticism of Dimitrov by Stalin, although rough in form, was expressed in friendly 
tones. This report was composed on the basis of notes taken at the meeting and from 
memory.  
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[Source: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Fond Kabinet Marshala Jugoslavije I-3-b-651, 
ll.33-40. Translated by Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive)] 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
Military Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Yugoslavia. 
 
November 14, 1951. 
  
 The Governments of the United States of America and the Federal People's 
Republic of Yugoslavia;  
Desiring to foster international peace and security within the framework of the 
Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of 
nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate 
effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of 
those purposes and principles;  
Reaffirming their determination to give their full cooperation to the efforts to 
provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated by the Charter and to 
obtain agreement on universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate 
guaranty against violations;  
Taking into consideration the support that the Government of the United States 
of America has brought to these principles by enacting the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Act of 1949,(2) as amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951,(3) 
which provide for the furnishing of military assistance to certain nations;  
Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the furnishing of such 
assistance;  
Have agreed as follows:  
Article I 
1. The Government of the United States of America will make or continue to 
make available to the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 
equipment, materials, services, or other assistance in accordance with such terms and 
conditions as may be agreed. The furnishing of such assistance shall be consistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations. Such assistance will be furnished under the 
provisions, and subject to all of the terms, conditions and termination provisions, of 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, 
acts amendatory and supplementary thereto and appropriation acts thereunder. The 
two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary 
to carry out the provisions of this paragraph.  
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2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will use the 
assistance exclusively in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter the United 
Nations for the promotion of international peace and security and for strengthening 
the defenses of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia against aggression.  
3. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia undertakes 
not to transfer to any person not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any 
other nation, title to or possession of any equipment, materials, information, or 
services, received on a grant basis, without the prior consent of the Government of 
the United States of America.  
4. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will provide 
the United States of America with reciprocal assistance by continuing to facilitate the 
production and transfer to the United States of America in such quantities and upon 
such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, of raw and semi-processed materials 
required by the United States of America as a result of deficiencies or potential 
deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Yugoslavia. 
Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to requirements of Yugoslavia 
for domestic use and commercial export.  
Article II 
1. Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent with security to 
keep the public informed of operations under this: Agreement.  
2. Each Government will take such security measures as may be agreed in each 
case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise 
of classified military articles, services or information furnished pursuant to this 
Agreement.  
Article III 
The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, negotiate 
appropriate arrangements between them respecting responsibility for patent or 
similar claims based on the use of devices, processes, technological information or 
other forms of property protected by law in connection with equipment, materials or 
services furnished pursuant to this Agreement. In such negotiations consideration 
shall be given to the inclusion of an undertaking whereby each Government will 
assume the responsibility for all such claims of its nationals and such claims arising 
in its jurisdiction of nationals of any country not a party to this Agreement.  
Article IV 
1. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia undertakes 
to make available to the Government of the United States of America diners for the 
use of the latter Government for its administrative and operating expenditures in 
connection with carrying out this Agreement. The two Governments will forthwith 
initiate discussions with a view to determining the amount of such diners and to 
agreeing upon arrangements for the furnishing of such diners.  
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2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia will, except 
as otherwise agreed to, grant duty free treatment and exemption from taxation upon 
importation or exportation to products, property, materials or equipment imported 
into or exported from its territory in connection with this Agreement or any similar 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
government of any other country receiving military assistance.  
Article V 
The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia agrees to 
receive personnel of the Government of the United States of America who will 
discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the United States 
of America under this Agreement and who will be accorded facilities to observe the 
progress of the assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. It is understood 
between the two Governments that the number of such personnel will be kept as low 
as possible. Such personnel who are United States nationals, including personnel 
temporarily assigned, will, in their relations with the Government of the Federal 
People's Republic of Yugoslavia, operate as a part of the Embassy of the United 
States of America under the direction and control of the Chief of the Diplomatic 
Mission, and will have the same status as that of other personnel with corresponding 
rank of the Embassy of the United States of America who are United States 
nationals. Upon appropriate notification by the Government of the United States of 
America full diplomatic status will be granted to an agreed number of the personnel 
assigned thereto.  
Article VI 
1. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia reaffirms 
that it will continue to join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, 
and in maintaining world peace; to make, consistent with its political and economic 
stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities, and 
general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own 
defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free world; and to take all 
reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities.  
2. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia undertakes 
to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of 
international tension.  
3. The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia agrees to 
take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization of the economic and military 
assistance provided by the Government of the United States of America.  
Article VII 
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature and will 
continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Party of written notice of 
the intention of the other Party to terminate it, provided that the provisions of Article 
I, paragraphs 2 and 3, and arrangements entered into under Article II, paragraph 2, 
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and under Article III, shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed bar the two 
Governments.  
2. The Government of the United States of America reserves the right at any 
time to suspend its assistance to Yugoslavia made available pursuant to this 
Agreement, including deliveries of all supplies scheduled but not yet transferred.  
3. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them consult 
regarding any matter relating to the application of this Agreement or to operations or 
arrangements carried out pursuant to this Agreement.  
4. The terms of this Agreement may at any time be reviewed at the request of 
either Government or amended by agreement between the two Governments  
5. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary General of the United 
Nations.  
Done at Belgrade, in duplicate in the English and Serbo-Croat languages, this 
fourteenth day of November, 1951.  
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APPENDIX V 
 
Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration Between the Turkish Republic, The 
Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 
February 28, 1953 
The Contracting Parties,  
Reaffirming their faith in the principles set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations;  
Being resolved to live at peace with all nations and to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace;  
Desiring to strengthen the friendly relations existing between them;  
Being determined to defend the liberty and independence of their peoples as 
well as their territorial integrity from any compulsion from without;  
Being resolved to unite their efforts to render more effective the organization of 
their defense against any foreign aggression, and to consult one another and 
collaborate on every matter of common interest, particularly on matters concerning 
their defense;  
Being convinced that the common interests of their peoples and of all peaceful 
nations require appropriate measures to safeguard peace and security in this part of 
the world, pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,  
Have decided to conclude the present Treaty, and their Heads of State have 
appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:  
who, having presented their full powers, found to be in good and due form, 
have agreed upon the following provisions:  
Article I 
In order to ensure their permanent collaboration, the Contracting Parties will 
consult on all problems of common interest. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
Contracting Parties, shall meet regularly in conference once a year, and more often if 
it is considered necessary, in order to study the international political situation and to 
take the necessary decision, in conformity with the purposes of the present Treaty.  
Article II 
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The Contracting Parties intend to continue their common efforts for the 
safeguarding of peace and security in their area and to pursue in common the study 
of the problems of their security, including common measures of defense the need 
for which might arise in the event of unprovoked aggression against them.  
Article III 
The General Staffs of the Contracting Parties shall continue their collaboration 
in order to submit to their Governments recommendations concerning questions of 
defense that are formulated by mutual agreement, with a view to the making of co-
ordinated decisions.  
Article IV 
The Contracting Parties will carry on their collaboration in the economic, 
cultural, and technical fields; in cases where it is considered advisable, appropriate 
agreements shall be concluded and the necessary agencies shall be established to 
resolve economic, technical, and cultural problems.  
Article V 
The Contracting Parties undertake to settle any dispute between them by such 
peaceful means as are specified in the Charter of the United Nations, and in a spirit 
of understanding and friendship; each Contracting Party also undertakes to refrain 
from any interference in the domestic affairs of the other parties.  
Article VI 
The Contracting Parties will refrain from concluding an alliance or from 
participating in an action directed against any one of them or of such nature as to 
prejudice its interests.  
Article VII 
The Contracting Parties declare, in so far as they are respectively concerned, 
that none of the international commitments now in force between them and one or 
more other States is in contradiction with the provisions of the present Treaty; 
furthermore, they assume the obligation not to sign in the future any international 
commitment that might be in conflict with the present Treaty.  
Article VIII 
This Treaty does not affect and cannot be interpreted as affecting in any way the 
rights and obligations of Turkey and Greece under the North Atlantic Treaty of April 
4, 1949.  
Article IX 
After the entry into force of the present Treaty, any other State whose 
collaboration is considered by all the Contracting Parties to be useful for the 
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accomplishment of the purposes of this Treaty may adhere to it under the same 
conditions and with the same rights as the three Signatory States.  
An adhering State will become a party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument 
of accession.  
Article X 
The present Treaty, the French text of which shall be authentic, shall be ratified 
by each of the Contracting and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with 
the Secretary of State of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade; it 
shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification.  
At the end of five years after the entry into force of the present Treaty, a 
Contracting Party may cease to be a party to this Treaty by a declaration addressed, 
one year in advance, to the Governments of the other Contracting Parties.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.  
Done at Ankara, this 28th day of February, one thousand nine hundred and 
fifty-three, in three originals, one of which has been delivered to each of the 
Contracting Parties.  
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APPENDIX VI 
 
Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the 
Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of 
Yugoslavia, August 9, 1954 
The Contracting Parties,  
Reaffirming their faith in the principles set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations and their desire to contribute, by co-ordinating their efforts, to the 
safeguarding of peace, the strengthening of security and the development of 
international cooperation;  
Resolved to ensure in the most effective manner the territorial integrity as well 
as the political independence of their countries in accordance with the principles and 
provisions of the United Nations Charter;  
Animated by the desire to widen and reinforce the bases of friendship and 
cooperation established in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between their 
countries, signed at Ankara on February 28, 1953, which proved to be an extremely 
effective instrument;  
Having in view that the said Treaty has always been considered an initial step 
toward an alliance;  
Considering that the conclusion of such an alliance is necessary;  
Convinced, furthermore, that the institution of a system of collective security 
among them through a treaty of alliance would not only constitute a decisive factor 
for their own security and independence, but would also benefit all the other 
countries adhering to the cause of a just and equitable peace, especially those situated 
in their area;  
Have decided to conclude the present Treaty and, for this purpose, have 
appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:  
who, having exhibited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have 
agreed on the following provisions:  
 
Article I 
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The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, to settle by peaceful means any international dispute in which they may be 
involved, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.  
Article II 
The Contracting Parties agree that any armed aggression against one or more of 
them in any part of their territories shall be considered an aggression against all the 
Contracting Parties, who, consequently, in the exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
shall jointly and severally go to the assistance of the Party or Parties attacked by 
taking immediately and by common accord any measures, including the use of armed 
force, which they deem necessary for effective defense.  
The Contracting Parties undertake, without prejudice to Article VII of the 
present Treaty, not to conclude peace or any other arrangement with the aggressor in 
the absence of a prior mutual agreement between the Parties.  
Article III 
To ensure in a continuous and effective manner the attainment of the objectives 
of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties undertake to assist each other to 
maintain and strengthen their defensive capacity.  
Article IV 
With a view to ensuring the effective application of the present Treaty, it is 
agreed as follows:  
1. There is hereby established a Permanent Council to be composed of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and any other members of the Governments of the 
Contracting Parties whose presence might be required by the needs of the situation 
and the nature of the subjects to be treated.  
The Permanent Council shall meet regularly twice a year. It may hold additional 
meetings whenever the Governments of all the Contracting Parties deem this 
necessary  
When the Permanent Council is not in session, it shall perform its functions 
through the Permanent Secretariat of the Treaty of Ankara according to a procedure 
to be determined.  
The Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs provided for in Article I of the 
Treaty of Ankara shall be replaced by the Permanent Council.  
Decisions of the Permanent Council on substantive matters shall be taken by 
unanimous agreement.  
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2. The General Staffs of the Contracting Parties shall continue their common 
task begun in application of Articles II and III of the Treaty of Ankara, with due 
regard to the provisions of the present Treaty.  
Article V 
As soon as the situation envisaged in Article II of the present Treaty occurs, the 
Contracting Parties will consult immediately and the Permanent Council shall meet 
at once in order to determine the measures which should be taken in addition to those 
already adopted pursuant to the aforesaid Article II, referred to above and which it 
would be necessary to take jointly in order to meet the situation.  
Article VI 
In the event of serious deterioration of the international situation, and more 
particularly in the areas where such deterioration might have a negative effect, 
whether direct or indirect, on the security of their area, the Contracting Parties will 
consult each other with a view to examining the situation and to determining their 
attitude.  
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that an armed aggression against a country 
other than one of them may, by spreading, threaten directly or indirectly the security 
and the integrity of one or more of them, agree as follows:  
In the event of an armed aggression against a country toward which one or more 
Contracting Parties has or have, at the time of signature of the present Treaty, 
obligations of mutual assistance, the Contracting Parties will consult each other 
regarding the measures which should be taken in accordance with the purposes of the 
United Nations and in order to meet the situation thus created in their area.  
It is understood that the consultations referred to in this article might include an 
emergency meeting of the Permanent Council.  
Article VII 
The Contracting Parties will immediately inform the United Nations Security 
Council of any armed aggression against them, and of the measures of self-defense 
which have been taken; they will discontinue the said measures when the Security 
Council has effectively applied those mentioned in Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.  
Likewise, the Governments of the Contracting Parties will immediately make 
the public statement provided for in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
No. 378 (V) A of November 17, 1950 (2) relating to the duties of States in the event 
of an outbreak of hostilities, and they will act in accordance with the said Resolution.  
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Article VIII 
The Contracting Parties reaffirm their decision not to participate in any 
coalition directed against any one of them and not to make any commitment 
incompatible with the provisions of the present Treaty.  
Article IX 
The provisions of the present Treaty do not affect and shall not be interpreted as 
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the 
United Nations.  
Article X 
The provisions of the present Treaty do not affect and shall not be interpreted as 
affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Greece and Turkey resulting from 
the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949.  
Article XI 
The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation concluded between the Contracting 
Parties at Ankara on February 28, 1953 shall remain in force in so far as it is not 
modified by the provisions of the present Treaty.  
The Contracting Parties agree to apply the provisions of Article XIII of the 
present Treaty in respect of the duration of the Treaty of Ankara.  
Article XII 
The provisions of Article IX of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 
February 28 shall apply to the present Treaty under the same conditions.  
Article XIII 
The present Treaty is concluded for a period of twenty years.  
If none of the Contracting Parties denounces this Treaty one year before its 
expiration, it shall automatically be extended for one more year, and so on until it is 
denounced by one of the Contracting Parties.  
Article XIV 
The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance 
with their respective constitutional processes. It shall enter into force on the date of 
deposit of the last instrument of ratification.  
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Kingdom of Greece.  
The Treaty shall be registered with the United Nations.  
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It has been drawn up in the French language three identical copies, one of 
which is to be delivered to each of the Contracting Parties.  
In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Parties have affixed 
their signatures hereto.  
Done at Bled, August 9, 1954.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
